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Redefining safety: An analysis of cultural and international safe havens in the context of genocidal violence

Antonella Regueiro

Nova Southeastern University, aregu003@gmail.com

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Redefining safety:
An analysis of cultural and international safe havens in the context of genocidal violence

by

Antonella Regueiro Fernandez

A Dissertation Presented to the
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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
Antonella Regueiro Fernandez
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Nova Southeastern University
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences


This dissertation was submitted by Antonella Regueiro Fernandez under the direction of the chair of the dissertation committee listed below. It was submitted to the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences and approved in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

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
Approved:


Dustin Berna Ph.D.
Chair


Robin Cooper, Ph.D.


Gary P. Gershman, J.D., Ph.D.

4/14/17
Date of Final Approval


Dustin Berna, Ph.D.
Chair

Dedication

To my mother, whose persistence, sacrifice and unconditional love has provided me with the opportunities to follow my dreams. It has not always been easy, but you never gave up.

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Abstract

The international community has shied away from instituting safe havens in conflict zones since the fall of Srebreniça in 1995. However, a look at the roles of safe havens in genocidal violence provides a deeper understanding of the need for these spaces to be established in a timely fashion. The strategic use of cultural safe havens as places for mass violence, necessitates the establishment of international safe havens for the protection of the targeted population, yet an analysis of the relationship between cultural safe havens and international safe havens has not been done before. As such, this research seeks to shed light on the relationship between the use of cultural safe havens, their inherent danger in cases of genocide, and the need for better models for international safe havens in times of violence. It is the researcher's argument that to achieve this, the very perception of safety must be reimagined. Using content analysis methodology in the form of case studies, along with historical sociology, this research analyzes accounts of genocidal campaigns – Armenia, Rwanda and Bosnia – to explain the relationship between the dangers of cultural safe havens and the subsequent need for international safe havens that are established in time to save the victimized populations.

Chapter 1: Introduction

“The victims, trusting in the solace of religion and the inviolability of the church, sought shelter in the one place they thought would provide them with sanctuary”

– Paul R. Bartrop

Introduction

Churches in Rwanda stand today as vivid reminders of tragedy. Inside, traces of bloodshed and bullet holes paint a picture that is both clear and disturbing, as they not only point to the massive loss of life that occurred in the spring of 1994, but also to the equally important loss of preconceived notions of safety. The latter is a loss that became a staple of the Rwandan genocide, as places that had before been secure in times of conflict transformed into the harbingers of death for thousands of people seeking refuge within their walls. In the Nyarubuye church compound alone, an estimated 20,000 Tutsi lost their lives in a span of three days (Bartrop, 2014); their bodies either left to rot or buried in mass graves without much ceremony.

In Rwanda, women, children and men, sought refuge in their churches, in their schools, in their convents and monasteries, all of which were places that had protected them before through repeated instances of violence. Yet they found their conceptions of safety betrayed, as *Interahamwe* and other perpetrators decimated the sanctity of these spaces with grenades, machetes, acts of rape and mass killings. There was no safety in Rwanda, no haven to be had in any of the spaces so many had trusted before. Here, the effectiveness of the genocide was complimented by the use of safe havens as strategic places for mass killings.

Yet Rwanda is not alone in these occurrences. Places such as churches, schools, and hospitals, have historically been shaped into symbols of sanctuary and hope. This has occurred through a variety of ways, including the formalized protection of these spaces in international humanitarian law. Consequently, they have transformed into spaces that are sometimes embedded in collective consciousness as places of safety and security, which leads victims to seek safety within these spaces in times of conflict. This occurs even when these spaces have often proved counterproductive in offering protection from violence. A fact that shows how deeply embedded some of these ideas can be in collective consciousness.

This has occurred throughout history in cases of conflict, from the Massacre at Drogheda in 1649, which was perpetrated by Cromwell, and in which “one thousand unresisting victims were immolated together within the walls of the great church, whither they had fled for protection” (Lingard, 1840, p. 19), to the synagogues in Nazi Germany. For example, on July 4, 1941, the German forces burned down the Great Choral Synagogue with hundreds inside. The synagogue had been used by Jewish refugees from surrounding cities who had gone to Riga seeking shelter from the violence. German forces locked the sheltered refugees along with more Jews from the neighborhood and set the building on fire. Press (2000) states, “(t)he screams of burning victims could be heard over a great distance and filled the souls of the people in the neighboring houses with horror” (p. 46). The use of perceived safe spaces as places for mass violence has been pervasive throughout history and yet their use remains an integral part of victim behavior

in cases of mass violence. This is understandably so, as many are not provided any other options for protection in times of violence.

When speaking of safe havens, it is important to note that there are two different types that can be easily recognized: Cultural safe havens, and international safe havens. In a cultural context, places of worship, schools, convents and missions, police stations and other government buildings, can all be identified as places that are preconceived as safe and which have fallen victim to violence in a myriad of instances. In an international context, places labeled as safe areas, safe zones or humanitarian zones, are all established by the international community in cases of mass violence and have also often been witness to violence regardless of international conventions for their protection. There are several differences between these two types of safe havens.

On the one hand, cultural safe havens are innately present in the community and are usually established as communal centers in which much of daily life occurs. These spaces are often central in both communal life and identity. An example can be found in both the churches and mission complexes embedded in the Armenian community during the Armenian genocide. In this case, churches were an essential part of the Armenian identity, as the community sought to keep its religion and traditions alive under the rule of an empire that did not wish them to exist. In a similar manner, missions had become embedded in Armenian culture as places for protection because it was the missionaries who acted on behalf of the Armenians throughout repeated bouts of violence in the Ottoman Empire. As such, when violence broke in 1915, the Armenians looked for protection in churches and mission complexes.

On the other hand, international safe havens are imposed by outsiders to the conflict, since it takes the consent of the international community to establish spaces that are specifically designated to provide safety. International safe havens have been used seldom, with the most well-known cases being those in Iraq during the 1990s, in Bosnia between 1993-1995, and in Rwanda in 1994. These spaces are created within the area of conflict and are protected by an international contingent made up of international troops. Most times, these spaces are monitored by the United Nations Peacekeeping forces, but their defense and survival is often contingent on the presence of forces with broader mandates that allow them to act on behalf of those seeking refuge inside.

Overall, the existence of safe havens, both at the cultural and international levels, may sometimes prove more harmful than expected because these places allow for the consolidation of the victimized populations in one area, consequently transforming what would otherwise be a scattered group of individuals, into a massive target for destruction. This is particularly true in the context of cultural safe havens, as no measures of protection are established in these cultural centers and their protection hinges solely in the reluctance of the perpetrators to desecrate these spaces. This is part of the reason why international safe havens are important, as their existence can ameliorate the circumstances for the victimized populations and at times provide ample protection which, although not perfect, is more than any cultural center could offer.

The meaning imbued on these structures prior to the conflicts sometimes determines the behavior of the victimized population. This concept of safety that is embedded in structures such as churches, hospitals and schools, is one that is socially

constructed, yet it does not assess the true value of safety of these spaces in cases of violence regardless of historical proof to the contrary. In fact, it is sometimes this perceived safety what makes them vulnerable to attack, as perpetrators recognize their importance in the culture of the targeted population, and thus find the use of these structures as advantageous to their cause of extermination.

Instances that depict the use of safe havens as places for mass violence can be found in the former Ottoman Empire, Bosnia, East Timor, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Nazi-occupied Europe, among others. The analysis of these instances of failure, as well as of those in which safe havens succeeded, is crucial in constructing a new concept of safety that could potentially provide members of the targeted populations with information that may determine their survival. In addition, a thorough understanding of this phenomenon could diminish the numbers of corpses on the ground by enabling the formulation of strategies for intervention that prioritize these places and provide enduring international safe havens that can deliver the promise of safety they so often break. Knowing which cultural spaces are more likely to be used by victimized groups in cases of mass violence, may be a determining factor in deciding where to send rapid deployment troops for their protection while the international community establishes effective international safe havens.

The discussion regarding the possible danger of safe spaces, often revolves around the Rwandan genocide. Yet this narrow focus denies that the possible dangers of these spaces is not exclusive to the Rwandan experience, and fails to explore similar experiences such as those in the Armenian genocide. Thus, the main purpose of this

research is to broaden the scope of the conversation about the potential dangers of safe havens, and to point out that the decimation of safety is a recurrent pattern in genocidal campaigns, which should be taken into consideration when developing an understanding of the international community's ability to protect the targeted populations. The fact that both cultural (churches, schools, hospital, etc...) and international (humanitarian zones, safe areas, safe zones, etc...) safe havens have been repeatedly reduced to places for mass violence, speaks to the potential danger for the victimized populations who are often killed within the walls of spaces they thought of as safe during conflict. However, this factor also speaks to the need for new models of protection that understand that although safety cannot be total at times, not providing such safety may be even more detrimental to the victims seeking refuge in their communal spaces.

An interdisciplinary approach will be needed when seeking solutions to this problem, as it cannot be left to only one field of study to completely resolve these issues. Fields such as sociology, history, conflict resolution and genocide studies, can be used to merge theory and practice in ways that will allow for the protection of the population within these spaces. Conflict Resolution may prove imperative in the development of new ideas for the prevention of mass violence that transcend the theoretical realm and become practical solutions.

Perhaps what needs to be worked on by scholars and activists alike is the reshaping of the very concept of safety ascribed to both cultural and international safe havens, as it is their perception of safety that shapes much of victim behavior in cases of mass violence. To achieve this, the true value of safety of these spaces must be

established by looking at their prescribed roles and their historical use throughout genocidal campaigns. In addition, a new understanding of safety must include the premise that safety can rarely be total. Reframing the conversation surrounding safe havens is essential in the development of new and efficient solutions to mass violence.

What is a Safe Haven?

International safe havens as concepts in international humanitarian law are found as early as The Hague Convention of 1899, in which areas that were undefended were deemed off-limits for attack by warring parties. This premise later evolved through a variety of legal conventions that culminated in the Geneva Convention of 1949. The conventional model of safe havens was seen in places like Sri Lanka, in which parties to the conflict agreed to create neutral zones for non-combatants. However, these ideas did not become engrained in the international community until the humanitarian abuses of Saddam Hussein's government on the Kurd population in the 1990s, when safe zones were created to protect the targeted population (Kabia, 2009). These efforts at creating safe zones were repeated in the former Yugoslavia when tensions ignited into violence and the Security Council's Resolution 824 declared six cities in Bosnia as safe areas where there would be a "cessation of armed attacks or any hostile act" as well as "the withdrawal of all Bosnia Serb military or paramilitary units from these towns" (SCR 824, 1993, p. 2). Similar efforts were made in Rwanda, in 1994, through the creation of humanitarian zones.

Safe havens have been created in many different areas of conflict, not only within the context of genocidal violence. For example, a report pertaining sexual violence and

shelter released by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and written by the Human Rights Center at the University of California, defined safe shelters as “any physical space or network of spaces that exclusively or incidentally offers temporary safety to individuals” (Human Rights Center, 2013). As such, the premise of safe haven can fluctuate to encompass small spaces, such as classrooms, to entire areas, such as sanctuary cities or humanitarian zones. At the international level, the premise of safe haven has always involved entire zones or areas that have been designated as places of protection for the persecuted.

The definition of safe haven as a place in which safety is guaranteed is relevant for the understanding of safe havens at the cultural and international level. Culturally, safe havens tend to be spaces that are central to communal life and that are implanted in the collective consciousness as places to run to in times of conflict because they provide temporary shelter throughout the violence. These are often places that have historically provided temporary safety to individuals in times of need. The development of the collective awareness that labels some places as safe while not labeling others, may occur through a variety of ways, including the promotion of these structures as neutral ground during a conflict by deeply held communal beliefs, or even by the physical construction of these buildings as structures that are stronger and more resistant than the rest of the buildings in any given community.

In states where genocide is occurring, the role of cultural spaces will vary according to both the history and context of the violence. In some cases, such as in Rwanda, these spaces have been previously used for shelter in times of non-genocidal

violence and have proven successful at providing safety, thus ensuring that the next time violence arises these spaces will be used again for safety. In other cases, such as in Armenia, cultural spaces are some of the only available options for safety and even a history of violence within them will not deter targeted groups from seeking shelter in them. Still in other cases, such as in Bosnia, cultural spaces are often targeted for destruction from the onset of violence and cannot provide any type of protection to the victimized population, which itself does not seek refuge within them.

The original concept of international safe havens promoted during the Gulf War still stands, with definitional demarcations between Safe Areas and Safe Havens. The former “are locations cordoned off where conflict is either imminent or under way between two or more groups and where a targeted population, usually civilians, is offered protection from the aggressors” (Totten & Bartrop, 2008, p. 384). The latter “are designated areas established to protect a group of people from persecution and violence” (Totten & Bartrop, 2008, p. 384). However, the difference between both seems to be linguistic and not operational, as both safe havens and safe areas are meant to protect the victimized populations and both are usually established by third parties, such as the United Nations. In Bosnia, for example, safe areas were established in six different cities, including Srebreniça, which became infamous for its failure to protect the refugees. However, although identified as ‘safe areas’ they worked equally as ‘safe havens’ in which cities were designated areas established to protect the Bosnian Muslims from persecution and violence.

Although specifically established for the protection of targeted groups, these places have sometimes failed at successfully attaining this goal, yet they undoubtedly succeed at attracting large groups of victims in search of refuge. The fact that these places are established by third parties and are internationally sanctioned, means that victimized peoples see these places as ensuring their safety. The existence of international humanitarian laws and global organizations such as the United Nations, provide individuals with an expectation of safety by international actors that claim to work for the benefit of all peoples, and who have created conventions for the punishment of crimes such as genocide. As such, international safe havens can also be engrained in a modern cultural conception of human rights. Consequently, many people are incentivized to flee to these spaces when they are established. Yet this is problematic when international actors are unable to keep their promises of safety. In many cases, the same actors that establish international safe havens find themselves becoming witnesses to mass atrocities. This must force the international community to assess the true value of safety of these spaces, and work to enhance the practice of building safe havens even when safety itself will never be total.

In states where genocide is occurring, international safe havens are often the only hope for targeted populations, as the laws of war prescribed in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are moot in conflicts that seek the total extermination of specific groups of peoples. The premise of respect for non-combatants defined in Article 51, Section 2, of *Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions* (1977) (“ICRC Database” n.d.), as prohibiting attacks and/or threats of violence against the civilian population, is lost in

genocidal states because it is the civilians who are the largest target for the perpetrators. After all, the intent to exterminate a specific group must, by its very nature, include the extermination of non-combatants. Thus, places of refuge that can be trusted are essential for the survival of many of the targeted individuals.

It is for this reason that the roles of safe havens in cases of genocide must be analyzed, to find a way to ensure that the establishment of these spaces can accurately protect the persecuted. Succeeding at this goal will not only save the lives of those inside them, but also validate the existing preconceptions of these spaces as safe in times of conflict. Failing to understand the issues related to the relationship between the dangers of cultural safe havens and the need for better international safe havens will be detrimental to the efforts at preventing genocide. While the establishment of safe havens is not the only way to protect the victimized groups, it is indeed an important tool to be used when violence has escalated and immediate action is needed to ensure the survival of as many people as possible. In addition, the dangers of cultural spaces must be understood as being intricately related to the development of effective preventive measures that can ensure the safety of the refugees within internationally sanctioned spaces, because the use of cultural spaces is often only a result of a lack of available opportunities for other forms of protection. As such, success in the implementation of international safe havens may diminish the use of cultural spaces and thus reduce the dangers of these places in cases of violence.

As stated previously, this research seeks to expand the conversation regarding the possible danger of safe havens far from the limited Rwandan context, and from the

continuous criticism of international havens. It seeks to propose recommendations for solutions that are more than just theoretical; they are applicable. The use of Stanton's suggestions for the creation of Rapid Deployment Forces, Heidenrich's victim-targeted propaganda, and the preventive establishment of plans for international safe havens based on the existing UN Framework for Analysis of Atrocity Crimes, as solutions may prove essential in the reduction of casualties on the ground.

Existing models of conflict escalation and predictors of genocidal violence are already established in the field, and using them wisely could lead to the recognition of places where violence is imminent. Once identified, the creation of cohesive plans for action that would evaluate situations in both regional and global contexts, while delineating the specifics needed for a successful intervention (i.e. number of troops that would be needed, geographical spaces that could be protected, etc...) is imperative in preparing for action. When created, these plans could serve to recognize vulnerable cultural spaces that would potentially be targeted for destruction and thus need to be rapidly protected, as well as to develop victim-targeted propaganda techniques that could prepare the population to move towards the spaces that will be protected by the international community rather than to cultural spaces.

What is Safety?

One of the main issues that must be tackled for any holistic discussion of safe havens, is the discussion of safety itself. This is because safety is understood as providing protection from all harm. Safety and security are some of the main concerns in any individual's life, and as such they are sought out through a variety of forms. Abraham

Maslow's theory of needs, includes safety as one of the main pillars of psychosocial development, coming second only after physiological needs. In cases of mass violence and safe havens, the issue of safety comes into question in a very specific question: What constitutes success at providing safety? Must safe havens protect every single individual to be considered successful, or can safe havens that protect most, but not all, of the refugees inside them be considered success stories? This is an important aspect to analyze, as it goes hand in hand with making the establishment of safe havens into a more realistic endeavor. In addition, the concept of safety and security is embedded in most of the treaties and agreements established by the international community. The United Nations has an entire department dedicated to safety and security, which works worldwide to provide operational and technical support to missions in different regions all over the world. Regional organizations such as NATO and the African Union, also make provisions for safety and security at the regional level.

This idea of safety and security is permeating when speaking of safe havens, as it is their sole purpose, after all, to provide safety in times of conflict. However, when this safety does not end up being total in scope, the fear of trying again is all-encompassing. Griffiths, O'Callaghan and Roach (2008), state that "the ultimate contradiction and danger of safe havens is that they lure frightened people into places where the international community continues to recognise the sovereignty of their persecutors. Such places often become death traps" (p. 288). Although an important point, and one which is made in this research as well; this perception of safe havens is limited to their failures

rather than an all-encompassing view of the institution of these spaces that also consider the limited, but important successes of these spaces.

As history shows, safe havens have not always been successful and in fact have proven counterproductive to safety in several instances, with the fall of Srebreniça becoming the poster child for safe haven failure. Yet this view is narrow and vastly understates the importance of the other five havens that were established in Bosnia. In the end, the analysis of safe havens must be done parallel to answering the question of whether the necessary resources to achieve complete safety of any persecuted group can realistically ever be provided.

On the Matter of Prevention

Genocide prevention is a growing field within genocide studies, encompassing some of the most well-known names in the field as proponents of strategies for prevention. Stanton, Totten, Charny, Bloxham, Waller, and others, have all been outspoken in regards to the need for specific methods of prevention and intervention. Be it by using a new classification of stages of escalation and the use of Rapid Deployment Forces, the creation of an International Peace Army, or the transformation of scholarship into activism; these scholars have furthered the field of prevention and intervention to new heights. However, many of the ideas for prevention have remained theoretical, making practical prevention a far-fetched endeavor. This might be because many of the ideas regarding prevention focus on the prevention of the crime of genocide in its entirety. This research seeks to focus on a single issue, that of safe havens, to make enforcement a more viable option. Safe havens are usually established after the violence,

so that they do not act as preventive measures. However, if plans of action are detailed early in the conflict, the quick establishment of these areas may be more viable.

The establishment of timely safe havens includes premises already in existence but highly tailored to this issue, as well as new proposals that could prove to be important in these cases. Included in this study are ideas such as Stanton's Rapid Deployment Forces, through which Stanton argues for the creation of ready-to-act troops, which could be deployed quickly into countries with escalating violence. However, Stanton's premise seeks to build these forces as global troops that are part of an international force, yet as regional organizations have evolved and created their own versions of these forces, it behooves the international community to use these regional forces for the benefit of the victimized populations. In addition, this study considers Heidenrich's victim-targeted propaganda as a method through which to educate the targeted population in regards to the possible dangers of cultural safe havens and the availability of other options for protection. This research, however, also includes a proposal for the creation of preemptive reports that would prepare the international to community to quickly react to the escalating violence that leads to genocide by delineating the specific needs for effective safe havens in individual cases. It is the hope of this researcher that these plans may eventually evolve into the establishment of pre-emptive safe havens in cases of escalated violence.

Methodological Approach

This research is based on a combination of two methodological approaches that go hand-in-hand with each other: content analysis and historical sociology. Like every

research, this one began with a research question that soon became the catalysts for the analysis of a vast range of materials. For this research, two questions needed to be asked:

1. What are the roles of cultural and international safe havens in the context of genocidal violence?
2. What is the relationship between cultural and international safe havens?

These questions guided the research, as they provided a specific point of reference for information that seemed to be missing or needing further expansion in the literature.

Thus, as the research began, these questions were meant to be answered from inferences that can be drawn from existing texts using a content analysis methodology that relies on case studies as its groundwork, while using historical sociology as the method that links historical fact to social phenomena. Case studies as a research strategy is used because “case studies do not imply the use of a particular type of evidence and they can be done using either qualitative or quantitative evidence” (Kohlbacher, 2004, Sec. 3.3). As such, the use of case studies is flexible enough and in-depth enough to provide a thorough understanding of the premises discussed.

Historical sociology argues that history and sociology are not two separate entities, but are in fact very much connected. In this research, historical facts guide the formulation of answers to broader questions that can be applied to the understanding of social phenomena in different contexts. Shaw (2013) argues that historical sociology must adhere to a methodology that avoids abstraction and grand theory, and instead focuses on “historically grounded generalization” (p. 9). This research provides

generalizations regarding the roles of cultural and international safe havens based on historical proof.

The field of genocide studies is innately rooted in historical analysis, as it must look back at instances of genocidal violence and analyze its causes to understand the crime. Even when attempting to answer broader, more theoretical questions such as the nature of evil and the commonality of perpetrators, genocide scholarship innately looks back to move forward. Thus, the use of historical sociology is merely an extension of a natural process of understanding, where the researcher finds historical data to help answer overarching questions whose answers would further the understanding of the crime of genocide. In addition to this, the interdisciplinary nature of both genocide studies and conflict resolution allows for the use of content analysis as an effective tool, as both fields provide ample content from a variety of perspectives.

Intrinsically related, content analysis and historical sociology provide a framework for the analysis of historically-rooted phenomena that can be used to answer broader questions to further social understanding. In this research, the challenges to the perceptions of safety are rooted in historical accounts of thousands of deaths occurring in these spaces, while the analysis of the benefits of these spaces is rooted in the successful institution of safe havens. The analysis of the use of safe havens in cases of genocide leads to a better understanding of the potential dangers of safe havens, and to the recognition that there is a more important question that needs to be asked: What are we going to do to change it? In addition, this analysis helps in the recognition that although potentially dangerous, these spaces have often succeeded at saving thousands of lives.

Thus, other important questions arise: Can safe havens that have been witness to violence still be considered safe? And how can their establishment be improved for future instances of mass violence?

Research Structure

This research is divided into eight chapters. The first is this, the introduction, where an outline of the issues at hand has been delineated. The second chapter is a review of the literature that addresses existing ideas and recognizes lacunas in the literature in regards to the roles of cultural and international safe havens in genocidal states. The third chapter delves into the methodological approach used for this research, and an analysis of the pros and cons of the chosen methods. The fourth chapter focuses on the issue of safety, the changes in approach to safe havens throughout history, and the preconceptions of safety that come attached to these spaces. The fifth chapter is the first of three case studies, the Armenian Genocide. The sixth chapter delves into the Rwandan Genocide. The seventh chapter regards the last case study, that of the genocide in Bosnia. Lastly, the eighth chapter delves into the findings, conclusions and recommendations for actions for the future institution of more effective safe havens.

Conclusions

The potential dangers of safe havens in genocidal states is one that is seldom spoken of outside the context of Rwanda or Srebreniça, yet it is a danger that is repeated throughout many genocidal campaigns in history. Therefore, there needs to be a recognition that the use of cultural safe havens is not always the most sensible option, but that many times these are the only spaces available for targeted populations to seek

protection. Consequently, effective international safe havens are needed in regions where genocidal campaigns are imminent or already in motion, regardless of their failures in the past. This is because the benefits of international safe havens often outweigh their possible dangers. Only through the establishment of spaces that can guarantee safety can the use of cultural safe havens as places for protection in cases of mass violence may diminish.

Through a content analysis methodology rooted in case study analysis, and combined with an historical sociology approach, this research looks at a pattern of strategic behavior used by the perpetrators to conduct effective campaigns of elimination in which safe havens provide massive congregations of victims that can be all eliminated at once. In addition, the understanding of the perils attached to cultural and international safe havens and the recognition of their possible benefits, may lead to the development of better methods of prevention in the context of genocidal violence. As such, both cultural and international safe havens must be analyzed to understand the relationship between them and the importance of their existence in the survival of the victimized population. Lastly, understanding that safety does not always translate to the complete protection of all individuals in need, may provide a way to move forward in the application of safe havens to escalating conflicts in a way that is both realistic and effective.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

“We study the injustices of history for the same reason that we study genocide... not in order to justify history, genocide, murder, and rape but to understand how those evil things came about and then to use that understanding so as to prevent their happening again” – Jared Diamond

Introduction

Historical accounts of genocide provide proof that during times of violence, places of safety are often transformed into places of mass murder. As it stands, genocide literature has neglected to address the possible dangers of cultural safe havens almost completely. This might be explained by the fact that this possible danger may be construed as a given fact in the context of genocide. Yet it is important to understand that these dangers are intricately tied to the need for more effective international safe havens, and that failure to create new models will prove dangerous to the targeted populations of future genocidal campaigns. In regards to international safe havens, the literature has proven critical to their existence, but has neglected to recognize the relationship between the establishment of international safe havens and the use of cultural ones.

This chapter seeks to review existing literature on both the subject of safe havens and of genocide. Although the very idea of cultural safe havens may seem like a myth to observers of violence, who understand that these spaces will be attacked, they exist within the minds of the victimized population as places of communal sanctity in which such violence should not occur. This explains why in places that can be as disconnected as Guatemala and Rwanda, victims are recorded to have very similar reactions of

bafflement and disbelief when these cultural spaces are attacked. Understanding the existing literature, then, is essential in developing new solutions for these recurring problems. Following is a breakdown of important definitions existing in the literature and their relation to the topic at hand.

Genocide

The emergence of a globally accepted definition of genocide proved to be cause for high levels of tension and bargaining in the United Nations, with states vying to include or exclude aspects of the definition that promoted their political agendas. The canonical definition of genocide, and the one recognized by the international community, is prescribed by Article II of “The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (UNCG) (1948), which states that:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

It is this definition that has determined the extent of foreign intervention in cases of genocide, as well as the fate of many perpetrators in international courts.

The UNCG definition is one that was born in a time of high political tensions and as such it is limited in scope, which is why many scholars have sought to broaden the

definition. However, it is important to note that while many may only correlate genocide to mass murder, the definition itself allows for acts of genocide without any direct acts of killing. Adam Jones (2011) points out that this definition means that “*one does not need to kill anyone at all to commit genocide!* Inflicting “serious bodily or mental harm” qualifies, as does preventing births or transferring children between groups” (emphasis in original) (p. 14). Thus, genocide can be committed in a variety of forms.

Raphael Lemkin, who created the word ‘genocide,’ and proposed its first definition, sought a more inclusive explanation for the term in 1944. In *Axis Rule*, Lemkin (2005) defines genocide as the “destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group” (p.79), via actions specifically intended at “aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (p.79). These plans of disintegration and extermination included, for Lemkin, the destruction of many identity-related factors such as political institutions, cultural traditions, religion, language, health, and more. Thus, his definition was much broader than that coined by the United Nations at his behest. Lemkin considered the cultural and linguistic destruction of a group as a form of genocide, a factor that was not included in the final definition of the term and that has since been commonly referred to as an independent crime named culturecide or cultural genocide. Yet Lemkin was not the only one disappointed with the narrowed definition established in 1948, as can be shown by the many scholars who have sought to redefine the crime since.

Leo Kuper (1982) mentions the need to include political affiliations into the definition of genocide, as its omission from the list of protected groups is nonsensical in

the light of conflicts that are themselves rooted in political discord. He argues that political differences are as important a demarcation and justification for violence, as religion, nation or ethnicity, and that governments often engage in genocidal massacres based on political differences. However, Kuper (1982) retains the UN definition as the guide to his research.

Besides calling our attention to this flaw in the definition of genocide, Kuper (1982) also identifies different types of genocide. First, he speaks of a “scapegoat type of genocide” (p. 43) in which a specific group is attributed with specific characteristics and differentiated from the rest of the population as targeted for destruction; where “(u)sually, perhaps invariably, hostile stereotypes are projected onto the victims” (p. 43) in an attempt at dehumanizing and segregating the population. Another type of genocide recognized by Kuper (1982) is one that arises because of colonialism, in which the tiered structures of the colonies, adding to the pluralistic nature of colonized states, leads to conflict between existing groups.

More radically, Chalk & Jonassohn (1990) reject the definition provided by the UN, and propose their own definition of genocide as “a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator” (p. 23). Under this definition the label of genocide could be legally stamped upon the crimes committed in Ukraine, Cambodia, and others. In these cases, victimhood was defined by the perpetrators, not by the victim’s belonging to a specific racial, religious, national or ethnic group. In Cambodia, Khmers killed other

Khmers due to political affiliation, while in the Ukraine, thousands of people were starved to death by the Soviet Union in what is now known as Holodomor.

In defining genocide as such, Chalk & Jonassohn (1990) seek to narrow the cases labeled as genocide by excluding any cases of mass killing in which the entirety of the population has not been labeled as targeted for extermination. Thus, mass killings, massacres or riots (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990) that have lesser aims than the complete extermination of a population, do not qualify as genocide. This means that while recognizing the existence of 'genocidal massacres,' Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) see these as a combination of genocide and ethnocide, with "no intent to kill the entire victim group" (p. 27).

Although a working definition for the crime of genocide, Chalk and Jonassohn's (1990) definition neglects the fact that many smaller scale genocidal massacres are performed with the intent of repetition at different times, and consequently in search for total annihilation of a predetermined group. An example of this can be found in the Hamidian Massacres of the 1890s in the Ottoman Empire, which predated the subsequent Armenian genocide. These massacres targeted a specific group and were repeated in different areas of the empire with the intent to destroy, at least in part, the Armenian population. Genocidal massacres may sometimes occur without escalation to full-fledged genocidal campaigns, yet they often serve as precursors of what is to come. The Hamidian Massacres were only the beginning of a cycle of violence that cleared the path to the Adana massacres, and then to the Armenian genocide.

Other scholars, such as Martin Shaw (2007), have sought to broaden the scope of the definition. Shaw (2007) defines genocide as “*a form of violent social conflict, or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction*” (emphasis in original) (p. 154). In this definition, Shaw (2007) rejects the categorization of groups by ethnic or religious groups, and instead broadens the scope of genocide to include any targeted civilian social group. This means any group that is unarmed and is being targeted for destruction can be qualified as victimized by genocidal campaigns. While this may seem too broad, it is evident that it was Shaw’s intent to depict it as such in what can only be considered a direct challenge against the narrow definition established by the 1948 Convention.

The nature of conflict as genocidal, for Shaw (2007), is determined by the existence of genocidal actions, which he defines as actions “*in which armed power organizations treat civilian social groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative social power by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom they regard as members of the groups*” (emphasis in the original) (p. 154). Thus, genocidal campaigns aim at destroying not only the physical existence of individuals in a group, but also their social significance in any established society through the act of killing. This broadened definition of genocide allows for the analysis of genocidal campaigns that would otherwise not be labeled as such under the definition provided by the UN, and would fall outside of the scope of the national, racial, religious and ethnic determinations set forth by the UNCG. Shaw’s (2007) definition, then, allows for the analysis of genocidal campaigns, such as the conflict in East Timor, which sought to

eliminate pro-independence social groups and their pre-established power from the political and social landscape of the state.

Further definitions of genocide seek to retain the exclusivity of the word and create new words for any cases of mass killing that fall outside of the prescribed definition of genocide by the UNGC. This difference in definitions is part of what Jones (2011) defines as “harder” and “softer” positions, where harder positions argue against broader definitions and softer positions are more flexible. Harder positions are those that wish to be selective in the use of the word ‘genocide’ in fear that it will be “rendered banal or meaningless by careless use” (Jones, 2001, p. 20).

Barbara Harff (1992) is one of the scholars who argues for a hard definition of genocide and a clear demarcation between genocide and politicide. Harff’s argument for distinction includes a definition of genocide as cases in which “the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics” (p. 28), while cases of politicide are those in which the victimized “groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant group” (p.28). In her argument, she discards massacres that may be genocidal in nature (i.e. massacres perpetrated against a specific group of people) unless there is a pattern of repetition to be found. This way, she differentiates the modern cases of mass murder as either genocide or politicide. Harff (1992) also makes it clear that these two labels are not mutually exclusive in times of conflict and that there can be both genocide and politicide occurring at once. For example, she identifies the decimation of the Cham Muslim population in Cambodia as genocide, while identifying the Khmer victims that did not belong to any of the

prescribed groups in the UNCG as political victims of mass murder (Harff, 1992). Thus, both genocide and politicide occurred within the same conflict, but only one of them deserves the label of genocide.

Vahakn Dadrian (1975) argues for a general definition of genocide, which he defines as “the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable...” (p. 204). He recognizes that genocide requires both perpetrators and victims, but does not define them by the national, ethnic or religious cleavages that the UNCG does. In doing so, his definition becomes more malleable and applicable to a variety of genocidal campaigns that are not defined by national, ethnic or religious demarcations. Important in this definition is the premise of “successful attempt...to reduce...the number of a minority group”, as it clearly marks genocide as a crime in which there must be some form of casualties, thus challenging the idea that genocide can be committed without direct acts of killing.

This is important yet also problematic, as Dadrian (1975) does not define exactly what ‘success’ means. Does the reduction of the victimized population by one hundred people bear the same weight in labeling it genocide as a reduction of the population by a million individuals? It seems that it does, and thus genocide can be labeled if there is proof of intent. In the context of Dadrian’s (1975) study, which focuses on the Armenian experience, this definition is not necessary, as the Armenians were a religious group under persecution, and thus would have been protected by the UNCG if it had existed at

the time. However, the Armenian genocide occurred within a context in which international humanitarian law was still lacking, and as such, there was no protection to be provided. In the case of the Armenian genocide, the intent to destroy the Armenians can be proven by a variety of factors, including the fact that the neighborhoods most heavily populated by Armenians were the ones from which people were forced to march. Dadrian's definition is expansive and allows other instances of violence, such as that administered on the East Timorese by Indonesia in the 1970s, to qualify as genocide. This case was an attempt to reduce the number of a group by an armed power. Since the attempt was based in political opposition, and not ethnic, religious, racial or national grouping, the UNGC cannot recognize it as genocide, but Dadrian's definition does in fact apply.

Huttenbach (1988) defines the act of genocide as "any act that puts the very existence of a group in jeopardy;" Midlarsky (2005) defines genocide as "the state-sponsored systematic mass murder of innocent and helpless men, women and children denoted by a particular ethnoreligious identity, having the purpose of eradicating this group from a particular territory;" Horowitz (1976) recognizes genocide as "a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus;" and Thompson and Quets (1987) define the act as "the extent of destruction of a social collectivity by whatever agents, with whatever intentions, by purposive actions which fall outside the recognized conventions of legitimate warfare" (See: Jones, 2011).

Although all working definitions, some of these are problematic. Midlarsky (2005) and Horowitz (1976), for example, define genocide as 'state-sponsored' and part

of a 'state bureaucratic apparatus', thus leaving room to neglect those genocides which may not be the result of violence by the state. Huttenbach's (1988) definition refers to 'any act' that jeopardizes the existence of a group; however, such a broad definition is too subjective to be viable in the realm of law and justice, thus rendering the punishment of the crime almost an impossibility. Thompson and Quets' (1987) definition is also problematic, as it does not specify intent, thus leaving room open to merge instances of mass killing without specific or general intent to destroy a population, as genocidal in nature. Thus, the demarcation between genocide and war are blurred, as the conventions of legitimate warfare are very often neglected in intra-state conflict.

Further redefinitions of the word 'genocide' can be found in the literature, all of which attempt to explain the intended annihilation of a specific group of people at the hands of another. For this research, the legal definition of genocide found within the UNCG will be retained, since it is the only definition that is viable for any decisions regarding the institution of safe havens in conflict. However, it is important to also understand the premise of genocidal massacres, a term coined by Leo Kuper in 1982, as these smaller cases of mass killing are acts of genocide that seek to exterminate as many members of a specific population and are thus punishable under international law.

The presence of both target specification and intent make these massacres as much a part of the genocidal campaign as any other act of mass killing. However, these smaller scale instances of violence, while still genocide under the legal definition, do not often invoke the necessary reaction from the international community because they are mostly seen as internal feuds in which state sovereignty must be protected. Yet the

sovereignty of the state ends the moment that state neglects to address the mass killing of a specific group within its population. The international community has legally bound itself to act in these cases by signing and ratifying the UNCG. In total, 147 countries are currently parties to the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” which has been in effect since 1951 (United Nations Treaty Collection, n.d.). This making most of the international community – 147 out of a total 196 countries – responsible for the enforcement of this document. Attacks on safe havens that occur during genocidal campaigns, then, although sometimes much smaller in scope than other instances of mass killings, are connective gears within the machinery of genocide – itself a grander sequence of violent actions – and are perpetrated with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a specific group of people.

Genocidal Massacres

To truly understand the possible dangers of safe havens in genocidal states, it is imperative to understand genocidal massacres. This term was coined to refer to smaller scale killings that were still demarcated by an intent to eliminate a specific group, in whole or in part. To exemplify his argument, Kuper (1982) refers to the French assault on the villages in Algeria after the Sétif riots of 1945, the massacre of fifty French hostages, the reprisals by the German officials against Lidice and Ležáky, and more. These cases exemplify instances of mass killing with specific genocidal intent (to destroy, in whole or in part) against predetermined targets. Thus, although not necessarily widespread cases of massacres, these mass killings are part and consequence of a genocidal continuum

(Sheper-Hughes, 2002) rooted in every-day, smaller scale actions, that may eventually progress into systemic campaigns of annihilation.

In analyzing Kuper's development of the term, Totten and Bartrop (2008) note that, for Kuper, although not a genocide in and of themselves, these massacres delineate underlying genocidal motives that are driven to fruition by genocidal intent. The understanding of the term is essential in the analysis of genocide, as the mass killing of specific groups of people, even when not within the context of a broader genocidal campaign, are riddled with an underlying intent to not only kill individuals from a specific group, but to kill as many of them as possible. These instances of violence are often seen in historical periods that predate full-fledged genocidal campaigns, as was the case in Armenia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. As such, the existence of genocidal massacres in the history of any country should be of immediate concern to its future, especially if the underlying grievances were never resolved and the social divides were masked but not eliminated.

Other scholars have also furthered the discussion regarding genocidal massacres. Kiernan (2007) describes genocidal massacres as "shorter, limited episodes of killing directed at a specific local and regional community, targeted because of its membership in a larger group" (p. 13) and argues that they may occur in three different forms, including: state-organized massacres, communal massacres, or a combination of the two. Kiernan's definition merges the concept of genocidal massacres with the need for an expanded definition of genocide, as it recognizes that membership to a group is not necessarily defined by ethnic, racial, national or religious affiliation and instead mentions

the targeted population as being members of “a larger group” – seemingly any larger group with a defined membership. Kiernan also explain that the concept of genocidal massacres is not covered under the UNCG as a genocidal act, but that this phenomenon is indeed covered by other international laws, specifically those pertaining crimes against humanity. Also, he suggests that genocidal massacres may sometimes be used as ends to another mean, and not an end in themselves.

Further definitions of genocidal massacres include Charny’s (1999), who defines genocidal massacres as mass killings conforming to the generic definition of genocide but in which the killings occur at a smaller scale in which a smaller number of people are killed, compared to full-fledged genocidal campaigns. Bartrop (2014) briefly addresses the idea of genocidal massacres by referring to localized massacres that have some elements of genocide but on their own do not constitute the act itself. Overall, scholars seem to agree in their definition of genocidal massacres as instances of mass killing characterized by the adherence to premises stated within the definition of genocide, yet not substantial enough to constitute genocide in-and-of themselves.

As such, massacres may occur outside of genocidal contexts, but must demonstrate intent for the destruction, in whole or in part, of specific groups to be able to be labeled as genocidal in scope. A good example of this would be the killing of 147 students at Kenya’s Garissa University, where the students were specifically targeted for their religious affiliation (Levs & Yan, 2015), thus proving that the perpetrators had the intent to eliminate, at least in part, specific members of a religious group. Therefore, this massacre qualifies as a genocidal massacre, as it was perpetrated with the intent of

elimination, but it was not a systemic campaign of extermination and as such it is not deemed genocide.

It is important to recognize genocidal massacres even when they occur outside of the context of broader genocidal campaigns, as their specific intent to destroy part of a specific population should bear the weight of punishment that is attached to genocidal crimes in international law. The Hamidian massacres, the Adana massacres, the massacre at Srebreniça – these are all genocidal massacres that did not occur under an official umbrella of genocide, but that were part of a repeated cycle of violence that insisted on exterminating entire groups of people. These genocidal massacres are not themselves spoken about as genocide, but they should be. The massacre in Srebreniça is not officially recognized by the international community as genocide, but rather as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The United Nations debated this terminology in 2015, when Russia vetoed a resolution to call the massacre at Srebreniça a crime of genocide (Sengupta, 2015). Only by recognizing them as instances of violence committed to eliminate part of a group within the targeted population, can there be true justice for the crimes.

It is important to ensure that the differentiation between genocidal massacres and massacres is clear: one is perpetrated to eliminate a specific group of people as labeled by their race, ethnicity, religious group, or nationality; while the other does not have a specific target. As such, tragedies such as the Sandy Hook massacre, in which 20 children perished within a school (Candiotti & Aarthun, 2012), do not qualify as genocidal, as the shooting was not perpetrated against a specific group of people. Massacres such as the Sand Creek massacre of 1864, could be retroactively labeled as genocidal, since they

were instigated against a specific group of people and its intent was to destroy as many of them as possible. In Sandy Creek, an approximate 150 Native Americans were killed at the hands of American troops (Hortwitz, 2014). The massacres predating both the Armenian and Rwandan genocides in their respective countries, all qualify as genocidal, since both Armenians and Tutsi were identified for destruction.

Genocidal massacres, although not always occurring within a broader systemic campaign of destruction, are part of the machinery of genocide, and their repetition throughout genocidal campaigns is evidence to a sequencing of violence that can eventually evolve into systematic destruction with the intent of total annihilation, as was the case for the Armenians and Rwandans. Often, genocidal massacres act as precursors to genocide. In this context, safe havens have the potential of becoming dangerous, as they serve as confinements wherein large groups of individuals who belong to the targeted populations gather in search of safety and are thus vulnerable to attack.

Genocidal Intent

The concept of genocidal intent is one that is mentioned within the legal definition of genocide, as perpetrators must have intent for the crime to be labeled as genocide, and intent must be proven for the perpetrators to be prosecuted. In fact, “(t)he inclusion of the criterion of intent is common to most of the definitions found in the literature” (Chalk and Jonnasohn, 1990, p. 26) because it is essential in naming the crime as genocide. Without intent, the international community does not recognize the crime, thus the UNCG definition makes certain that ‘intent’ is part of the crime. Kiernan (2007) points out that genocidal intent has two different legal categories, general and specific;

where the former is not enough to qualify as genocide, and the latter must refer to acts that seek to specifically “accomplish complete or partial destruction of a group” (p. 17). General intent does not clearly show that the act was carried out to destroy in whole or in part a very specific group of people, defined under the convention by the categories of race, ethnicity, religion and nationality. This is shown by what international law recognizes as specific intent, and it is more difficult to prove. To depict this in familiar terms, previously addressed examples can be explained: The Sandy Hook massacre in Connecticut shows a general intent in which no specific group of people was singled out for destruction, while the Garissa University attacks in Kenya and the Sandy Creek massacres show specific intent because the attackers targeted very specific groups.

Schabas (2000) notes that “genocide cannot be committed without a degree of planning and preparation” (p. 226) and therefore, genocidal campaigns can seldom be extricated from intentional destruction. Schabas (2000) also points out that specific intent has three main components needed to be proved in the international courts, these are: “the offender must intend to destroy the group, the offender must intend that the group be destroyed in whole or in part, and the offender must intend to destroy a group that is defined by nationality, race, ethnicity or religion” (p. 228). Intent is not fixed, however, as it can vary per situation and per the objectives sought out by the perpetrators (Dadrian, 1975). These characteristics make intent a very malleable and subjective concept to argue in international criminal courts, thus making it harder to bring justice to those affected.

Jason J. Campbell (2013) recognizes eight concepts that allow for the definition and understanding of genocidal intent. He proposes that, Immutable demographic

identifiers, Mutable demographic identifiers, Acting telos, Intentional complicity, Dispositional Intent, Direct genocidal force, Indirect genocidal force, and Intentional denial, are all important in expanding our understanding of intent, yet they are neither a fixed nor exhaustive compilation of factors, and in fact “the notion of genocidal intent is greater than the sum of its eight definitional concepts” (p. 7). By immutable and mutable identifiers, he refers to the aspects of a victimized population whereby they are targeted for destruction and can or cannot be changed.

Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) briefly refer to this when they speak of the differences between the genocides occurring in Germany (the Holocaust) and Turkey (Armenian genocide), where the former was based on racial determinism and the latter on differences in language, culture and religion. The first (racial determinism) could not be denied or adapted by the targeted population, thus it was based on immutable identifiers; while the latter (language, culture and religion) could, even when seldom done so, be renounced, making the genocidal campaign one based on mutable identifiers. This means that for the victims, the factors that define them as enemies to the perpetrators are important in determining their fate.

Campbell’s (2003) distinction between direct and indirect force is also an important one, as the perpetrators’ willingness to use “government military forces” or “nongovernmental militia forces” (p.6) to commit an act of genocide is one of the most observable proofs of intent.

Martin Shaw (2007) argues that the premise of genocidal intent is composed of both knowledge and intent, where knowledge “involves awareness that the acts

committed will lead to the destruction of the target group. It is entwined with the second element, intent, because a crucial element of knowledge is awareness of the existence of a ‘plan’ to destroy a group” (p. 82). However, this definition seemingly exonerates those who participate in the crime but are not privy to the grander plans. This is problematic, as denying knowledge of overarching plans does not negate the acts of mass killing of individuals with specific characteristics by individual perpetrators. These individual actors are aware of who the victim pool is and how to recognize them for destruction, thus being aware of target specification. As such, individual perpetrators without knowledge of grander schemes cannot be absolved of their crimes because their actions prove intent, as they repeatedly target a predetermined group of people for mass murder.

This is a problem that arises in the legal realm from having a distinction between general and specific intent, because only the masterminds behind the overarching plans will be charged of specific intent, and thus of genocide, while those on the ground might be exonerated from having specific intent since they might not have been aware that the plan’s sole objective was to destroy as many individuals belonging to a predetermined group as possible. In addition, this issue of both knowledge and intent begs the question of exactly how much knowledge it is necessary to be had to be accused of genocide. When one person is repeatedly engaging in acts of violence against known members of specific groups, can it truly be said that they did not know that it would lead to their destruction? In Nazi Germany, Hitler and his high-ranking officers developed plans for a systemic campaign of elimination that required an industrialization of mass murder in the form of concentration camps and gas chambers, yet are the crimes of the men and women

who collaborated with the killings at the level of everyday tasks any lesser? In Rwanda, the Hutu Power extremists released a campaign of mass murder that was swift and unrelenting, but are the crimes of the militia groups, who everyday cleaned their machetes of fresh blood, any lesser? The distinction between forms of intent, then, is a challenge to bringing justice to the victims of this crime.

The premise of genocidal intent is intricately bound to safe havens, especially when speaking of cultural safe havens. Many times, the perpetrators use these structures as strategic places to gather the victimized population before ensuing violence, as was the case in Rwanda. In addition, these places are also often used by perpetrators as strategic for mass violence, including torture and rape, as was the case during the Armenian genocide and during the Bosnian War. Thus, their intent is proven by the gathering of victims into large groupings for mass extermination or other forms of violence. For example, the massacre at the Mugonero Adventist Church in Rwanda came after days during which the *burgomasters* of different districts directed the Tutsi refugees to seek refuge in the church compound. In one case, the pastor of the congregation urged Tutsis “to seek shelter” in Mugonero (Osborn, 2010). Only after they had amassed a large enough number of people, did the perpetrators attack the compound and killed everyone in their path, with almost all 3,000 refugees in the church slain in a single day (Osborn, 2010). The planning and conscious amassing of as many targets as possible shows clear intent in the use of cultural safe havens places for mass violence. As Campbell (2013) states, “this attempt to separate and consolidate those targeted for extermination, in

effect, facilitates the process of their extermination” (p. 128), and is also irrevocable proof of intent.

In those cases in which it is the victims who flee to these spaces for refuge and not the perpetrators who gather them there, intent can also be proven by the actions of the perpetrators, who often wait for the places to be filled to the brim before attacking. In addition, the repeated mass murder of those hiding in these places is proof of intent, especially when the distinction is made in the group of refugees between those who will be killed and those who will be allowed to survive. A demonstrative example of this would be that of the Glina genocidal massacres during the Ustasha period in Bosnia, in which people were gathered in the church for days before they were killed. A few, however, were reportedly allowed to leave once they had converted to Catholicism, which proves the intent of the perpetrators for eliminating only a group – in this case the Serbs – and using a cultural site to do so.

Furthermore, these safe spaces can sometimes be coopted by the perpetrators and used intentionally to perform other genocidal acts that are not necessarily mass murder, including rape and torture. In the Armenian genocide, a church was used as a brothel in which approximately 300 women were kept and used as sex slaves for the Turkish troops, who then killed the women at their leisure. In Bosnia, schools were often used as holding pens, labor camps, and rape camps. In the Dos Erres massacre in Guatemala, the women of the village were all gathered in the church, where the perpetrators proceeded to engage in genocidal rape. In Cambodia, an entire school was transformed into a torture and killing center. Tuol Sleng, commonly known as S21, was a former high school that

became a torture chamber to thousands of people under the rule of Pol Pot. In these cases, there is a specific and malignant intent to cause harm to members of a specific group, and even to deliberately bring about the physical destruction of a group in whole or in part.

Typologies of Genocide

Since the inception of the word ‘genocide’ scholars have been attempting to ascribe typologies to understand the phenomenon more clearly. One of these attempts at understanding different types of genocide is found in Dadrian’s (1975) “A Typology of Genocide,” where he recognizes three factors that differentiate genocide from other forms of mass violence. These factors include: perpetrator intent, level of victimization, and scale of casualties. Using these three factors, Dadrian then recognizes specific types of genocide including a general ideal type, cultural genocide, retributive genocide, utilitarian genocide, and optimal genocide.

Retributive genocide involves campaigns that seek revenge on the victimized population and are thus “localized atrocities as a form of meting out punishment to a segment of the minority” (Dadrian, 1975, p. 207). This concept is important when looking at safe havens, as many of the genocidal massacres that occur in these spaces occur out of a vengeful sense of retribution. Utilitarian genocide, on the other hand, involves a genocidal campaign whereby the perpetrators seek to gain something from the victimized population. Finally, optimal genocides involve campaigns in which the destruction “is massive, relatively indiscriminate in terms of victims’ age, sex and other categories, is sustained in duration, and aims at the total obliteration of the victim group”

(Dadrian, 1975, p. 210). Thus, optimal genocide is optimal because it accomplishes the most successful level of destruction.

Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) prescribe four different typologies in their research to explain genocidal campaigns. Their types of genocides are defined by perpetrator motive and are to eliminate a real or potential threat; to spread terror among real or potential enemies; to acquire economic wealth; or to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology (p. 29). Since they define genocide as one-sided campaigns against a predetermined group, these types of genocide are broad enough to include groups that have not been included in the UNCG. Thus, genocide becomes any one-sided campaign with the intent to eliminate a group as perceived by the perpetrators whether as being a threat or potential enemy, as owning economic wealth, or as needing ideological reform; regardless of national, ethnic, racial or religious membership. The authors argue that in many cases, more than one of these motives is present.

This attempt at prescribing typologies in genocide can also be found in Roger Smith's (2000) work, who differentiates between five different types of genocide: Retributive, Institutional, Utilitarian, Monopolistic and Ideological. Smith's retributive genocide, much like Dadrian's concept, is the type of extermination done via retribution with the purpose of "blaming the victim" whereby the perpetrators attempt to rationalize extermination using judicial vocabulary. Institutional genocide "was the major source of politically sanctioned mass murder in the ancient and medieval worlds" (Smith, 2000, p. 24), meaning that the establishment, as an institution, sought the extermination and terrorization of other people. In this form of genocide, "instead of ruling a city or

territory, extracting tribute from it, and perhaps even incorporating it into one's own system of power and authority, the society was devastated" (Smith, 2000, p. 24). Thus, a connection between Kuper's arguments for including political groups based on their victimization by the government can be made, as governmental institutions engaged in devastating these societies.

Utilitarian genocide, per Smith (2000), was of importance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as colonial domination expanded throughout the globe. This type of genocide is particularly dangerous, according to Smith, because it tends to be total in scope. Smith's definition of utilitarian genocide differs from that of Dadrian because the former sees this genocide as potentially total in scope, while the latter argues that utilitarian campaigns are more for profit, or for spreading fear and thus gaining power and control over other groups. In looking at the Armenian, Rwandan, and Bosnian genocides, we can see Dadrian's definition at play, as all three of these genocides sought to gain power in the social order and were not total in scope. Overall, genocidal campaigns are rarely total, as the extermination of every single member of a specific community is almost an impossibility. However, the severity of the genocide may lead to catastrophic losses for the victimized population. The premise of utilitarian genocide also ties into Kuper's proposition of genocide based on colonialist structures. In both types, the tensions that arise from colonial incursions may lead to genocidal campaigns in an attempt at regaining or maintaining control.

Monopolistic genocide is defined by Smith (2000) as genocide inspired by a need for total control, and as genocide that occurs within the confines of a state, not in an

exterior environment. He states, “examples of such attempts come from those that are ideologically motivated (Cambodia), those that are not (Pakistan), and those that combine elements of both (Armenia)” (Smith, 2000, p. 26). Lastly, ideological genocide is described by Smith (2000) as being catastrophic in scope. He states, “ideology under modern conditions tends towards holocaust” (p. 26). It has been recent history what has led ideology to be a powerful force for mass murder. He quotes the Turkish genocide of the Armenians (both the 1895-1908 & 1915-1917 campaigns), the Holocaust, the revolution of Mao’s China, and the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, all as ideological-based genocides in the 20th century. This type of genocide compares to Dadrian’s optimal genocide, and to Chalk and Jonassohn’s fourth typology, in which perpetrators seek to implement an ideology or theory onto the victimized population.

Anton Weiss-Wendt (2010) argues that genocide is fundamentally ideological and that such a form of mass violence cannot erupt incidentally; it must be planned. He argues that “the act of physical or biological destruction of an entire group, no matter to what ends, is innately ideological in its intent” (p. 83-84). It could be argued that genocide sometimes occurs organically, as an evident progression of the country’s continued existence. As such, planning is less of a factor in these cases and violence becomes more of a logical conclusion to the underlying grievances permeating society. This is because not all genocides seem as planned as those that occurred in Nazi Germany, Rwanda, and the Ottoman Empire. Instead, genocides such as those that occurred in East Timor and Guatemala, seem less a detailed planned for extermination than the natural evolution of existing conflicts into catastrophic escalation of violence.

Weiss-Wendt, however, argues that the deep ideological roots of genocidal violence are intricately bound to the deliberate planning of the crime. This is important, as it recognizes that genocide is by its very nature an ideological conflict rooted in ideological tensions and as such it makes places where ideologies conflict more vulnerable to the crime. Furthermore, Weiss-Wendt argues that genocidal intent is “reinterpreted in terms of productivity and expediency” (p. 89) as the campaigns are part of a bureaucracy that seeks to be as effective as possible in the destruction of the targeted population. This recognition of genocide as an ideological bureaucracy of destruction is essential in our understanding of the crime as more than an escalated conflict, but as a systemic structure with a single aim: the destruction of a predetermined group of people.

These typologies of genocide help to qualify certain campaigns of mass extermination as genocide, which would not be so if the field were strictly bound by the UNCG (i.e. Cambodia). Most the massive loss of life in Democratic Kampuchea was, after all, politically and ideologically based, not rooted in national, ethnical, racial or religious groupings. However, these typologies of genocide and our attempt at understanding the crime, have led to a seemingly endless array of definitions and partitions that do not aid when it comes to intervention, but in fact muddle the discussion even further.

Cultural Genocide

As stated previously, Lemkin’s original idea for what genocide should be, included the idea of cultural genocide, which refers to the decimation of cultural and linguistic traditions of a targeted group. Although this aspect of his definition did not

reach the final convention document, it is an important aspect to understand because it is almost universally linked to the physical destruction of the victimized population. Stuart Stein (2004) defines ‘culturecide,’ also known as cultural genocide or deculturation, as “processes that have usually been purposely introduced and that result in the decline or demise of a culture, without necessarily resulting in the physical destruction of its bearers” (p. 99). Kiernan (2007) also refers to cultural genocide, or ethnocide, as the imposition of a new culture on a group by enforcing educational and linguistic restrictions without necessarily causing physical harm. Dadrian (1975) states that cultural genocide involves conversion of religious beliefs, systematic adoption of victimized children into the dominant group, and other methods which seek the “deliberate structuring of preemptive assimilation” (p.205); all of which does not necessarily equate to violence. Jones (2011) describes cultural genocide as the destruction of a group’s language, culture and existential underpinnings without necessarily involving the physical destruction of the individuals. He also argues against the use of the word ‘genocide’ when there is no systemic killing accompanying cultural destruction.

The premise of cultural genocide is important when discussing safe havens because the destruction of these places is often the goal of the perpetrators. Sometimes, their destruction is not linked to mass murder within these spaces, as in the case of the destruction of mosques in Bosnia, or many of the synagogues in Germany. However, the destruction of these places often comes together with their use as places of mass murder, as in the case of the Hamidian massacres or the Rwandan genocide. Thus, not only do the perpetrators seek to intentionally destroy segments of a specific population, they also

seek to intentionally destroy the symbols and cultural affiliations that the targeted population may have with spaces they deem safe.

This may sometimes occur without the strategic use of these spaces for mass killing, so that it is the culture that is being eliminated, not the people. Cultural genocide, in theory, does not necessitate the physical destruction of the individuals belonging to the targeted group, but rather the destruction of their language, history, religion, and other traditions from the everyday life in the country in which culturcide is occurring. The conversion of Native Americans to Christianity, and the complete rejection of their 'pagan' practices fall in line with this process of culturcide. In practice, however, the destruction of these spaces usually goes hand-in-hand with the destruction of the people who carry their traditions with them, as can also be understood with the Native American example, in which thousands of natives were killed simply because they would not conform to the 'civilized' society that quickly became the primary culture in existence. The purposeful destruction of cultural spaces was also seen before, during, and after the Bosnian War with the large-scale destructions of churches and mosques during times of conflict being a pervasive issue in Bosnian history. It is because of this that these structures become potentially dangerous in times of conflict, as their destruction ensures the solidification of power at the hands of the dominant group, while also condemning the minority to either die with their cultural heritage or continue their existence without it.

Genocide Prevention

Much of the literature in genocide pertains the prevention of the crime, arguing that certain factors exist that could preempt the evolution of the conflict into genocidal campaigns. Stanton (n.d.) argues that there are two reasons why genocide still occurs. First, he argues that the world has not developed the international institutions needed to predict and prevent it. Second, he states that the world's leaders do not have the political will to stop it. To abate this issue, Stanton proposes the creation of four institutions: "centers for early warning, programs for conflict transformation, standing forces for rapid intervention, and international courts for effective punishment" (par. 6). It is the third of these institutions, the forces for rapid intervention, that is most relevant to this research, as it would be these forces that would need to be deployed early in the genocide to protect as many people as possible.

To justify the creation of this force, Stanton argues that "articles 43 to 48 of the U.N. Charter already provides for a permanent command structure, which has never been created, and a liberal interpretation of those articles would also permit creation of a standing army" (par. 17). Although advocating for early intervention, Stanton identifies that early intervention is not enough to prevent genocide. To prevent genocide, Stanton argues, the first step is "getting the facts in clear, indisputable form to policy makers" (par. 23). Thus, the most important factor is the accurate, rapid, and transparent spread of information from the ground and into the hands of the policymakers who have the power to make a difference.

The rise and spread of international law, along with the establishment of international courts, have led to the perception of punishment as prevention, where indictments in criminal courts would act as deterrents for future acts of genocide. However, Bloxham (2010) argues against this premise convincingly, as he states that the premises of 'war crimes,' 'crimes against peace' and 'crimes against humanity,' although hopeful during their inception in The London Charter, have proven almost impossible to punish in the international arena. Bloxham (2010) states that punishment in these courts have "classically been justified in one of three ways, as retribution, as a means of preventing the perpetrator from committing similar crimes again in the future, and as a way of deterring other potential offenders from engaging in similar crimes themselves" (p. 632). However, he also argues that the historical failure of these courts in bringing perpetrators to justice proves that the idea of punishment as a method of prevention is not realistic.

Thus, prevention must be sought out in different ways, not only through the channels of international criminal law. However, Bloxham (2010) does argue that international courts are not entirely purposeless, as they show the world a statement of principle in which the international community stands against these crimes in all their forms; it is "an act of symbolic disapproval on the part of the international community" (p.636). Yet the sheer repetition of the crime of genocide post-Nuremberg trials is enough proof to the futility of prevention through punishment.

For this reason, it is important to attempt to prevent genocide in other ways. Jones (2011) argues that there are reliable indicators to the inevitability of genocide, citing a

history of genocide, severe economic crises, mobilization along communal cleavages, hate propaganda, severe and systematic state repression, among others to be only a few of them. In identifying these factors within regions of high tension, it could be possible to predict where the next genocidal campaign will blossom. He contributes to the field by calling for an international recognition that there is a specific group that is most vulnerable to destruction: “adult males, notably men of “battle” age” (Jones, 2011, p. 571). Thus, a greater sensitivity to this group and their victimization might provide a greater opportunity for prevention. This recognition of reliable indicators of rising genocidal violence goes hand-in-hand with Stanton’s ten stages of classification, in which he identifies aspects such as dehumanization, polarization, preparation, and extermination as part of evolving stages that feed one another and eventually lead to genocide. The existence of these indicators is itself conducive to the prevention of genocide, as well as to the establishment of preventive measures that could make a difference in the final death toll of the violence.

John G. Heidenrich (2001) dedicated an entire book to the issue of genocide prevention, providing options ranging from quiet diplomacy and covert operations, to international and military intervention. Recognizing the existence of a Genocide Early Warning System (GEWS), Heidenrich advises that these systems need more than a few months to be able to prevent atrocities. Ideally, he states, “a genocide early warning system should forecast a genocide, or at least genocidal trouble, several months or even years in advance” (p. 74). Thus, the current attempts at prevention, although important in the development of an institutionalized system of prevention, are not enough. For this

reason, Heindenrich provides a myriad of other options available to states to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. One of the most original approaches to prevention is that of the use of propaganda targeting the victimized population. Heinderich (2001) states, “(p)erhaps a *psyop* campaign should therefore attempt to influence a genocide’s intended victims. By warning them a genocide against them is either impending or ongoing, they could encouraged [sic] to seek out their own native rescuers” (emphasis in original) (p. 121). In this way, foreign propaganda could alert the intended populations of the imminent violence, which could then seek ways to either prevent or survive the campaign.

If this propaganda also aimed at warning the targeted population of the potential danger of cultural safe havens, potential victims could seek refuge in internationally sanctioned havens instead, which should be established early in the violence through the cooperation of regional and global institutions. An early warning system would not only help in the prevention of the crime, but also in the establishment of preemptive plans for international safe havens to which people could run to while the situation is stabilized on the ground. A combination of classification systems that point towards rising violence and propaganda mechanisms that keep the targeted population informed, could prove imperative for the rerouting of refugees from their paths towards cultural safe havens into paths towards established international ones.

The Choices Program, part of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University, published an educational report on genocide titled “Confronting Genocide: Never Again?” in which four options for intervention and

prevention were provided. First, the report stated that “preventing genocide must become a foreign policy priority for the United States.” Second, the report suggested that there must be international recognition that the UN is the only entity with “the legitimacy and experience to develop and maintain a long-term, international effort to prevent and stop genocide.” Third, the report insisted that although it is our duty to speak out against the crime of genocide, a nation’s right to govern itself “must be preserved.” Lastly, the report advises that although genocide is a global malady, the US should only intervene when the genocidal campaigns directly threaten US stability, with involvement limited “to diplomatic initiatives” (p. 26). These different approaches are all valid, and they all bring the attention of the reader to some of the most evident deficiencies in preventing genocide: Firstly, the United Nations enforcement mechanism is insufficient; secondly, countries will continuously act rationally to protect their own interests; and thirdly, genocide prevention is still not in the forefront of foreign policy in many countries around the world.

A different report, written by the Genocide Prevention Task Force, provided several recommendations for prevention not only to the U.S. but to other members of the international community. These included the creation of a “formal network dedicated to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities” as well as a provision by the US, USAID and the Department of Defense to “provide capacity-building assistance to international partners who are willing to take measures to prevent genocide and mass atrocities” (p. 114). These recommendations, as well as others provided by the report, are important to consider in the fight against the repetition of this violence. A network of international

actors would prove significantly important at the time of mobilizing forces and resources when needed. This network of international actors, including NGOs and institutions such as the United Nations, has a vital role in confirming “that a genocidal threat does indeed exist” (Heindenrich, 2001, p. 79).

Even more challenging ideas have been proposed in the field, including Charny’s premise of an International Peace Army (IPA). This army “would move automatically into action any time that authenticated reports are received of the mass killing of any group of unarmed civilians” (Charny, 2011, par. 9), and it would include a military, a medical and humanitarian army, and an army for rebuilding communities. This army could also be established per the same liberal interpretation of articles 43 to 48 of the UN Charter used by Stanton to justify the Rapid Deployment Forces. Charny’s army, however, does not need to be authorized by the UN (although he hopes it would be), but by a “broad-based international community” (par. 10). This is where the proposal becomes problematic, as this broad-based approval is extremely difficult to attain in the international contexts. However, the establishment of such an army, whose sole purpose is to keep peace and reconstruct more tolerant communities in the wake of violence, would be a welcomed relief from the repetition of UN Peacekeeping missions with inadequate mandates.

In 2014, the United Nations released its own “Framework of analysis for atrocity crimes: A tool for prevention,” which it hoped would lead to better methods of prevention against atrocity crimes. In this framework, the United Nations identified common trends that are indicative of these crimes. The framework recognizes that

“atrocities crimes are not usually single or random events. Instead, they tend to develop in a dynamic process that offers entry points for action to prevent their occurrence” (p. 3-4).

As such, the United Nations itself recognizes that the process of escalation in violent conflicts is complex, and leaves opportunities for action before the conflict spirals into chaos. The institution of effective international safe havens, then, is one of the tools for prevention that should be deployed whenever possible at the stages of escalation in which persecution seems inevitable. This way, members of the victimized populations can flee to these spaces rather than to cultural safe havens that may be completely ill-equipped to provide any kind of safety,

These strategies for prevention are all varied and inventive, yet they all seek to tackle the issue of genocide head-on and in its totality. Genocide prevention must be a puzzle, with parts that attempt to tackle a variety of issues within the context of genocide. Much like the many nuanced conventions in international law, which seek to target very specified issues, a segmented approach to genocide prevention may provide a long-term solution. The issue of preventing genocide in its totality and without failure is one that is beyond the scope of this research. As such, this research focuses solely on the issue of safe havens.

Theories of Genocide

Dehumanization and ‘Othering’

The premise of dehumanization explains how individuals see others as subhuman, or lesser than themselves. Maiese (2013) explains dehumanization as “a psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of

moral consideration” (par. 1). This makes dehumanization an integral component of genocidal campaigns. Usually, the dehumanization of a group occurs parallel to their demonization, so that the victimized group becomes a threat and thus their suppression and/or extermination is not only made easier, but justified.

Dehumanization is part of the process of ‘othering,’ through which a framework of reference transforms from “us” to “us v. them.” This process of othering is identified by Waller (2007) as being composed of three parts: Us-them thinking, Moral Disengagement, and Blaming the victims. Together, these three components allow for perpetrators to be able to persecute entire groups. This process of disengagement is consistently seen in genocidal campaigns. By dehumanizing the targeted group, perpetrators rally around their own group and ensure its own protection from a perceived and socially constructed threat. Together, these three parts are integral to a broader explanation of genocide, which Waller (2007) depicts as follows:




Figure 1. Waller's model on how ordinary people commit genocide and mass killing

In regards to safe havens, the premises of dehumanization and othering come to light in the facility with which victims are exterminated in places which are often respected by everyone in the community, including the perpetrators. The use of schools in Bosnia as places for mass violence, for example, was not concentrated solely in the use of Islamic schools. Instead, schools were used that formed part of the community and provided ample space for the Serbian forces to work with, regardless of affiliation. This shows a disconnect between the importance of the spaces even to the perpetrator's own community, and the ease with which atrocities are committed when the targeted group is considered alien to that of the perpetrator. When there is a strongly demarcated "us" and "them" committing atrocities in any space becomes easier. This was also seen in Rwanda, where places that were pillars of Rwandan communities and used by both Hutu and Tutsi alike, were used as places for mass violence without any regard to their communal

importance of these spaces. In genocidal violence, the demarcation between one group and another is pivotal to the occurrence of violence.

This also applies to international safe havens, which are supposed to be neutral spaces that will protect anyone who needs protection. However, perpetrator groups tend to deem these spaces as part of the “other” and see no neutrality in their existence. This was especially true in Bosnia, where the UN safe areas established in six different cities were persistently attacked by the Serbian forces and constantly rejected as neutral and impartial zones. As such, these areas were often seen as fair to attack, culminating with the 1995 massacre at Srebreniça as the most violent instances of othering seen in the Bosnian conflict. The process of ‘othering’ then, is expanded to the international community who becomes part of the “them” and as such is fair game in the conflict.

It is important to note that othering is not only a one-sided phenomenon and in fact tends to become an identifier for all groups in the conflict. In Bosnia, many different factions were part of the conflict and they each believed their own group to be correct. As such, violence was ensued in all sides of the conflict – Serbs to Muslims, Muslims to Serbs, Croats to Muslims, Muslims to Croats, Serb to Croats, and Croats to Serbs. As such, the process of othering not only clearly defines the identity of the perpetrators, but also that of the victims. In many cases, these demarcations last for long after the conflict is over and may ignite future conflicts if the underlying issues are not resolved during the peace process.

The Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), is a recent addition to the dialogue surrounding international humanitarian law and responsibility. Basically, it certifies that the sovereignty of any nation is not more important than the protection of innocent civilians who might be targeted for destruction. As such, it is the duty of the international community to intervene as necessary for the protection of the victimized population. The three main points of R2P, as delineated by the United Nations, are as follows:

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and *other means* to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (emphasis added).

As such, the international community is encouraged to act through this responsibility to protect, which makes it clear that the lives of those targeted for destruction is more important than any state's sovereignty. In fact, this should also mean that the safety of the victims is more important than the sovereignty of any perpetrator, be it state or non-state

actors. It is important to note the mention of ‘other means’ for protection established in the third point above, because this would include the use of safe havens as a possible tool for the protection of the population from these crimes. When diplomacy fails to de-escalate conflicts and violence continues, the establishment of safe havens may be the only available means for protection.

Theoretically, R2P is an ideal framework to be used in genocide prevention, yet realistically it has proven not to be so simple. The premise that sovereignty is the most sacred aspect of statehood has been engrained into the international community’s collective consciousness since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. As such, changing this conception will take time and effort from international actors more devoted to the safety and security of those in need than on their own gains.

Safe Havens

Cultural Safe Havens

As stated in the introduction, the premise of safe havens in conflict zones is a relatively new idea at the international level, as the first truly international havens were not established until the 1990s. However, the premise of sanctuary in cultural spaces is historically rooted, appearing within English law as early as medieval times. At the time, “any consecrated church in England, and indeed throughout medieval Christendom, was understood to provide sanctuary” (Shoemaker, 2013, p. 15). Sanctuary was originally reserved for criminals seeking refuge from the law. This type of sanctuary provided by the church stood for centuries, until its abolition by Henry VIII, who amended the premise of sanctuary to protect only those culpable of lesser offenses (Shoemaker, 2013).

This idea of refuge in churches was not only present in England, but in many other Christian nations, including Catholic France, which was also forced to eventually amend the premise in an attempt at bringing justice to offenders. The expansion of Christianity, then, aided in the proliferation of the idea of churches as sanctuary throughout the world, mainly because the premise of sanctuary itself was rooted in scripture.

Michels and Blaikie (2013), in conducting research regarding the practice of providing sanctuary, discovered that many people provide sanctuary when they think the system has failed to provide protection, so that “communities and frequently churches were portrayed as having stepped into this role [of protector], and, in doing so, claimed the higher moral ground” (p. 30). In the United States, as recently as 2001-2009, research discovered a resurgence of sanctuary-based movements wishing to provide asylum to refugees who were workers and undocumented migrants (Michels & Blaikie, 2013). The justification provided for the issuance of asylum rested in the fact that there was a moral imperative to do so since those providing sanctuary felt that people needed help and someone had to do something about it (Michels & Blaikie, 2013). This same research addressed the historical proclivity for sanctuary to be provided in Canada, especially to U.S. military deserters, and a resurgence in the practice after the commencement of the Iraq War when, although not sanctioned by the government, the churches took up the cause and provided sanctuary to American soldiers (Michels & Blaikie, 2013). In addition, in 2017 the Trump administration has found a variety of cities fighting to keep their title as ‘sanctuary cities’ in which immigrants are protected from persecution and deportation.

As can be seen, there is a historical reoccurrence of churches providing sanctuary.

The growth and expansion of Christianity to all corners of the world, then, explains the presence of this type of safe haven as being globally recognized. However, the premise is not solely belong to Christianity, as supporters for the practice “justified sanctuary as part of every major faith tradition, premised on the sacredness of life” (Michels & Blaikie, 2013, p. 37). According to a report titled “Islam and Refugees” released by the UNHCR in 2012, “In Islam, asylum is a right of anyone seeking protection” (p. 1), with people from all races, ethnicities and nationalities accepted as receivers of that protection. Furthermore, “Islamic law, or Shariah, affirms the practice of providing sanctuary to persecuted persons and the sacredness of places, such as the Kaaba in Mecca” (“Islam and Refugees,” 2012, p.1). It stands to reason, then, that churches are not the only places of worship to which people run to in times of conflict. Overall, probably due to their connection to teachings that speak of mercy and compassion, places of worship in many cultures are sanctuary for victimized populations.

Other structures, particularly schools, are often seen as sanctuary. In America, for example, “the schoolhouse is a “safe haven,” separated from the world purposefully so that America’s young will learn in a protected environment, nurtured by caring adults...” (Watson & Watson, 2002, p.1) so that whenever it is disturbed by any act of violence, the very fabric of American society is shaken. The idea of childhood innocence as a mythical shroud that is intended to protect schools from atrocities is one that can be seen throughout the world, as evidenced by the social outrage witnessed when violence reaches schools or school children. The kidnappings of the Kenyan schoolgirls in 2014,

for example, provoked global outrage, not only because it was a terrorist attack, but also because it was an attack on the innocent within the context of their preconceived safety.

This premise of schools as safe havens is not specific to America, as depicted by the fact that on September 2014, a Human Rights Watch report advised that over six hundred schools had been used as shelter by displaced populations in Kurdish territory (Abrahams, 2014), especially the Yazidi who had been targeted for destruction by fighters of the Islamic State (ISIS). According to the report, the use of school as shelters was a natural occurrence, as refugees “camped out in whatever unoccupied structures they could find” (par. 1). In Iraq alone, 2,000 schools transformed from educational facilities to refugee camps. Structures such as hospitals, government buildings and universities have also been sanctuary, and they are often used as shelter in cases of natural disasters or during spurs of violent conflict.

These cultural safe havens have offered protection throughout history, yet they have also repeatedly failed at providing refuge. Donatella Lorch (1994) reported in regards to the dangers of these structures during the Rwandan genocide when she described the massacre at the Nyarubuye church complex and noted that there were so many bodies of the dead that it was “impossible to walk through without treading on them,” as the complex had rooms “filled with hundreds of corpses, shoulder to shoulder, and piled onto one another” (par. 4). Gwin (2014), in a photo essay aimed at revisiting the horrors of Rwanda, noted that refugees had fled to churches seeking refuge but had instead found themselves in killing grounds, with many of the parish priests sometimes actively contributing with the killers. Adam Jones (2011) further noted that in Rwanda,

“(t)ens of thousands of Tutsi sought sanctuary in schools, stadiums, and especially places of worship. But there was no sanctuary to be had” (p. 355). However, they have not failed only in Rwanda, even when most of the literature makes it seem as such. An article in the *Los Angeles Times* reported that in Sarajevo, “a school became a war zone filled with the screams and broken bodies of children...” (par. 1) when the Serb forces shelled the school in a mortar attack. In the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey, churches were burned down while those seeking shelter inside were left to die in the fire. In Nazi Germany, Guatemala, East Timor, Darfur, and in other cases of genocide, these spaces have been repeatedly targeted for destruction. It is important to note that many other structures perceived as sanctuary have been targets for destruction and sometimes strategically used for mass killing throughout genocidal campaigns.

In addition, the codification of these spaces as ‘off-limits’ in international humanitarian law, also provides an added stratum of safety on these spaces. Throughout several decades, the international community has worked on bettering humanitarian law, and as such has created conventions that deem spaces such as hospitals, places of worship, and other cultural spaces as forbidden for attack due to their civilian usage. In fact, customary international law calls for the protection of these spaces and for warring parties to do their best to protect and respect the non-combatants and their institutions in times of conflict. This means that an attack on these spaces is supposed to evoke immediate reactions from the international community, and as such these spaces may be deemed safer than others in cases of violence.

The concept of preconceptions is also important to discuss when speaking of cultural safe havens, as it is the preconceived idea of safety what sometimes fuels the victimized populations to seek shelter in these spaces. Much like internationally sanctioned safe havens, which themselves are infused with a perceived idea of safety and responsibility, cultural safe havens are very much shrouded by the idea that they are too sacrosanct to be violated by violence. A survivor account from one of Guatemala's many massacres tells of an instance in which the soldiers ordered the people of the town to head to the church and carry on with their prayers. In indignation, the survivor states that all the villagers asked each other: "Should we do it? My God, would they kill us during the mass? Maybe we shouldn't" (Jonas, McCaughan & Martinez, 1984, p. 159). In the end, they had no choice but to congregate at the church, but this account is a clear demonstration of the perception of barbarity that comes with the violation of sanctity. "My God, would they kill us during mass?" is a question that portrays the disbelief at such an action. After all, in a country dominated by religion, the violation of a house of God seemed too vicious to believe. This indignation is a recurrent theme in the accounts of individuals who have survived attacks in places they perceived as safe.

International Safe Havens

Safe zones emerged "from early humanitarian efforts to ensure the treatment and safety of the wounded, the sick and the civilian in conflict" (Elewa, 2001, p. 461). These safe havens were not international in scope until their recognition by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which codified the premise into part of international humanitarian law. However, it was not until the establishment of safe zones in Iraq that this practice

became internationalized. Prior to this, safe areas had been established without much international intervention and with consent from conflicting parties, with the Open Relief Centres in Sri Lanka as a prime example of the “traditional IHL [International Humanitarian Law] safe zone concepts” (Elewa, 2001, p. 461). According to Landgren (1995), within the context of humanitarian law, the essence of a safe zone is “that of a location within the disputed country or territory, neutral and free of belligerent activity, to which humanitarian access is ensured” (p.438). Thus, the entire premise of a safe zone is itself instilled with an expectation of safety that is to be provided by a neutral party and that is responsible for the safety of those who seek refuge within its limits.

However, there is an innate problem in seeing these places as having to be completely “neutral and free of belligerent activity” because this means that safety is only defined by the success of these spaces to achieve *complete* neutrality and to repel *all* attacks from perpetrating forces successfully. This is almost an impossibility in the context of genocidal violence for two reasons. First, neutrality and impartiality during genocide is often equivalent to inaction, as proven by the failure of UN troops on the ground to act on behalf of people who were being persecuted right in front of them. Secondly, while safe areas should seek to ensure as much protection as possible, they are often targeted for attacks and can seldom truly acquire any level of peace, as was seen in every safe area in Bosnia. However, these spaces still provided a much-needed level of safety that, while not total, kept many people alive who might otherwise have perished.

Heidenrich (2001) eloquently delineated the differences between safe havens and safe zones in the international arena. According to Heidenrich, “a *safe haven* is

sometimes called a *safe area* or a *protected area*. It is a sanctuary of sorts, a place where persecuted people can go to survive” (emphasis in original) (p.169). This definition corroborates the idea that the premise of safe haven is rooted in the idea of sanctuary, which has been transposed into the international arena. On the other hand, safe zones are much larger spaces within the conflicted state where parts of the country, sometimes “large enough to encompass several towns or even cities” (Heindenrich, 2001, p. 172) have been rendered safe by the presence of outside forces. Some of the most talked about safe zones include those established in Iraq for the Kurds and in Rwanda for the Tutsi. These different definitions, again, seem to be more semantic than operational, as both safe havens and safe zones are created within conflict zones for the same purpose: to protect a population in need.

Mohamed S. Elewa (2001) addresses the danger of international safe areas, specifically in regards to the failed area of Srebreniça, which was established in 1993 by decree from the United Nations Security Council but was lost to Serbian forces in 1995. Srebreniça was only one of six cities designated as safe areas during the conflict in Bosnia, yet although all sanctioned by the UN as places where military operations were prohibited and where aggression was supposed to cease, “up to 20,000 people, the overwhelming majority of which were from the Bosnian Muslim Community, were killed in and around the safe areas” (Elewa, 2001, p. 432). According to Elewa, many of these areas provided marginal living conditions and also violated some basic premises in the targeted population’s rights to seek asylum by compromising “the right of individuals to leave the state, and the universal and unconditional, rather than particular, nature of

asylum” (Elewa, 2001, p. 469). However, had these spaces no existed, the Bosnian Muslims would have had no place to hide, as their cultural spaces were strategically targeted for destruction by the perpetrators. As such, these safe areas were essential for the survival of thousands.

Elewa (2001) concludes that,

On the one hand, ensuring the relief of the internally displaced and other civilians within conflict zones is an important humanitarian task. Yet on the other hand, the right to be a refugee moves beyond the immediate securing of ‘safety’ in the emergency to offer much wider protections that speak to broader liberal aspirations to protect freedom and human dignity, not just ‘bare life’ (p. 472).

These authors have recognized that safe areas are often not as safe as they claim to be, and as such they must be treated with renewed care by an international community that recognizes its failures and is willing to change its methods.

Aligning with these two authors, Hyndman (2003) furthers the criticism of safe zones by pointing out that the safe cities established in Bosnia in 1993 “created a target for aggressors *and* participated in a humanitarian exercise that inadvertently ethnically cleansed large tracts of rural territory now available to these same aggressors” (emphasis in original) (p. 175). In pointing this out, Hyndman (2003) recognizes that safe zones can be counterproductive to their cause, as they can become conducive to the mass killing of targeted peoples by providing a space in which they are consolidated and vulnerable. Much like cultural safe havens, these spaces cannot be effective unless they are highly protected. In the case of international safe havens, the inability to provide proper

protection has backfired in several occasions. However, to dismiss these spaces as completely failed is to narrow the true scope of their role in keeping many targeted individuals safe during the violence.

One of the most well-known controversies surrounding international safe havens is addressed by Sophie Haspeslagh (n.d.), in her essay “Safe Havens in Rwanda: Operation Turquoise,” where she specifically criticizes the formation of humanitarian zones in Rwanda during the genocide. Termed *Operation Turquoise*, the mission established safe havens in the country and named these Safe Humanitarian Zones. These areas covered a fifth of the country’s territory, thus proving essential in providing safety to the victimized population. However, these zones were not effectively protected or demilitarized, as “extremist Hutu militia members who were still armed operated in the zones, intimidating moderate Hutus and killing Tutsi” (Haspeslagh, n.d., par. 5). Haspeslagh points out that safe zones still proved important in the protection of approximately 14,000 people in the region, as well as in the cessation of victim migration into neighboring Zaire, which could not have survived the overflow of people.

Jones (2011) notes that this intervention, although successful at saving many Tutsi, was not meant solely for that. He states that, “protecting Tutsi was not the main purpose of the intervention. Rather, the operation was a continuation of the long-standing French support for the Hutu Power government” (p. 359). Although the validity of this safe zones has been questioned, the reality is that it did provide shelter to thousands of people who would have otherwise been exposed to continued violence. As such, it is important not to ignore the successes of these spaces when considering their possible

institution in future conflicts. The fact that they could not provide protection to everyone inside and that they were used by the *genocidaires* as a path to safety in Zaire, does not negate the fact that many more would have perished if these areas had not been created.

Landgren (1995) balances the negative outlook towards the safe zones established by the French operation in Rwanda, noting, much like Haspeslagh, that their establishment not only reduced the flow of refugees to Zaire substantially, but also “protected some Tutsis in the zone” and “protected Hutu troops from revenge killings” (p. 450-451). Thus, although not entirely successful in keeping everyone safe, these humanitarian zones were not irrelevant. This is important because it shows that international safe havens are indeed essential to assuage conflict and lessen death. Arguably, what needs to change is not their establishment, but the methods the international community utilizes in the creation of these spaces.

Not all safe zones have been unsuccessful, however, as depicted by the realization of the Open Relief Centers in Sri Lanka during the conflict between the Tamil Tigers and the government of Sri Lanka. These centers accommodated up to 20,000 people during the conflict, and provided safety during violence. They were established through an agreement between the warring parties to have these spaces as safe. Thus, these places were not imposed on the conflict zone, but were rather born from within it. Hyndman (2003) states,

“What distinguishes the ORC [Open Relief Centers] in Northern Sri Lanka from the safe cities of Bosnia and the preventive zone of Somalia are two factors: first, its demilitarized character at the front line of the war and yet its inception *outside*

the rubric of humanitarian law; and second, local consensus among warring factions on its identity as a safe area *before* UNHCR arrived” (emphasis in original) (p. 179).

Once established, these centers for relief were supported by an expansive network of organizations already on the ground, including Oxfam, Doctors without Borders, and the Sri Lankan Red Cross, among others. Thus, these successful establishments were so because they were consented to by all parties, and because they had the support of a vast array of organizations already working within the communities, rather than only from international entities too far removed from the issues in the ground. However, as shall be seen later in this study, consent does not always translate into success at providing safety.

Further criticism of these international safe havens is linked to the idea of international asylum. Long (2012) argues that the concept of safe areas created within the country of origin of the victimized population is “...particularly difficult to reconcile with the fundamental right to seek asylum outside a country of persecution, blurring the distinction between the ‘right to remain’ and the obligation not to leave” (p. 465). This argument is insightful, as it recognizes that the establishment of safe havens within the countries in which genocide is taking place leaves the population with less options to flee and allows the international community to look away from the conflict by justifying their denial in terms of already existing safety. If safe zones are established within the conflict area, there is no need for international actors to bear the brunt of refugees. However, safe havens within conflict zones have sometimes become dangerous, as illustrated by the massacre in Srebreniça and the conflicts within the humanitarian zones in Rwanda. As

such, the right to asylum should be continued even when refugees reach the safety of these havens.

Overall, most of the literature regarding international safe havens is scathing, criticizing the establishment of these zones without the necessary protection to ensure the safety of the peoples who flee to them. Thus, the potential danger of these spaces has been recognized, with recommendations for solutions revolving mostly around the establishment of better security measures or increased personnel. However, there needs to be a recognition that the establishment of preemptive plans for action, the collaboration of regional rapid deployment forces, the use of victim-targeted propaganda, and the need for stronger physical structures all can help better the success of these areas. Ideally, a combination of all these components with higher levels of security would allow international safe havens to better live up to their name.

Conclusions

Genocide literature is as vast as it is complex, with scholars defining and redefining the crime in an attempt at understanding it. As such, genocide scholarship covers a vast array of typologies and theoretical frameworks that seek to prevent the repetition of the crime. However, there are lacunas in the literature that need attention; one of them being the roles of cultural and international safe havens in genocidal campaigns and the relationship between them. As it stands, the literature says little about the possible dangers of cultural safe havens, which are made up of places thought safe by the target population. These cultural safe havens are often places that have historically served as shelter, such as churches and other places of worship, but they may also be

places that are deemed safe simply because they are perceived as such, much like schools, police stations and government buildings. The target population's use of these structures as shelters in times of conflict often leaves them vulnerable to mass violence precisely because it serves the purpose of aggregating as many of the victims as possible in a single, inescapable place. The literature vaguely addresses these spaces, with only a few references to the churches in Rwanda as examples.

On the other hand, the idea of international safe havens is much more addressed in the literature, with criticism revolving around the ineffectiveness of many of these places, as well as around their role in inhibiting refugees from seeking international asylum. Elewa (2001) recognizes that "it is beyond doubt that the safe area concept would fail unless the security of those areas was guaranteed and protected..." (p.456). In this case, Elewa (2001) speaks specifically of Bosnia, as the protection needed to come from UNPROFOR. Yet his observation applies to all cases of safe havens. Thus, if stronger, more protected international safe havens are established, the need for cultural safe havens will be reduced. Collectively, however, the international community has shied away from instituting safe havens in a post-Srebreniça environment, even when conflict such as the war in Syria and the ethnic cleansing in Myanmar are in desperate need of intervention. This is because the international community seems to focus more on the failures in Srebreniça, than the successes of the other five areas. Consequently, the international community seems to have narrowed the scope of analysis only to the negative aspects and not to the successes.

The overall premise of safe havens is much more complex than the mere existence of these structures and their use as shelter by targeted populations. After all, it is often the preconception of these spaces as safe what leads the victims to them. As such, it is this preconception that needs to be addressed through tactics that advise populations at risk of the dangers they face when congregating in one place without proper protection. The establishment of preemptive plans for safe havens, as well as the use of regional organizations and their rapid deployment forces and victim-targeted propaganda, may all prove imperative in reducing casualties in times of genocide.

Chapter 3: Research Methods

“The intellectual roots of content analysis... can be traced far back in human history, to the beginning of the conscious use of symbols and voice, especially writing”

– Krippendorff

Methodology

Every research must be based on a method, and this one is no exception. Whether qualitative or quantitative methodology, all research must be constructed to ensure that the inferences drawn from the research will be valid conclusions that are not only sensible, but also replicable by others in the field. This research relies in qualitative methodology. From the qualitative methods available, including case studies, grounded theory, content analysis, and more, the researcher has chosen to use that of content analysis, where the analysis and understanding of existing information is essential in discovering new points of view through which to explain social phenomena. In addition, content analysis will be advanced by using case studies, to delve deeper into specific cases of genocidal violence and their relation to the roles of safe havens. This chapter delineates the methodology chosen, as well as the reasons for its choosing, so that the reader may understand the approach to the subject.

Using content analysis as the methodology for this research is helpful, as it allows for the amalgamation of instances of safe haven usage, their categorization, and their explanation as either failed or successful in providing safety, which will help in furthering the understanding of the crime of genocide as a whole. As such, a

comprehensive understanding of the potential dangers as well as the possible successes of safe havens is essential in developing future models of prevention.

The method of content analysis falls under the category of qualitative research and it is a method that has been used extensively in the field of social sciences. As Krippendorff (2013) states, content analysis has been an integral part of human history and its development because it has been used since the beginning of language, especially written language. Krippendorff identifies three essential characteristics in modern content analysis, which include content analysis as an empirically grounded method; content analysis as transcending notions of symbols, contents and intent; and content analysis as forced to develop a methodology on its own, which allows researchers to “plan, execute, communicate, reproduce, and critically evaluate their analyses...” (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 4). Historically, content analysis has been the “reading of a body of texts, images, and symbolic matter” (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 10) to arrive at new conclusions.

Although originally mostly used in the field of communications, content analysis has evolved to a methodology used in a wide range of fields. Krippendorff (2013) also states that,

... content analysis has evolved into a repertoire of methods of research that promise to yield inferences from all kinds of verbal, pictorial, symbolic, and communication data. Beyond the technique’s initially journalistic roots, the past century has witnessed the migration of content analysis into various fields and the clarification of many methodological issues (p. 23)

Thus, the use of this method of research necessitates ample access to materials that may be used for the development of new understandings, which is why it is the chosen methodology for this study.

Types of Content Analysis

Hsiu-Fang Hsieh (2005) identifies three types of content analysis: Conventional Content Analysis, Directed Content Analysis, and Summative Content Analysis. The first type of analysis “is generally used with a study design whose aim is to describe a phenomenon” (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1279) for which there is a limited theoretical and research literature. This type of research follows the data without being prescribed by the researcher, and is flexible enough to allow new insights to develop from the analysis. Typically, this research is conducted by immersing into the data and coding “by first highlighting the exact words from the text that appear to capture key thoughts and concepts” (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1279). This analysis is usually not framed by a prescribed theoretical framework, and thus can create new theories and explanations for social phenomena that are lacking in the literature.

The second type of analysis, Directed Content Analysis, is based on preexisting theories or explanations about a specific phenomenon. However, these theories or explanations are lacking in some way and thus need further research to fill the lacunas in the knowledge. “The goal of a directed approach to content analysis is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1281). For this method of analysis, categories are prescribed to answer the questions that have not been answered in the existing literature, thus guiding the data search. In an interview, for

example, these categories may guide the questions asked of the participants. The results from this type of analysis usually provide both supportive and non-supportive evidence to the theory used, thus affecting the existing conversation and either agreeing with it or guiding it towards new concepts and understandings of social phenomena. The use of directed content analysis suffers from a proclivity to bias, which is why “researchers might be more likely to find evidence that is supportive rather than nonsupportive of a theory” (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1283). To avoid this, there needs to be an “auditing trail” that can be used for the researcher to stay objective, and for others in the field to check the results.

Lastly, Summative Content Analysis, in which the “focus is on discovering underlying meanings of the words or the content” (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1284). This analysis begins as a quantitative process in which the repetition of words or content is tabulated by the researcher, and continues further when the researcher analyzes the context in which the identified terms are repeated, and the meaning of the differences in repetition. Through this research, the researchers “try to explore word usage or discover the range of meaning that a word can have in normal use” (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1285). Thus, this methodology works well when the researcher needs to establish an understanding of the broader context for terms that have been identified as important for furthering the field of study.

This research is a combination of the first two types of content analysis, as it seeks to expand on a subject that is lacking within the literature and requires deep immersion into the data and coding processes to be able to succeed. At the same time,

however, this is a directed research, since it is very specific to a single subject: safe havens. The prescription of categories aid in the guiding of the research towards a specific aim: to add to the literature in regards to the roles of safe havens in genocidal states. As part of this directed research, the study is at risk of falling victim to researcher bias. This issue is addressed by the research in several ways to ensure neutrality and trustworthiness of the information. Overall, this research, although directed at a specific issue at hand, needs to still be flexible enough, like a conventional analysis, to create new theories and explanations for the understanding of a phenomenon that is seldom addressed in the existing literature.

Historical Sociology

Historical sociology argues that history and sociology are not two separate entities, but are in fact very much connected to each other. This is because “sociological explanation is necessarily historical” (Abram, 1982, p. 2), as social understanding is rooted in historical events. Abrams (1982), argues that recognizing that history and sociology merge allows sociology to become capable of “answering our urgent questions about why the world is as it is; about why particular men and women make the particular choices they do and why they succeed or fail in their projects” (p. 3). Thus, the historical side of research serves as proof and explanation to sociological premises and theoretical questions. It is through this method that sociologists seek to find historical answers to questions posed in a variety of contexts.

Historical Sociology is defined as “the attempt to understand the relationship of personal activity and experience on the one hand and social organisation on the other as

something that is continuously constructed in time” (Abrams, 1982, p. 16). Therefore, the processes that connect personal activity and experience to the broader structure of social organizations are historically rooted. It is for this reason that this is an accurate model for this research, as the researcher seeks to understand the roles of safe havens in genocidal campaigns, and to the relationship between cultural and international safe havens. To do so without an historical context would hinder the validity of this research.

Historical Sociology arose as part of a movement attempting to understand the rise of modernity, with Karl Marx being thought to be one of its founders. Marx, and subsequently Weber, are both seen as historical sociologists, who saw this methodology as “central to an understanding of the present and neither saw a clear disciplinary separation of history and sociology” (Delanty & Isin, 2003, p. 9). In their attempt to understand the changing landscape of the time, the rise of industrialism, and the emergence of modernity, Marx and Weber looked at the history behind the social change. After all, “historical sociology tries to make explicit the relationship between social theory and historical change; that is, historical sociology uses social theory in a self-conscious way to outline general propositions about the nature of historical development” (Kelly, 2003, p. 11). This leaves a vast and flexible space for interpretation, thus allowing researchers to ask sociological questions and propose sociological theories that can be explained through the contextual use of history as both shaped by and shaping social phenomena.

In this case, the sociological questions pertain the roles of safe havens in genocidal states, while the varied historical contexts studied provide not only an

understanding to why safe havens can sometimes be transformed into places of violence, but also how this is achieved. In addition, historical context also provides examples of safe havens as successful in their manifest functions, and thus provides the conditions necessary for future success. Overall, this approach allows for the development of answers to questions that can be used in a modern context, while still being rooted in an historical past.

Historical Sociology is a comparative framework in which what is different between cases is secondary to what is similar. As Lachman (2013) states, “historians and historical sociologists both devote themselves to explaining how social actors are constrained by what they and their predecessors did in earlier times” (p. 9). Thus, current social phenomena are analyzed and explained according to historical fact. The historical aspect of this research seeks to prove, case by case, that it is time to challenge the preconception of safety that shrouds safe havens, while at the same time arguing that the definition of safety itself must be addressed for future implementations of safe havens in conflict zones. In addition, a new method is required for providing safety in genocidal states. As such, what is similar between the case studies will be much more valuable than what is different between them for the conception of a new model for intervention in what pertains safe havens. Shaw (2013) argues that historical sociology must adhere to a methodology that avoids abstraction and grand theory, and instead focuses on “historically grounded generalization” (p. 9). This is exactly what this research seeks to do, as the generalizations provided regarding safe havens are not sociological abstractions, but rather rooted in history.

Existing literature with similar methodology

The use of content analysis rooted in the premise of historical sociology can be found in genocide literature, as it is through a look at historical events that we can formulate new understandings of the crime, especially since access to these conflict zones is scarce and access to victims and perpetrators may prove difficult to come by for research. Much of the literature is rooted in historical accounts, written testimonies, and previously developed theories that have been proposed throughout the years. Martin Shaw's (2015), *What is Genocide?*, was developed using the methodology of historical sociology, in which he focuses "unapologetically on sociological conceptualization" while at the same time linking his arguments "to particular cases and historical themes." He argues that genocide is a phenomenon that changes its appearance throughout time – throughout history. Shaw's other work, *Genocide and International Relations* (2013), also follows a similar approach.

Michael Mann (2005), hailed by Shaw (2013) as the only major figure in historical sociology to deal with genocide, wrote *The Dark Side of Democracy*, in which he deals with the historical development of genocide, proposing the argument that it is during modernity that "murderous [ethnic] cleansing" becomes commonplace. Mann proposes eight different theses that explain the rise of genocide as a crime in modernity, while evaluating historical events to provide proof to his arguments. Chalk and Jonassohn's, *The History and Sociology of Genocide* (1990), as the name suggests, endeavors to understand the sociological understanding of genocide through an historical analysis that encompasses the definitional development of the word "genocide," and a

detailed look into historical cases of the crime, in an attempt to understand the phenomenon of genocide and our continuously evolving definitional interpretations of it. This is similar to the approach of this research, as it attempts to develop a sociological understanding of safe havens, while linking the argument to empirical and historical data found in the literature.

Elizabeth Hope Murray (2015), in her work, *Disrupting Pathways to Genocide*, applies a methodology of historical sociology to further her argument regarding the process of ideological radicalization. She argues that the methodology of historical sociology is one that uses history to explain causation, so that sequencing is highlighted in the generalizations made from the research. She states,

HS [Historical Sociology] puts facts and circumstances gathered by historians to use in a larger picture, thus deriving macro and mid-level theories that can be applied across socio-spatial spheres. Historical events are not the outcome of historical sociological research; historical events are instead the foundation of historical sociological research (p. 24)

Murray is keen to advise in regards to the problems with this approach, especially in regards to researcher bias. This is a problem that she tackles in the same way as the researcher of this study, by “checking and cross-checking” the information gathered within the literature “in an attempt to ensure a true representation of historical fact and interpretive analysis” (p. 27).

Although demarcated as its own method, the idea of combining history and sociology is one that seems to be innately present in the study of genocide, as the crime

cannot be understood without a historical context and broader sociological questions.

Even Waller's famous inquiry into the nature of evil and the commonality of perpetrators, cannot be answered without an understanding of historical contexts or without the presence of historical facts that may prove or disprove a researcher's arguments. Thus, historical sociology relies on content analysis at its base, and adds to it by answering overarching questions of social phenomena rooted in historical fact, in an attempt at understanding society better.

Primary Research Questions

Like every research, this one began with research questions that soon became the catalysts for the analysis of a vast range of materials. "Research questions are the targets of the analyst's inferences from available texts. Generally, such questions delineate several possible and initially uncertain answers" (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 37). Thus, these questions were meant to guide the research and seek to fill lacunas in the existing literature. For this research, there were two main questions that needed to be asked:

1. What are the roles of cultural and international safe havens in the context of genocidal violence?
2. What is the relationship between cultural and international safe havens?

As the research began, these questions were meant to be answered from inferences that can be drawn from existing texts using a content analysis methodology that uses case studies as its groundwork, while using historical sociology as the method that links historical fact to social phenomena.

The use of research questions is essential in the development of research, as they allow the analysts to have a purpose in mind as they attempt to sift through hundreds of pages already filled with information. Krippendorff (2013) states that, “Content analysts who start with a research question read text for a purpose, not for what an author may lead them to think or what they say in the abstract” (p. 37). Thus, the purpose of this research is to answer the questions in a manner that adds to the fields of genocide studies and conflict resolution through both the recognition and the understanding of the possible dangers and the proven successes of safe havens in genocidal states. This is to be accomplished by analyzing existing data in historical accounts of safe havens as places of mass killings and as places of safety.

Sampling Strategies and Inclusion Criteria

Once the research questions were identified, content analysis necessitated the selection of a sample. In this case, the sample refers to the genocidal campaigns that are analyzed throughout the study. Mainly, this research focuses on some of the major genocidal campaigns of the twentieth century, including the Armenian genocide, the Rwandan genocide, and the genocide in Bosnia. Thus, the research seeks to apply the findings to future genocides. From within the content of these genocidal campaigns, samples were selected for evaluation from historical data mentioning the use of safe havens as places for safety in genocidal campaigns. The cases were selected according to the type of safe haven (cultural or international), the type of use given to the structure (as place of refuge by the victims or as strategic places for violence by the perpetrators), and the end result (successful at providing safety or not).

In regards to cultural safe havens, the detailed accounts of cases occurring in the Armenian genocide and in Rwanda were selected because they show a pattern of repetition throughout time regardless of the decades in between instances of violence, thus proving that the use of safe havens for mass killing is not only specific to Rwanda. In regards to international safe havens, the Rwandan genocide and the genocide in Bosnia are some of the best-known cases of safe havens. Since these places incentivize a constant flow of victims to seek shelter within them, their failure at providing safety is a failure at achieving their intended purpose. However, to dismiss them as wholly ineffective is to dismiss much of their success. This means that a holistic discussion of the roles of these safe havens is necessary for our understanding of their importance to the victimized populations, and for our understanding of safety.

In both types of safe havens, the number of deaths was not a factor in the selection, but rather, the selection was defined by the inclusion of the massacres within the canon of genocidal massacres. Regardless of the number of victims, the intent to eliminate specific groups of people was more important than the final toll of the violence within these spaces. This is important to note, as massacres occur within safe spaces all over the world and during many instances of violent conflict. However, the purpose of this research is to determine the role of these spaces as it pertains genocidal campaigns, thus necessitating intent as part of the violence.

To truly understand the meaning of safety and its possible replication, cases must also be included in which both cultural and international havens were successful at their manifest functions. These cases were selected through some very simple and straight-

forward criteria: success at providing safety in genocidal campaigns. They are essential for the research because they depict some of the needed conditions for the successful protection of victimized populations. A thorough understanding of these cases may prove invaluable in developing a plan for action and prevention that will prove effective in cases of mass violence.

Method of Analysis

For this research, gathering of data from a variety of mediums was essential. The data was found in the existing literature in many of its forms: books, articles, archives, newspapers, websites, etc... Importance is given to the existing literature within the field of genocide studies and to accounts written by those who lived through the violence, perpetrated the violence, or were witnesses to it. After all, these memoirs are essential to understanding the occurrence of violence in genocidal campaigns. The use of content analysis for this research sought to understand the roles of safe havens in the context of genocidal violence, the preconceptions of safety that shape behavior, and the true meaning of safety as it pertains the institution of international safe havens.

This focus on the roles of safe havens is part of a narrowing down of the existing content, as the existing material is vast and multidimensional in scope. Consequently, an analysis that attributed meaning to all existing content was an effort in futility, which is why the issue of safety was singled out as particularly important to study. "Focusing on selected aspects of your material is what distinguishes QCA [Qualitative Content Analysis] from many other qualitative methods for data analysis" (Schreier, 2012, p. 4). Furthermore, this focus on safety was the best way to answer the research question

formulated for this research. Although content analysis may be conducted on a variety of messaging systems, such as “written text, transcribed speech, verbal interactions, visual images, characterizations, nonverbal behaviors, sound events, or any other message type” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 24), this research focuses mostly on text analysis, pulling from different mediums used for text content.

In the process of collecting data it is necessary to identify exactly what will be collected from the content. For this research, the collection pertained instances in two different categories: Safe havens that proved to be dangerous, and safe havens that proved to be safe. The first category looked at cases of mass killings within safe spaces from a variety of sources that spanned the breath of the genocidal campaigns selected. The narratives of these instances are scattered throughout the literature in the form of historical accounts, testimonials from victims, witnesses and perpetrators, newspaper articles written at the times of the events in question, and personal memoirs from survivors and witnesses. In addition, similar sources were used to find the instances in which safe havens did in fact prove successful at protecting the population.

Processes for Data Analysis

Prior to getting into the process of coding, the most important part of this process was to choose the three cases that would be analyzed for the research. Genocide is not the most prevalent form of conflict in human existence, but it has indeed repeated itself enough in human history to make choosing only a few cases a challenge. As such, an explanation as to why these three specific cases were needed is in order:

1. The Armenian Genocide, which occurred in 1915, occurred within a context in which international humanitarian law was virtually non-existent. As such, it provides a baseline for understanding the effects of humanitarian law in the protection of the victimized populations. The lack of a concept of ‘safe havens’ in international law, means that the actions of the international community were differently defined. To understand the subsequent development of safe havens, it is important to understand how similar situations occurred before the development of these ideas.
2. The Rwandan Genocide and the Genocide in Bosnia were two cases that occurred almost simultaneously, and in which international safe havens were instituted. As such, these cases provide two great examples of international safe havens in cases of genocidal violence as recognized by the legal definition of ‘genocide’ in the UNCG.
3. All three cases provide different cultural perceptions and occurred within different regional and international contexts, which together provide a good framework for the analysis of cultural safe havens.

Collecting instances of safe haven uses from the literature was the most time-consuming part of the research, as these instances were sometimes hidden within text without any clear demarcation of their existence. This is because most of the scholarship does not have sections specifically on the roles of safe havens, but instead, the accounts of the use of these havens are found within the context of broader historical accounts of the

violence. This is especially true when speaking of cultural safe havens, as the literature regarding international safe havens is much more expansive.

The first step of the process was to find as many instances as possible that met the sampling criteria and were pertaining to the genocidal campaigns selected. To begin this process, existing reference material (such as *Dictionary of Genocide* (Totten & Bartrop, 2007), *Atrocities, Massacres and War Crimes* (Mikaberidze, 2013), *Encyclopedia of Genocide* (Charny, 1999), and others) were essential to discover instances of safe haven use within the selected genocidal campaigns. After identifying useful information from these texts, the research continued into genocide-specific literature, such as *Machete Season* (Hatzfeld, 2006), *The History of the Armenian Genocide* (Dadrian, 1995), and others. These steps allowed the research to develop in a sequential and organized manner, and allowed for corroboration of the facts. This process was repeated for international safe havens as well, but using the literature available on international safe havens.

The second step was to sort these instances into specific categories that take them past the genocide-specific context into the broader context of safe havens. These categories are as follows:

1. Instances of mass killing in cultural safe havens within genocidal states
2. Instances of mass killing in international safe havens established because of genocidal campaigns
3. Instances in which safe spaces, both cultural and international, proved successful at protecting the targeted population during genocidal campaigns

These categories organized the previously recognized instances of safe haven use, into definite groupings that were then used to draw inferences about the subject at hand.

The purpose of this categorization was also to make the construction of the study an organized and carefully curated endeavor. This is because “when there is a careful match among the theory being tested, the data collected, and the research question, there is construct validity – one important type of affirmation that your study has been carefully designed and implemented” (Brause, 2000, Ch. 10). After all, no amount of research will be of any use to the field if it cannot be validated.

This categorization was part of a coding process that included the recognition of the major spaces of safety used in each case study. These spaces were equally analyzed for both the instances of violence and the instances of safety, and the occurrence of either violence or safety in these spaces were recorded for this research (See Table 1).

Table 1

Safe Haven Categories

Cultural		International	
Cases of Violence	Cases of Safety	Cases of Violence	Cases of Safety
Armenia	Armenia	Armenia	Armenia
Missions, Churches, Monasteries	Missions, Churches, Monasteries	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
Rwanda	Rwanda	Rwanda	Rwanda
Churches, Schools, Convents	Churches, Schools, Convents	Humanitarian Zones, Refugee Camps	Humanitarian Zones, Refugee Camps
Bosnia	Bosnia	Bosnia	Bosnia
Mosques, Orphanages, Schools	Not Applicable	UN Safe Areas	UN Safe Areas

The individual instances of violence cannot be depicted in this table, as there are too many – however, these are individually assessed in the subsequent case studies. As can be seen, it was important to narrow down the number of instances to include only the most important for each case. These spaces change per the case study (Armenia, Rwanda or Bosnia), for two reasons:

1. Cultural safe havens are, as their name suggests, culturally relative, which means that different cultures will have different places of importance in cases of mass violence, and different historical contexts will define behavior.
2. The international community has reacted differently to all cases of genocide, which means that international safe havens will also be unique to the case at hand.

After categorizing the locations used as safe havens in both cultural and international contexts, further categorization was needed as either successful for the protection of the victimized population or not successful. Once in these two groups, patterns began to emerge that were then transformed into the findings. For example, in all three case studies, cultural spaces were strategically used by perpetrators for the enhancement of their violent campaigns, whether by using them as places for torture or sexual violence, or by goading the victims into these spaces by promising protection but in fact ensuing violence. In Armenia and Rwanda, the effectiveness of cultural spaces in providing safety to the victimized populations was directly contingent on third-party intervention. The same process occurred when analyzing international safe havens. Case-specific findings are provided in the conclusion section of each case study chapter. The overall findings of

the study, which include findings for all three cases, are specified in the 'Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations' section of the research.

To arrive at these findings, the process of categorization had to be rigorous, as not only were patterns emerging that needed to be recognized, but also a clear triangulation of the data was needed to avoid researcher bias. The process involved a color-coding system that moved progressively from finding the cases of safety or violence in safe havens, to then identifying patterns such as third-party intervention and strategic use of these spaces by perpetrators. During the first phase, instances of violence within safe havens were coded in purple, while instances in which these spaces proved successful, were coded in orange. As patterns began to arise, cases of third-party intervention were coded green, and cases of strategic use of cultural safe havens as places for mass violence were coded yellow. A blackboard was used to write down these identified patterns. In addition, a notebook with notes for each case study was also used.

When the data sources were online and thus were not able to be coded with page flags, the researcher saved these files and highlighted the information needed using the same colors as before, sometimes digitally, or sometimes by printing the information. Each of these printed sources were then saved in specific case files, with all those relating to Armenia, Rwanda and Bosnia, filed into individual folders.

To keep up with the triangulation of the data, cases that were reported by different sources, ranging from witness accounts, survivor or perpetrator testimony, reports or scholarly analyses, were coded bright pink. When these sources were online and thus already highlighted in a case-specific color, the researcher wrote down the event in the

research notebook, and then listed the sources in which the event was mentioned. This way, the researcher could determine if the cases had been found in more than one source, and thus reinforce their validity. In an attempt to not confuse any of the coding, colored legends were created and taped to the research notebook to keep the information in order and to remind the researcher of which color was assigned to each case.

This method was repeated when considering international safe havens. As such, the instances in which the international community established safe havens in any of the three case studies, were coded to find instances of violence within these spaces. In addition, factors that determined the success of these spaces were also coded for, to try to create holistic recommendations for actions that could be help create future models of international intervention. This research involved an ample use of page flags and in the end, the research sources were colorful and filled with annotations that helped sort through the information and arrive at cohesive conclusions.

Ethical Considerations

The ethical considerations of research done through a methodology of content analysis are invariably tied to the researcher's interpretation of such data. It is possible that the researcher may be biased to interpret the data in a specific way. To avoid this, however, the researcher has ensured that the data provides ample historical examples. Thus, the analysis of content has not been solely interpretational, but it has been rooted in historical fact that itself has been cross-checked across different sources to provide as holistic an account as possible for each case study.

The selection of the examples was varied, ranging from an analysis of personal accounts of people who lived through the conflict, to scholarly accounts from reputable sources in the field of genocide studies. Furthermore, the use of archives from well-known institutions such as the Holocaust Memorial Museum have been selected not only for their reliability, but also for their ability to be accessed by anyone interested in the subject. Thus, the ethical considerations of a biased research have been diminished as much as possible by the researcher.

Triangulation of Data

Member-checking is an important part of the research process, yet it cannot occur without participants. However, to ensure a balanced and unbiased approach to research, the triangulation of data occurred by cross-referencing historical accounts of safe spaces used in genocidal campaigns between different content sources. The scholarly work regarding genocide has greatly expanded, as Samuel Totten (2011) so eloquently argues in his article regarding the state and future of genocide studies. Thus, there is now a vast range of data from which the researcher was able to pull from when conducting this analysis. The inferences arrived at from this analysis are backed by a series of already existing and published information, accessible to anyone in the field. Using a variety of sources, the researcher managed to check the trustworthiness of the information, consequently discarding that which could not be cross-referenced against any other documents, and keeping only those instances that could be cross-referenced with at least one more source. As explained above, the triangulation of the data was coded with its own specific color so that it was easy to find the repetition of cases in multiple sources.

Thus, the list of examples was narrowed and the margin for bias reduced. In total, over 200 sources were used, ranging from books, journal articles, interview transcripts, news sources, personal memoirs and organizational reports (See Figure 2).




Figure 2. Source Categorization

The categorization of the sources was broad, with the category of “Book” including memoirs such as *Armenian Golgotha*, *The Story of the Near East Relief*, *Forgiveness: The Rwandan Way*, and more; interview-based books, such as *Machete Season*, *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide: The Women of Srebreniça Speak*, and more; as well as edited works, such as *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, *Human Destructiveness and Politics: The Twentieth Century as an Age of Genocide*, and others. In addition, the category of “News Article” includes newspaper articles from archived material, as well as easily accessible online. “Report” includes the final reports from

organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as the final reports from Justice Tribunals and the International Criminal Court. Overall, every source fell within one of these categories, and those that were in a category of their own, such as those in “Audio” “Video” or “Conference Paper” were given their own place in the graph.

As can be seen, all the information regarding the roles of both cultural and international safe havens for all three case studies, was available in the existing literature. Thus, the process of analysis had to become one of making new connections between the existing content and providing new conclusions and solutions that could further the fields of conflict resolution and genocide studies.

Expected Contributions of the Proposed Research

A look at genocide literature provides an over-arching picture of the use of safe havens in genocidal states. However, a distinction between cultural and international safe havens has not been made, nor has a connection been established between the use of cultural safe havens and the subsequent need for better and well-established international safe havens. Although scholars do mention attacks on these spaces throughout their writing of genocidal campaigns, there still lacks a recognition that the potential dangers of safe havens are a common thread in genocidal campaigns. Thus, this research will add to the literature by filling this lacuna. Furthermore, the research seeks to provide an understanding of the preconceptions of safety that lead the masses to seek safety in these places while attempting to address how ‘safety’ can truly be defined and assessed. Thus,

the researcher seeks to make recommendations that could reduce the grim toll of death these genocidal campaigns bring forth.

Limitations to the Study

Inferences and generalizations must be made from collected data, and must be confined to the limitations of this study, as there should not be any generalizations that are unsupported by the gathered data (Brause, 2000). Limitations to research are sometimes inherent in the methodology chosen, as is the case for the use of content analysis. Krippendorff (1989) identifies three limitations that come with the territory of using content analysis as the preferred methodology for research. First, is the method's commitment to scientific decision making, as this requires many units of analysis that are essential in quantitative analysis, not qualitative ones. The second is the issue of replicability, which arises from an inability for the methodology to be rooted in unchangeable data. Content analysis as a qualitative method is rooted in contexts that may change per the existence of different communicators or social groups, thus making replicability a problematic phenomenon. Even when rooted in historical data, this research runs the risk of future discoveries changing the history known, and consequently changing the applicability to this study. Lastly, content analysis is limited in its contribution to social theory, as it comes from pre-existing material and thus has restricted flexibility in rearranging the existing canon of literature.

The limited access to primary sources is also part of the limitations of this study, since even memoirs tend to go through an editing process that will redact the experiences of survivors, witnesses and perpetrators. As such, it was important to find as many works

as possible that spoke through the voice of those who experienced the violence first-hand. This was particularly difficult to do in the case of the Armenian genocide, as most documents are still not translated into English and many have not been released by the Turkish government. Overall, the attempt was made to collect as varied a compilation of sources as possible through which the data could be triangulated.

Lastly, there are also limitations that are specific to this study simply due to the material that is being researched. As Brause (2012) points out, no research can address all possible dimensions involved. This applies to the study of safe havens because analyzing all available content pertaining to all major genocides in the twentieth century is almost an impossibility. However, this research uses as many examples that apply as possible for the genocides selected. In addition, this study does not cover in detail every instance of successful refuge provided by both cultural and international safe havens, much like it cannot cover every instance of failure. Furthermore, the use of safe havens in non-genocidal conflict zones is an area that will need further research in later studies. The recognition of these limitations must come with an appeal to other scholars in the fields, not only of genocide studies, peace studies or conflict resolution; but also in other fields, to contribute to the research with their own accounts and interpretations.

Conclusions

This chapter outlined the chosen methodology for this research as that of content analysis and historical sociology, and the reasoning behind why it was chosen by the researcher. As a methodology, content analysis allows for the evaluation of vast amounts of information with the purpose of answering a specific research question, which is

exactly what this study seeks to do through a combination of conventional and directed content analysis. In addition, the use of a case study approach allows for the narrowing down of information to specific events in history. At the same time, historical sociology roots the research in historical occurrences with which to attempt to answer overarching questions about a specific social phenomenon. The researcher has chosen a case study content analysis approach and a framework of historical sociology because an analysis of historical information found in personal accounts, scholarly accounts, archives and memoirs requires such a methodology. Overall, content analysis provides a flexible framework for analysis in which the research can develop to understand the roles of safe havens in the context of genocidal violence.

Chapter 4: Safe Havens in International Law

“As I prepare for my second term as Secretary-General, I am thinking hard about how we can meet the expectations of the millions of people who see the U.N.'s blue flag as a banner of hope.” – Ban Ki-Moon

Introduction

The role of safe havens in genocidal states is a contested premise, especially in regards to international safe havens that are established by the international community for the protection of the victimized population. The debate mainly focuses around whether these places are truly safe, and whether their existence is beneficial for the victims. However, there are other aspects of safe havens that also need to be discussed, including the existence of cultural safe havens that are often used by victimized populations in times of need and at times prove counterproductive to protection, the difference between the theoretical conception of safety and the reality of safety on the ground, and the relationship between cultural and international safe havens.

Cultural safe havens are places that are engrained in the collective psyche as places that provide relief from conflict. Thus, almost universally, places of worship, schools, hospitals and government facilities are deemed safer than other structures in times of violence. This is proven by the historical proclivity of victimized populations to flee to these spaces in times of conflict. The existence of both international and cultural safe havens creates preconceptions of safety in the minds of the targeted populations, which often use these spaces without a true value judgment of their safety. Genocidal violence within safe spaces occurs not only in the context of systemic genocidal

campaigns, but in smaller acts of violence with the intent to eliminate, in whole or in part, specific groups of peoples. As such, the role of international law in the development of preconceptions of safety surrounding both cultural and international safe havens must be the groundwork of this analysis, as it has been international humanitarian law that has advanced the premise of safe havens to new heights.

This chapter delves into the history of safe havens in international law by analyzing international conventions and the evolution of its definitions throughout history. This will be followed by a section regarding the issue of preconceived ideas of safety that permeate both cultural and international safe havens. These preconceived notions of safety tend to shape the actions of victimized populations, who, thinking these places to be safe for a variety of reasons, flee to them without sometimes assessing the risks involved. The results are mixed, with some groups finding the safety they seek, and others finding violence instead.

The Evolution of Safety

Safe Havens in Humanitarian Law

The original Geneva Conventions were signed in 1864, approximately half a century before tragedy reached the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, but has since been ratified to total four different versions of the Convention (1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949), each building on the previous one in an ever-evolving process seeking better methods of international justice. This international agreement to establish regulation at times of war, as well as some forms of humanitarian measures, was begun by the efforts of Henry Dunant. According to Bennet (2005), international humanitarian law began in Solferino,

during the Franco-Austrian war in 1859, when 40,000 wounded men were left to die without shelter or aid. Henry Dunant, a witness to this tragedy, then embarked on a campaign to establish a system that would provide aid to wounded soldiers in war. Dunant's efforts eventually led to the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863, and to the drafting of the First Geneva Convention in 1864.

The first Convention focused on three principal measures: relief to the wounded without any distinction regarding nationality; neutrality (inviolability) of medical personnel and medical establishments and units; and the creation of the distinctive sign of a Red Cross on a white background (ICRC, n.d.). Basically, this first Convention focused on the establishment of procedures that would recognize and respect the neutrality of medical personnel and establishments, such as military hospitals, to protect the sick and wounded in battle. Although an incredible advancement in international humanitarian law it was still lacking in scope, and it took the next eighty-five years to shape this initiative into an effort that expanded from protecting only the sick and wounded soldiers, to protecting also the civilian population in the form of the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Yet the Geneva Conventions were not the only attempts at changing the interactions of war. Other conventions were important in spearheading the movement towards the protection of civilians and the establishment of safe spaces, such as The Hague Convention of 1899, which stated that "The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited" (Sec. 2, Ch. 1, Art. 25). Thus, a clear demarcation arose that delineated certain spaces as untouchable in

times of war, including any non-defended buildings, villages, and towns. Article 27 of the second draft of The Hague Convention, finalized in 1907, states that,

In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.

Here, the definition of safe spaces is more specific, thus mentioning places of worship, charity, hospitals and places that have historic meaning to the population (all of them culturally important) as places of safety in times of conflict. This article was also present in the 1899 version, thus proving a continued thread of concern for the safety of non-military establishments.

This same premise is also seen in the Monaco Convention of 1934, which established the premise of civilian security in Chapter 3, Articles 5 & 6, when stating that, “Defended towns may be attacked with all licit means of war. Belligerents should do their utmost to hit in such towns none of the buildings dedicated to public worship, charity, and science or having a historic or artistic character” (ICRC, n.d.). The Monaco Convention went even further in determining that “Undefended towns containing no military objectives, may be transformed into security towns” that would have the same protection as hospital towns, which were towns occupied and used by non-belligerent medical institutions such as the Red Cross (ICRC, n.d.), but that did not necessitate the presence of these organizations for their protection. Thus, not only were specific spaces such as places of worship and others protected, but entire towns as well. This premise

would be of great importance in 1993, when six cities in Bosnia would be deemed ‘Safe Areas’ for the protection of the civilian population. Although proposed in 1934, there was no formal advancement regarding the establishment of these secured towns until 1949 in Geneva (Landgren, 1995).

Safe zones in humanitarian law are understood to be “a location within the disputed country or territory, neutral and free of belligerent activity, to which humanitarian access is ensured” (Landgren, 1995, p. 438). It has been the work of the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) that has relentlessly sought to develop the establishment of these type of spaces in conflict zones, regardless of whether the violence is international or involving only parties within the state itself. The finalized codification of these spaces occurred in the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949, and were expanded in the additional protocols of 1977. Article 15 of this convention addresses neutralized zones and “declares that they are to be created where fighting is taking place” (Landgren, 1995, p. 439).

An important caveat to note in Article 15 is that the establishment of these zones must be agreed upon by both belligerent parties. This is what Yamashita (2004) refers to as the “Conventional model” of humanitarian spaces, which Yamashita deems compatible with preexisting notions of sovereignty, as they are established within the territory of conflict and are subject to the approval of warring parties. However, gaining approval from all warring parties is usually a difficult condition to satisfy in times of conflict, especially in cases of genocide. For this reason, many of the modern versions of safe zones have not required the agreement of both parties, and have in fact sometimes

been established completely independently to them and without discrimination between civilians and combatants. However, this has also been problematic, as Langren (1995) so aptly pin-points, since many times militants have used these spaces repeatedly to engage in military activities from and through these spaces, a factor that was seen in Rwanda's humanitarian zones.

In addition to the efforts in Article 15 to establish these neutral zones, Article 60 of Additional Protocol I, added to the Convention in 1977, addresses "the creation of zones where populations can be sheltered" (Landgren, 1995, p. 440), and in which the demilitarized rules established in Article 15 are also enforced. Although codified in the most important document ruling international law, the successful establishment of these zones has been limited.

Since most of the international rules apply only in time of international conflict, those abuses that occur within the state's own borders, and which do not involve an outside aggressor, were, for a time, mostly ignored by the international community and left to be dealt with by the state in question. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 ensured that sovereignty rules supreme over interference in state affairs. It would take two World Wars and countless conflicts to reshape the focus of the international community, as it was not until the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 that issues regarding non-international abuses began to be addressed. The post-WWII world also saw the creation of the United Nations and a dramatic increase in interest for the establishment of a myriad of conventions aimed at protecting a variety of groups from a plethora of violent situations. These efforts included the establishment of conventions regarding subjects

such as torture, genocide, children's rights, indigenous populations, women's rights, crimes against humanity, and many others. In addition, the efforts included the establishment of international criminal courts, truth and reconciliation committees, and efforts to bring justice to affected populations in all parts of the world.

International Humanitarian Law is thus made up of a series of treaties and conventions that are weaved together to bring a humanistic approach to international relations, but the establishment of safe zones for the protection of non-combatants has been slow to take shape in conflict zones. The issue of cultural safe havens has been briefly addressed in international law by both The Hague and Monaco Conventions, which identified places such as houses of worship, hospitals, charitable institutions, and places with historical significance as places that should not be targeted in times of violence. However, other than these two documents, not much more effort was put into protecting these establishments, especially within the framework of internal struggles until the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

This is especially important when addressing international humanitarian law in the context of genocidal violence, as the existence of this law applies, officially, only to the governments in conflict and their militaries, yet not to the paramilitary groups sometimes involved in this violence. Speaking in regards to the difficulties that accompany international law, Bassiouni (1999) states that the positive developments in international law

“were not matched by the practices of irregular combatants, para-military groups and others active in “conflicts of a non-international character,” and in purely

internal conflicts... Thus, the enhanced developments of international humanitarian law norms have not necessarily brought about increased compliance and reduced victimization” (p. 45).

Genocidal campaigns show that the use of these irregular groups to issue violence is commonplace in this type of conflict, as depicted by the existence of the *interahamwe* in Rwanda, the Civil Defense Units in Guatemala, the *chetes* in Armenia, the Janjaweed in Darfur, and more.

In addition, genocidal campaigns usually do not involve two evenly matched warring parties, but instead one dominant group working on eliminating a group that cannot defend itself. International humanitarian law has been built on the premise of war involving two or more somewhat evenly warring parties, yet it has been unprepared to deal with conflicts in which these factors are missing. Thus, genocidal conflicts are conflicts that are generally not subjected to any form of international law respected by belligerents, which makes international exceptions against houses of worship, hospitals, and others safe zones, moot in the face of genocidal violence.

International safe havens are thus the only option available for the protection of the victimized population, and their establishment is imperative in lessening the use of cultural safe havens in cases of mass violence. However, it is only in rare occasions that safe havens are constructed within conflict zones to provide shelter from violence, as was the case in Iraq, Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s. Although the practice of safe zones within violent states in conflict seemed to peak during the 1990s, it has diminished since, as the existence of these safe zones proved controversial in two out of its three instances.

However, their possible resurgence in cases of mass violence is not a far-fetched assumption, and in fact it is a model to strive towards if it can be modified and perfected.

The United Nations “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” was established precisely because countries in which genocide is occurring cannot stop the violence from within, and international intervention is required to end such violence. Unfortunately, cultural safe havens are located within the borders of conflict zones, and although they are protected officially by international law, intra-state conflicts tend to ignore these protections. Those who manage to flee outside of the boundaries of violence often find refuge in internationally-sanctioned spaces, such as refugee camps. However, those who stay within must choose between staying in their homes and seeking safety elsewhere, including places they preconceive as safe. As such, the institution of international safe havens in a timely manner can be the difference between life and death to thousands of people, even when the international community quickly intervenes – as was shown in Kosovo in 1999, when intervention led to increased ethnic cleansing (Phillips, n.d.). It is important, then, to understand the construction of meaning that revolves around cultural and international safe havens, which many times determines the actions of the targeted population.

Preconceptions of Safety

Cultural Safe Havens

Preconceived ideas of safety are important to understand in the discussion of safe havens. Cultural safe havens are especially inclined to creating these preconceptions, as the notion of their safety has been passed down throughout time and thus has become

engrained in cultural beliefs. In addition, cultural safe havens are sometimes the only viable option available to the victimized populations, as many times the creation of international safe havens does not occur, or occurs too late in the conflict. International safe havens, however, are not immune to this phenomenon of preconception, and although their formalized existence is a relatively new idea, the international support behind these spaces is a powerful incentive for refuge-seeking behavior by populations who see the international community as their only hope for survival. The fact that the safety of both types of safe havens is codified in humanitarian law, leads to the belief that they will be protected by the international community if they were ever to be violated. As such, there is a collective belief rooted in the inviolability of these spaces that is not simply rooted in faith or tradition, but is grounded in the legal documents that rule international relations and humanitarian intervention.

To begin to understand the concept of safe havens, the premise of ‘sanctuary’ must be explored in detail, because it is what grounds the very existence of safe havens. This is a notion that is historically rooted, dating back to Roman, Egyptian, and Greek civilizations, which provided sanctuary to slaves who had run away and had no rights under the law (Rabben, 2011). In addition, Greek temples were early places of sanctuary for criminals. This premise was also found in Medieval English Law, when “any consecrated church in England, and indeed throughout medieval Christendom, was understood to provide sanctuary” (Shoemaker, 2013, p. 15). Although sanctuary began as a temporary premise, where those seeking sanctuary could only stay for approximately forty days, many churches provided permanent sanctuary. This early version sanctuary

was reserved solely for criminals seeking refuge from the law, until its abolition by Henry VIII who amended the premise of sanctuary to protect only those culpable of lesser offenses (Shoemaker, 2013). In the end, Henry VIII destroyed the church houses that had provided refuge and instead created cities of refuge until the British Parliament abolished the premise of church sanctuary (Rabben, 2011).

This idea of seeking refuge in churches was not only present in England, but in many other Christian nations, including Catholic France, which was also forced to amend the premise to bring justice to offenders. The expansion of Christianity, then, aided in the proliferation of churches as sanctuary throughout the world. The legal premise of sanctuary was abolished in the sixteenth century (Shoemaker, 2013), yet its basic premise of protection has endured the test of time. The practice of sanctuary eventually evolved into a secular premise that harbored all those who needed protection and aid, including thousands of refugees migrating throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. This idea that safety can be found within specific places has been passed down from generation to generation, making it ingrained in a cultural collective identity, that, at least regarding churches and other places of worship, seems universal in scope. As recently as September, 2015, Pope Francis called for every parish in Europe to act as safe haven for the masses of incoming refugees from conflicted areas in the Middle East and Africa (AP, 2015). This move proved that the conception of places of worship as places of safety is one that continues to be part of our culture, regardless of past and present proof to the contrary.

The idea of sanctuary is not exclusive to Christian churches, but in fact can be found in different religious dogmas, because this teaching of protection and safety is many times instilled within the scriptures themselves. Two of the major religions, Christianity and Islam, have these teachings of safety entrenched in their dogma. In the Bible, for example, verses such as “And I tell you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not overcome it” (Matt. 16:18, New International Version), aid in the creation of a sense of security that translates into believing that places of worship are safe refuges during violence. In addition, “The Old Testament mentions safe haven at the altar for criminals who commit accidental murder” (Engber, 2006, par. 4). According to Heger (1999), one of the Biblical Altar laws was that of asylum being given once the altar “horns” were reached. Heger (1999), states, “... by touching or grasping the altar’s corners or its projections [the ‘horns’], one is symbolically attached to it and enjoys its right of asylum” (p. 220).

Further mention of sanctuary is found in verses such as, “six of the towns you give the Levites will be cities of refuge, to which a person who has killed someone may flee” (Numbers 35:6, New International Version). This provided entire cities as places for protection. This idea of safe cities in the Bible, can be seen extrapolated into reality throughout the evolution of international humanitarian law, as the safe zones instituted in the 1990s for Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda, all demonstrate. Christianity, then, has had a tradition of sanctuary since its inception. This belief in sanctuary has remained through the ages, as demonstrated by the use of a Chicago church in 2006 as a place for sanctuary for a Mexican immigrant attempting to avoid deportation (Ebger, 2006). The

sacrosanctity of the church, and other places of religious significance, is ingrained in the Christian tradition, and consequently has the potential to shape behavior, as the outcomes of both the Armenian and Rwandan genocides reveal.

In the Qur'an, the idea of refuge is also predominant. Verses such as "Allah has made the Ka'bah, the Sacred House, an asylum of security and Hajj and 'Umrah (pilgrimage) for mankind..." (Quran 5:95); "Certainly, you shall enter Al-Masjid-al-Haram; if Allah wills, secure ... having no fear" (Quran 48:27); and "the Maqam (place) of Ibrahim (Abraham); whosoever enters it, he attains security" (Quran 3:97), are all evidence to the belief that places of worship are secure, and thus can be trusted. As such, the idea of sanctuary encompasses some of the central beliefs of a vast number of the world's population, since there are 2.2 billion Christians, and 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide (Chappell, 2015).

Although it could be argued that the premise of safety in scripture refers only to the metaphorical perception of evil, not to the physical evil of violence, to do so would neglect to recognize that scripture promises protection from all, not only from demonic figures. In addition, the root of sanctuary dealt more with the protection of people from revenge, rather than from demonic figures. Churches were safe havens for criminals, not only to evade execution or punishment, but also to avoid revenge from the families of those affected by their actions. Safety, then, is the goal of sanctuary, both in history and in scripture. This is a premise many places of worship have abided by throughout the centuries by providing sanctuary to people in need whenever possible regardless of their trespasses.

Christianity and Islam are the two major religions of the world, yet these two religions are not the only ones that have established a predetermined sense of security throughout history. An example of this can be found with a deeper look at Buddhism and its relationship with state governments across the Asian territory. Speaking in regard to the army-monastic relationships in Asia, Frydenlund (2013), states that, “In the context of territorial disputes in ethnic and religious minority areas, Buddhist monks receive state protection of temples and sacred sites” (p. 109). Thus, these sacred spaces are promised protection by the state itself, deeming them a sanctuary in case of conflict. In addition, temples, synagogues, churches, mosques, and many other places of worship have been repeatedly used as shelter in times of conflict all over the world.

The idea of sanctuary has evolved significantly throughout the years. In fact, sanctuary movements throughout the globe have sometimes evolved into sometimes completely secular movements, which require neither a sacred space nor a theological dimension. Czajka (2013) states that, “the theological imperative to sanctuary and its provision in sacred spaces do not characterize all sanctuary practices, which also include efforts to enact and network cities of sanctuary, or implement Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell campaigns” (p. 47). Thus, sanctuary, although mostly rooted in religious ideology, has evolved to include a variety of sanctuary types that include the use of schools, universities, and even entire cities as forms of protection for those in need. This is an important factor to understand, as it has shaped cultural views of safety and broadened the scope of cultural safe havens from churches, to other non-secular establishments that

are also deemed safe in times of conflict. These places may include schools, orphanages, hospitals, university campuses, and government buildings.

As history and time have shaped the conception of sanctuary, the repeated mention of these spaces – whether in scripture, public discourse or international law – as places of safety has managed to overpower the very real dangers of these spaces in the context of mass violence. As such, the idea of safety has become more powerful than the true value of safety encountered in these spaces. Consequently, the premise of safety has been shaped into a preconceived idea so culturally ingrained that it does not require questioning. This premise translates into action, as preconceived ideas need no judgement because they are innately defined. As such, individuals act according to the preconception itself, not according to their objective judgement to particular circumstances. This is important in the discussion of both cultural and international safe havens, as these places come with an expected protection that has been codified in humanitarian law. In situations of mass violence, targeted populations move towards places already preconceived as safe without assessing the true value of their safety.

Aside from places of worship, it is not uncommon for places such as schools and hospitals to be believed to be safe in times of conflict, mainly because it is often the case that these places have been purposefully built as safe spaces and are also protected by international law. A United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report states that, “In developed countries, local schools and hospitals are typically designed to ensure survivability and are designated as safe shelter for affected community members” (p. 1). Another report by the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project (2001), implemented by the

Organization of American States (OAS), states that “When an extreme natural event is expected, emergency shelters, often school buildings, may be opened to house the local population and keep them out of harm's way” (par. 3). Furthermore, as recently as 2014, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reported that approximately 237,000 people were sheltered within mission schools in Gaza. Thus, the idea of using schools as shelters is one that seems to be global in scope, spanning places such as the Middle East, the Caribbean, and the United States among others.

The use of school as places for refuge in cases of violence is, at its core, rooted in the premise of sanctuary, and in the belief that no harm will come to those inside the walls of these institutions. In addition, schools provide ample spaces to congregate, as they are usually closed during violent conflicts and can consequently be used by internally displaced persons as places to find shelter and company. When violence breaks out in conflict zones, people may seek refuge in the schools, yet these are not the only places to which society has posited such meaning.

Some of the first attempts at protecting hospitals, as seen in the previous section, came with Article 27 of The Hague Convention in 1907. Yet no agreements were reached to formally enforce this protection. Thus, the first true attempts to protect civilian hospitals from the scourges of war were made during the Second World War, when parties sought to establish safety zones for civilians and protect hospitals (Van Engeland, 2011). Although a failure at the time due to no agreement between the parties involved, this move set a precedent that would delineate the later Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Hospitals are now protected zones by international humanitarian law, which states that, “Directing an attack against a zone established to shelter the wounded, the sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities is prohibited” (“Customary IHL,” par. 1). These zones are divided into four groups, “non-defended localities, hospital zones and localities, neutralized zones, and demilitarized zones” (Van Engeland, 2011, p. 72). Thus, civilian hospitals were afforded safe haven status in cases of war and consequently were automatically imbued with a preconception of safety.

However, genocide is not a war even when it may sometimes occur within the context of one. As such, the use of hospitals as safe havens is problematic because no international humanitarian laws apply in a conflict where one party overpowers the other and seeks the latter’s complete elimination. These humanitarian laws, although useful at times of international war, have imbued hospitals with a sense of safety that is sometimes shattered in cases of genocidal violence. Victimized populations, then, have a perception of safety when it comes to hospitals that goes hand-in-hand with an expectation for international intervention when such safety is violated by the perpetrators. After all, the international community has agreed to protect these spaces from the viciousness of war. Formal codification in international law, then, leads to an expectation of punishment in cases of blatant violation, yet the enforcement of these laws has proven to be problematic throughout time. Recent bombings of Doctors without Borders hospitals in Syria (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2016) have led to no repercussion from the international community, even when those inside the hospitals were innocent civilians being treated for their wounds or seeking shelter from the violence.

Many times, these preconceptions are rooted not only in law or scripture, but in the idea that some of these structures are built more strongly than regular homes, and that consequently they are much more suited for protection. In Ottoman Turkey, for example, monasteries and churches were seen this way, with churches such as that of Mor Afrem “built like a fortress” (Gaunt, 2006, p. 211), and the Mor Eliyo monastery “built on a high hill and surrounded by high walls” (Gaunt, 2006, p. 225), thus making it easily defensible against perpetrators. Many of these spaces were often built centuries before their use as shelters, or were established as communal centers for their towns, thus necessitating broad and sturdy construction that lasted throughout time. The sturdiness of these places is sometimes beneficial for the victimized populations, who use it to their advantage in their last attempts at resistance.

These preconceptions then, can be justified by the believers as unequivocal truths, especially when there has been previous use for these structures as shelters during violence, as was the case in Rwanda. However, Rwanda is not the only country with a history of shelter-seeking in places of preconceived safety. In Ottoman Turkey, for example, “terrified Armenians fled into their churches for protection, as they had done for centuries in times of trouble” (Hovannisian & Payaslian, 2008, p. 509), and in Nazi occupied territories, Jews sought refuge in the synagogues as they had done many times before. While many of these spaces have historically proven to be ineffective at providing protection, a combination of deeply rooted preconceptions and no other options available, lead victimized groups to continue to flock to these spaces for safety. In 2012, in Syria, NGOs were estimating that approximately 60,000 people in Aleppo were reported to

have found shelter in schools, mosques, and the Aleppo University campus as they tried to flee the violence (Jesuit Refugee Service, 2012). Regardless of continued bombing against schools and other community centers, the refugees in Aleppo still flocked to these spaces. This speaks to the lack of options available for protection, as well as to the dire need for the creation of effective international safe havens to take the place of cultural safe havens, which cannot provide such safety.

International Safe Havens

Cultural spaces are not the only places that incite these preconceptions, as safe havens, such as safe zones or humanitarian zones, are all also imbued with this meaning of safety. Officially established for the first time in the 1990s, as a method of protection for the Kurdish population of Northern Iraq, international safe havens are places created as neutral spaces which warring parties cannot attack, and which are protected by the international community. The efforts to establish these zones are almost always executed by the United Nations, although they may sometimes be established by the warring parties themselves, as was the case of the Open Relief Centers in Sri Lanka. The success of these places has been varied, with some failing tragically, as was the case of Srebreniça, and others succeeding, as was the case of the safe havens for the Kurds. There have been several other cases of success in the establishment of international safe havens, including the establishment of three structures – a college, a hospital and a hotel – as neutral zones in Bangladesh in 1971; the establishment of three neutral zones in Cyprus in 1974; a neutralized zone in Vietnam in 1975; and two neutralized zones – a hospital and a monastery – established in Croatia in 1992; among others (Landgren,

1995). However, the establishment of these zones, in the context of mass violence, has been sporadic and limited. In addition, the ICRC has declared that these zones barely fall within what was intended by the Geneva Conventions (Landgren, 1995). As can be seen from the examples above, many of the international safe havens are established within cultural safe havens, such as hospitals and monasteries. Thus further cementing their preconceptions as places of safety. This proclivity at establishing international safe havens within cultural spaces is important to note, as it may prove to be essential in the construction of new plans for safety. Creating international safe havens in locations that are culturally important, will not only enable to the victimized population to reach these places quickly, but also allow for the protection of their cultural heritage.

Prior to the establishment of international safe havens, some ad-hoc efforts to create areas of humanitarian protection were seen in Spain during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), when Franco assigned Madrid to be a safe zone, and in Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). These were established with the consent of the warring parties and were meant to provide temporary relief from the violence (Long, 2012). However, the safe zones that have most closely adhered to the premises proposed in the Geneva Conventions are those which were set in Sri Lanka in the 1980s (Long, 2012), which were also established by consent from warring parties and proved highly successful. These early attempts at creating safe havens were usually spear-headed by the parties in conflict, and thus did not come with a promise or expectation of international protection. Later attempts at safety, however, have been established through the efforts of international organizations such as the UN, and have come hand-in-hand with a

protection force. Such was the case in Bosnia, where six cities were designated as safe areas and protected by UN soldiers, and in Rwanda, where the creation of a humanitarian zone was led by the French contingent and was followed shortly after by new reinforcements for the UNAMIR forces on the ground.

Conclusions

The idea of safe havens is innately rooted in the notion of sanctuary, which has been a part of human history for thousands of years. The premise of sanctuary was part of Egyptian, Greek and Roman civilizations, and continued throughout time in Medieval England and even modern-day United States. The idea of sanctuary can also be found in the ruling dogmas of some of the world's most important beliefs, as well as in secular movements that seek the protection of specific groups of people. As such, this need for providing protection has shaped much of human history and has seeped its way into the codification of international humanitarian law. Both cultural and international safe havens are innately defined by the belief that providing protections is possible, yet these spaces are often incapable of delivering the protection they have promised.

The establishment of international safe havens is intricately attached to an expectation of safety and protection that incentivizes the targeted populations to flee to these refuges. In addition, the fact that many of these spaces are established and managed by the United Nations, the leading international organization and promoter of human rights, provides for greater expectations of safety. However, the ability to provide this safety, even when it is not perfectly accomplished, is imperative in the protection of many. After all, in genocidal campaigns the act of congregating *en masse*, as members of

the targeted population, sometimes proves to be counterproductive, which means that fleeing to cultural safe havens can be more dangerous than fleeing to international safe havens. The act of congregating in large numbers proves even more detrimental when the perpetrators are aware of the belief and can predict the actions of the victims, as was the case in Rwanda.

Following is a case-by-case analysis of the roles of cultural and international safe havens in the context of genocidal violence, using the examples of the Armenian genocide, the Rwandan genocide and the relationship between them, and the genocide in Bosnia. Each chapter will include an analysis of the role of cultural safe havens and an analysis of the role of international safe havens within their individual historical contexts. In the process, this research also ponders the question of whether safety must truly be total to be considered successful. The research moves in chronological order, and as such begins with the plight of the Armenians, moves on to Rwanda, and ends with Bosnia.

Chapter 5: The Plight of the Armenians

“When a detailed account of the horrors which accompanied these massacres is fully disclosed to the civilized world, it will stand out in all history as the greatest masterpiece of brutality ever committed, even by the Turk” – Roupen, 1915

Introduction

The history of the Armenian genocide has been documented by scholars in the field of genocide studies, through many different perspectives that have created a robust scholarship in the subject (See: Dadrian (1995); Balakian (2009); Kervokian (2011); Hovannisian (2011); Suny (2015); Akçam (2006); Lewy (2005); and others). For this reason, this research does not delve into a minutely detailed account of its history. After all, the focus of this research is the role of safe havens in the context of genocidal violence, and although these roles will be rooted in history, they can be analyzed without an overly detailed accounting of the tragedy.

As can be seen in the first section of this chapter, almost none of the articles in international humanitarian law created for the protection of civilians and the establishment of safe zones, existed at the time of the plight of the Armenians. Those that were beginning to take shape were still too limited in scope to address a conflict of the magnitude seen in 1915, much less in the context of World War I. The concept of genocide itself did not come to life until over three decades after the event, when Raphael Lemkin set out to put a name to the mass murder of specific groups of people. Thus, Armenians had little options in regards to seeking safety at the time of their persecution.

This factor, compounded with a largely passive international community, sealed the fate of many Armenians.

This chapter focuses on the Armenian genocide, mentioning also the simultaneous genocide of other Christian minorities in the Ottoman territory, and its relation to the use of cultural and international safe havens. Although formal international safe havens were not established in international law at the time, there were foreign institutions and spaces that sought to provide as much protection as possible for the Armenians, and these were the closest the victimized population had to any international protection. The value of their safety is assessed in this section to provide a baseline with which future efforts can be compared. One of the most important of these, as shall be explored, was the Near East Relief effort, which funded refuges for thousands of Armenians, especially children. There were also spaces for Armenians to seek protection under Russian territory and in Egypt. These places were tended to by the newly instituted Red Cross/Red Crescent and faced a myriad of troubles in attempting to keep the Armenians safe.

In the case of the Armenian genocide, the evaluation of international safe havens as we know them today is not possible, as the premise was not codified in international humanitarian law until years after the genocide. However, the Armenian case can be used as a baseline for the analysis of later international safe havens as it provides other types of international intervention that were used in the absence of formalized safe havens. As such, the Armenian genocide provides a reference from which to analyze whether the establishment of international safe havens is truly effective in protecting the targeted populations.

The Armenian case can also be used to analyze cultural safe since these spaces were repeatedly used in this case for both protection and strategic violence. Many Armenians sought, as they had countless times before in times of conflict, refuge in cultural spaces, especially in churches and mission complexes. This use of cultural safe havens is analyzed in an attempt to understand their effectiveness in the context of genocidal violence. As the first genocide of the twentieth century, the elimination of the Armenians and other Ottoman Christians serves as reference for the evaluation of safe havens in genocidal campaigns.

Safety within a Culture of Massacre

This analysis begins with a consideration of the use of the cultural safe havens by the Armenians. To accurately address this, a brief look at history is necessary, to a time before the 1915 genocidal campaign, to the reign of Sultan Hamid II and the Hamidian massacres. This historical period is important for this analysis because it provides accounts of Armenians seeking shelter in cultural safe havens and allows for the analysis of the true value of their safety. This explains that the use of cultural safe havens was engrained in Armenian culture before the genocide, and how a culture of massacre (Dadrian, 1995) that thrived within the Ottoman territories proved fundamental in the escalation of violence against the Armenians in the years after the Sultan.

The Armenians had a history as a loyal people to the Ottoman Empire, and enjoyed relative autonomy within the Empire for a good part of their history. Sultan Hamid II created the Midhat Constitution in 1876, which proclaimed the equal treatment of all nationalities, including the Armenians. However, Armenian nationalism kept

growing and a newborn resistance to the government began to fester in the bosom of the ancient nation. The Ottoman loss of the Bulgarian territory in 1876, the independence of Greece, and the spread of pro-Russian sentiments within the Armenian population, led the Ottomans to begin questioning the loyalty of the Armenian people, fearing they would be next in a push for independence. In 1878, Sultan Hamid II suspended the 1876 constitution (Lewy, 2005).

The situation of the Armenians drastically changed at this point and the government's repression increased. The Sultan called for the formation of a Kurdish volunteer cavalry (Whitehorn, 2015), known as the Hamidiye, who had unprecedented liberties in their dealings with the Armenians, and who were very much emboldened by their power as the irregular soldiers of the Sultan (Lewy, 2005). The rise of the Hamidiye coincided with the rise of Armenian nationalism and rebellious sentiments, which were compounded by the foundation of Armenian groups such as the Hunchaks and the Dashnak, both of which were committed to engage in armed struggle if necessary to achieve their goals of Armenian autonomy (Lewy, 2005). Inspired by the secession of former Ottoman territories, the Armenians sought their own autonomy, although not complete independence, and expected the contribution and support of European powers to achieve it. However, this support did not come as expected and in fact, although European powers did intervene by creating policy reforms that were aimed at protecting the Armenians, they "never followed through long enough to achieve lasting reforms" (Lewy, 2005, p 16). European intervention enraged the Ottoman government and led to a

radicalization of action against the Armenians. Once war began in 1914, the European powers had more pressing issues in their hands than caring for the fate of the Armenians.

The first wave of escalated violence occurred in the years of 1894-1895, under the reign of Sultan Hamid II, who, troubled by the increased activity of Armenian revolutionaries and a growing pro-Russian sentiment, felt the need to restore order after the Armenian citizens of Sassoun refused to pay double taxes to the government officials and the Kurdish chieftains. This act of open rebellion was the excuse needed by the government to attempt to regain control over the Armenians. Dadrian (2008) states that, “The Sassoun massacre was the first instance of organized mass murder of Armenians in modern Ottoman history that was carried out in peace time and had no connection with any foreign war” (p. 117). The massacre included the use of churches in which young women and girls were driven into, and in which soldiers were ordered to do as they wished with them and subsequently kill them (Dadrian, 2008).

The Sassoun Uprising was followed by a Hunchakist demonstration in Constantinople, in which Armenians sought to deliver a protest regarding the Sassoun massacres, but “following an altercation, an exchange of shots took place, and the massacre began” (Dadrian, 2008, p. 120). Armenians were hunted down and killed throughout the city, without discrimination. It was in this instance that “some two thousand Armenians took refuge in various churches of the city” (Lewy, 2005, p. 22). These churches proved successful in Constantinople, and the refugees were eventually allowed to leave without being harassed by government officials or Hamidiye contingents. However, as tensions continued to mount, violence erupted in other parts of

the Ottoman territory and the success of churches as places of safety was called into question.

In Ourfa there were two massacres, one in October and the other in December of 1895. The December massacre saw people who sought refuge in the church especially targeted for destruction. On December 28th, the massacre began with an approximate 3,000 men, women, and children taking refuge in the church (“The Ourfa Massacre,” 1896). Once the perpetrators returned on 29 December, they set fire to the cathedral. “The mob first began by firing in through the windows; then the iron door was smashed in, and the attacking party proceeded to massacre all those, mostly men, who were on the ground floor” (“The Ourfa Massacre,” 1896, par. 4). After pillaging the cathedral, the perpetrators set fire to the gallery on the upper section of the cathedral “where a packed mass of shrieking and terrified women, children, and some men were gathered” (“The Ourfa Massacre,” 1896, par. 4). Although approximately 300 people managed to escape through the roof (“Thousands of Armenians Perish,” 1896), thousands were not as lucky. In total, an estimated 1,800 people died in the church while seeking refuge within its walls.

Further violence within cultural spaces was found in the massacres that occurred in the churches at Severeke, where both Gregorian and Protestant churches were targeted for destruction. According to a witness account found in Dadrian’s *The History of the Armenian Genocide* (1995), “The mob had plundered the Gregorian church, desecrated it, murdered all who had sought shelter there, and as a sacrifice, beheaded the sexton on the stone threshold” (p. 150-151). In Sa’diye, in October of 1895, an anti-Armenian pogrom

led to the deaths of many people who “perished in the church when it was set on fire” (Gaunt, 2006, p. 250). Dadrian (1995) states that during the time of the Hamidian massacres, “Armenian churches, the symbols of the Christian faith of the hated infidels, were reduced to slaughterhouses” (p. 150). For the Armenians, churches were supposed to provide shelter amid chaos, but for the Turkish perpetrators, churches provided easier targets for destruction that not only allowed for the physical decimation of Armenian individuals, but also for the cultural destruction of Armenian life in the Ottoman territories.

The period of the Hamidian Massacres established a precedent of immunity that proved lethal in later years, because although Europeans did complain about the violence witnessed by their diplomats and reported by the media, their intervention was “never forceful and effective enough to provide meaningful protection for the Armenians who relied upon the promises of assistance” (Lewy, 2005, p. 28). Through the motions of political theatre, the European powers managed to seem interested in the Armenians, while at the same time leaving them completely alone in their suffering. Consequently, a new expectation of immunity arose, and a culture of massacre encompassed the people of the Ottoman territories. This was a fact that was put to the test again in 1909 in the region of Cilicia, and the city of Adana.

Continuing the sequencing of violence against the Armenian and Christian populations within Ottoman territory, a new set of massacres occurred in the province of Adana in 1909, leading to an approximate 30,000 people killed in the violence (Adalian, 2010, p. 70). The *Red Cross Bulletin* (1909) reported the first massacres as occurring

between April 14th- April 16th, and a second set of massacres between April 25th and 26th, 1909. Several testimonies have been recorded, including one from a survivor of the massacres in Ormanie, where Armenians gathered in the church “sensing that they might not be safe in their homes” (Miller & Miller, 1993, p. 63). Approximately 500 people were gathered in the church, which was then torched, and those who tried to flee were shot as they ran out. Almost everyone inside the church died in the fire. Another survivor of the massacres tells how she fled into the church seeking refuge “but the Turks poured gasoline on the roof and it started burning” (Miller & Miller, 1993, p. 64). A few people tried to escape and were shot in the attempt, while others managed to run away with their lives.

The use of fire as a method of extermination proved as efficient in the Adana massacres as it had in the Oufra massacres, as the Turks simply had to ensure the buildings were locked or well-guarded, and watch the fire consume those within. The second massacre in Adana, which occurred on April 25th, 1909, included the destruction of the New Market Armenian School, along with most of the 2,000 people hiding there (The American Red Cross, 1909). Simultaneous massacres occurred in the adjoining girls’ school and Gregorian Church (The American Red Cross, 1909). In total, approximately 2,500 people perished during this second massacre, and most of them perished within cultural safe havens. Although successful at protecting refugees in the Hunchakist demonstration in Constantinople in 1895, these cultural safe havens transformed into death traps in later bouts of violence.

The discussion of a ‘culture of massacre’ has the potential to become one that is addressed only in regards to state-sponsored violence. However, it is important to note that at the time of the Adana massacres the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), commonly known as the Young Turks, and the Armenian revolutionaries, were not at war with each other. In fact, these two groups saw each other as allies in search for a unified Turkish state in which liberal policies could lead to religious equality. “The CUP, even as it shifted away from a conception of an Ottoman state of nationalities to one controlled and streamlined by one ruling Turkish *millet*, looked to Dashnaksutian as, in some ways, a kindred, progressive partner” (Levene, 2013, p. 98). This relationship between the CUP and the Dashnaks survived the Adana massacres, which were perpetrated during a counter coup that sought to dethrone the Young Turks, who had only taken power in 1908 (Lewy, 2005). The Dashnak party members “were the friends and advisers of the Young Turk Party, and, having formed a “bloc” with them, they always sided with the Turks in Parliamentary conflicts” (Rushdouni, n.d., p. 100). At the time, both Armenians and the Young Turks had the same goal in mind: A liberal state that allowed for all nationalities to live in harmony.

The Adana massacres, then, were not perpetrated by state-sponsored groups, but by a mob that had been incited by Muslim religious leaders proclaiming their opposition to religious equality in the country. This proves that a culture of massacre is not exclusive to state-sponsored actions, but rather to the culture of a people that is shaped by the methods it takes to deal with conflict. In the Ottoman territories, the proclivity to

massacre unwanted groups was ingrained in the very essence not only of the state, but of the people. According to Levene (2014),

Indeed, in the decade from 1912–13 to 1922–23, as core imperial territories were lost to, or alternatively reclaimed for, the new Kemalist-inspired Turkish nation state, somewhere along the east–west axis of the central, historic Ottoman belt—from the slopes of Ararat to the banks of the Drina one could be fairly certain of finding a case of genocidal or sub-genocidal violence (p. 96).

Massacres were a common occurrence in the Ottoman territories, and as such, massacres became a cultural staple that did not necessitate the approval or engagement of the state, as shown by the Adana massacres of 1909. These massacres were perpetrated by enraged groups of people who had become used to this method of resolving their differences. By eliminating large numbers of individuals belonging to the targeted population as had been done before, the perpetrators managed to control and punish them without fear of retaliation.

Dadrian (1995) suggests that “these massacres are important not only because they foreshadowed the subsequent genocide, but also because the perpetrators were not prosecuted. Given this precedent, the Turks had strong reason to believe that there would likewise be no punishment for subsequent killings” (p. 380). Hovannisian (2007) furthers this argument by stating that, “the Hamidian massacres were not just an episodic occurrence but had consequences far beyond the event, paving the way to 1915 by providing the Young Turks with a “predictable impunity”” (p. 11). Thus, the premise of unpunished extermination was established.

The later Adana massacres were also part of this sequencing of violence that weaved together the policies of the Hamidian massacres and the subsequent genocidal campaign of the Young Turks. Adalian (2010) states that, “for the Young Turks, the Adana Massacre proved a rehearsal for gauging the depth of Turkish animosity in the Ottoman Empire toward the Christian minorities and for testing their skills in marshaling those forces for political ends” (p. 71). Thus, these genocidal massacres allowed for the planning of the future destruction of millions of Armenians in the Ottoman territories, as well as the destruction of other Christian groups such as the Assyrians and Greeks. The elimination of these groups necessitated the repeated use of cultural safe havens as places for mass violence, including churches, orphanages, hospitals and monasteries.

The advent of World War I provided the Young Turks a golden opportunity to accomplish their goals, and proved fatal to the Armenian population. Having failed at intervening against previous episodes of violence, the European powers were now too engaged in their own battles to successfully advocate for the Armenians. In addition, the Turkish government was quick to align itself with the Germans, and thus gained the protection of a powerful European state. Germany, on the other hand, chose to ignore the plight of the Armenians, leaving intervention on their behalf to an individual level that could not do enough to save the victimized populations. “The Armenian Genocide was a secondary issue for the Foreign Office [of Germany], where the importance of the Ottoman contribution to the war effort was widely appreciated” (Kaiser, 1999, p. 93). Protected by a powerful ally and accustomed to go unpunished, the government of the

Young Turks had free reign on their plans to nationalize their territory and eliminate unwanted populations.

Cultural Places as Spaces for Violence

Although the Armenian genocide occurred in greater scope than the Hamidian massacres, and although most killings were achieved through massive deportation and death marchers, instances of violence within cultural safe havens still occurred repeatedly. This is particularly true in the case of the eastern provinces, which were closer to the Russian front and were some of the most heavily populated areas by the Armenians. Some of the regions most marked by violence included the regions of Van and Bitlis, which were the heart of the Armenian nation. Here, then, the elimination of the targeted population through massacre was more viable than through deportation. Thus, again through the use of fire, entire groups were burned alive within all available buildings. Speaking of the violence in these regions, Levene (2014) states that the methods of killing “included wholesale conflagrations—usually, in practice, of the women, children, babies, and old people who had survived the initial onslaught—utilizing all available large buildings—churches, schools, orphanages, as well as in haylofts and stables—in which to pack and incinerate them” (p. 154). There was no safety to be found within the walls of churches, schools, or orphanages for the Armenians, yet they were the only places for protection available to them due to a lack of international intervention on their behalf.

The *vilayet* (province) of Van is important to analyze, as it was the uprising of the Armenians in Van that proved a catalyst to the deportations and massacres. According to

Balakian (2003), the battle in Van was the spark that ignited the institution of genocidal policies against the Armenians after 1915, since it allowed the Turkish government to excuse their policies as matter of national security. The conflict began when Turkish soldiers attempted to violate a group of Armenian women and subsequently killed the young Armenian men who came to their aid (Rushdouni, n.d). As a consequence, the Armenians walled themselves off in a section of the city or ran in search for shelter.

Over 6,000 of Armenians ran to the American mission, “filling church and school buildings and every room that could possibly be spared in the missionary residences” (Knapp, 1915, p. 15). There, they were relatively safe until the Turkish army began bombarding the mission because they believed that Armenian rebels were being harbored there, regardless of testimony by the American missionaries denying this fact. Rushdouni also provides an account of the attack on the compound, stating that

“on the 15th and 16th May [1915] the guns were directed upon the American Institutions, where all the people were. Although during the whole period of fighting they had fired upon the American compound, the Hospital, the Church and Dr. Ussher’s home, and wounded thirteen people, it was only during the last two days that the bombardment was confined to the compound alone” (p. 106).

Thus, throughout the battle in Van, cultural safe havens were specifically targeted for attack. Here, these proved relatively successful at providing shelter during the weeks of the siege. As conditions worsened, the bombing became more intense against these places of refuge and it was the approach of the Russian army what saved the *vilayet* of Van and its people after weeks of confrontation.

The success of the Armenians in Van and the protection gained by them from the Russians enraged the Turkish government, and the retaliation was swift. In the province of Bitlis and in the towns of Moush and Sassoun, which were all main Armenian communities, the destruction of the population did not occur through deportation; rather, the population in these areas were massacred and tortured (Bryce & Toynbee, 2005). Many of these massacres occurred within cultural safe havens to which people had fled for refuge.

In Moush, the Armenians attempted to successfully defend themselves by hiding in churches and stone buildings from which they fought for four days. However, the Turkish artillery and German leadership proved more successful here than it had in Van, and soon the Turkish army ensured that “the silence of death reigned over the ruins of the churches and the rest” (Safrastian, 1915, p. 121). All Armenian leaders and fighting men were killed, while the women and children were driven out of town. Orphanages in Moush were wiped of their charges, with the German orphanage suffering heavy losses and the children deported. In one case, 4,000 Armenians took refuge in the forests of the St. Garabed monastery and from there they fought off the Turks and Kurds until many were forced to surrender (Paelian, 1916). The Turkish forces decimated Moush, without respect to any place of cultural importance or refuge. Although the international community had already attempted to demarcate certain spaces as off-limits for destruction in The Hague Convention of 1899 by prohibiting the attacks of habitations or buildings that were not defended, the attack of orphanages and churches in Moush was a prevailing aspect of the violence. Thus, neither international conventions nor respect for

the cultural importance of specific sites managed to save those inside, yet no other options were available and as such, these spaces were the only hope of the Armenians.

In 1915, the massacres that occurred in the province of Urumia included the burning of 200 Assyrians in a church (“Stars and Stripes”, 1915), as well as several attacks on the mission complexes that had become refugee centers for thousands fleeing the violence. In the village of Bote, the church of Mor Afrem was used as a shelter during a thirteen-day siege by the Kurdish forces. Although some people managed to escape while the Kurds attempted to break into the church, many were captured or killed when “the enemy set fire in the entrances, and those inside [the church] died of the smoke” (Gaunt, 2006, p. 212). In the end, Bote saw the massacre of most of its Christian inhabitants (Omtzigt, Tozman & Tyndall, 2012). In Geogtapa, the people fled to the Russian church, which was on high ground, and barricaded themselves in preparation for the Kurdish attack. The men defended the premises as best they could and the women were crowded into the church (Bryce & Toynbee, 2005). These refugees were saved by the intervention of an American doctor, and allowed to leave the church if they surrendered their ammunition. They were moved to the American mission and added to those already in the compound, which totaled at least 10,000 people (Lewis, 2005).

Urumia was at first saved by the Russian army but left to its own survival shortly after. The Russian retreat led to the return of the Kurds and the congregation of Armenians, with 3,000 gathering in the church, 2,000 in the mission college, and 500 in the hospital (Cochran, 1915). The province of Aleppo saw the use of churches and schools as places for refuge by many Armenians who had been displaced from other

provinces. In the region of Jibal Mousa, the refugees taking shelter in their church were being attacked by the Turks who wished to massacre them. They were saved when a French ship, the *Guichen*, bombed the neighborhood surrounding the church to stop the Turkish forces (Thorgom, n.d.). The effectiveness of the church as refuge was thus determined by foreign intervention, in this case from the French forces who would take many of the refugees into Port Said, Egypt.

Similar attacks occurred against the monastery in Dayro da Şlibo, where the refugees secluded themselves behind the strong walls of the monastery and stayed there for as long as possible. The Kurdish forces eventually attacked at night and managed to occupy the monastery, leaving alive only those people who were outside of the village at the time (Gaunt, 2006). In the village of Guerektha d'Batdro, "most villagers were slaughtered inside the church" (Gaunt, 2006, p. 222). In Kafarbe, the population hid inside the monastery until they were captured and subsequently murdered within the confines of their parish church (Gaunt, 2006). Several of the refugees were saved by empathetic Kurds who helped them escape, but all the inhabitants of the monastery, most of them monks and nuns, were killed in the attack (Ozlem Biner, 2015). In Mansuriye, the villagers were tricked into believing they would be protected by a Kurdish leader, but instead were slaughtered inside the church once they opened the doors; forty-one people were killed, including two who were burned alive (Gaunt, 2006). In Taqiyan, "the mayor, the priest, and 105 others were slaughtered" (Gaunt, 2006, p. 261) when the church was set on fire during the summer of 1915. These attacks against cultural safe havens prove that the preconceptions of safety imbued on these spaces throughout history does not hold

up in cases of genocidal violence and as such, better methods of protection must be quickly deployed into escalating conflicts. Otherwise, these sacred spaces run the risk of becoming death traps to thousands of displaced individuals who have no other place to go to for protection.

It is important to note the use of mission complexes as places of shelter by the Armenians, for many of these missions helped keep safe thousands of people and were indeed relatively safe during the violence. Having provided shelter and humanitarian aid through previous conflicts, the missions, many times marked by foreign flags, were symbols of refuge, especially since they had been a part of Armenian relations for decades prior to the advent of the genocide. A victim of the genocide in Urumia states, “For the past seventy years the only help we have had has come through the English and American missions” (Bryce & Toynbee, 2005, p. 215). In Marsovan, the five decades of work the missionaries had done before the genocide had led the missions to become important religious, educational and health centers for the Armenian population (Elmer, 1915). Moranian (2003) states,

“At the beginning of the twentieth century, the American Board [of Commissioners for Foreign Missions] operated 12 stations and 270 outstations in Asiatic Turkey. Nearly 145 missionaries and over 800 native workers managed these enterprises. By the end, the Board had established 114 organized churches with over 13,000 converts. Their evangelists taught over 60,000 students in their 132 high-grade and over 1,100 lower-grade schools” (p. 186).

Thus, the missions had become cultural symbols of importance. As such, it was not surprising to see the Armenians rush to the mission compounds in search of shelter.

However, although sometimes successful, the missions were ill-equipped to keep the Armenians in livable conditions. In the region of Urumia alone, approximately “3,000 to 4,000 of those who sought shelter in the American mission died of disease, mainly from typhus; and 600 of those who fled to the Catholic mission met the same fate” (Gaunt, 2006, p. 118). The refugees died of fear, inappropriate shelter, cold, hunger, and typhoid fever (Nisan, 1915). Thus, although providing protection from immediate and direct violence, these missions were inefficient as shelters. Furthermore, the missions proved to be counterproductive in several instances, as they provided immediate access to members of the victimized population at any point in time during the conflict, which made them targets for attacks. In some instances, these places unintentionally served to provide the Turkish forces with a victim pool for destruction.

In Urumia, sixty men were removed from the French mission and killed; while in the Catholic mission, dozens were bound, taken to the mountains and shot (Travis, 2006). In the town of Gulpashan, sixty-five men were taken from the missions and hanged (Travis, 2006). Thus, although imperative in providing shelter to many Christians during the conflict, the missions were not prepared, equipped or protected enough to ensure the safety of the refugees.

Yet this does not mean that they failed completely. These same missions in Urumia sheltered approximately 3,000 people in the French mission, and 17,000 in the American mission (Shedd, 1915). Although 4,000 refugees died in the American mission,

the other 13,000 found relative safety in the mission compound. This success, however, always hinged on the intervention of the foreign missionaries, who were determined to save as many Armenians as possible. Without their intervention, we can assume that the success of these places would have been lesser, and the death toll of the Armenians would have risen.

Monasteries were also seen as places to seek refuge due to their stronger buildings and often high walls that seemed much more defensible than individual homes in a village. However, much like mission complexes, these places proved to be ill-equipped to offer shelter. The Za'faran monastery (also known as Saffron Monastery), for example, housed refugees from several different villages. It sheltered approximately 700 refugees when it was attacked on 4 July 1915. Although safe from attacks, the monastery was not equipped to deal with large-scale medical issues and consequently saw the death of approximately half of the refugees due to epidemics (Gaunt, 2006), yet it successfully managed to provide shelter to the other half.

The monastery of Saint Mary in Zeitoun also managed to provide shelter to rebel refugees, who took refuge within the monastery walls and escaped right before the Turkish forces attacked and burned the building (Trowbridge, n.d.). The use of monasteries as shelter occurred in Dayro da Şlibo, as previously mentioned; in Hebob, where the isolation and high walls of the monastery also allowed for a successful defense against perpetrators; in Kafro-Tahtayo, Kharabe-Mishka, Mor Malke Qluzmoyo, and Sederi, among others. Although some cases proved to be successful, many became places of mass killing or cesspools of disease that led to the death of a great number of refugees.

Places with religious affiliations were not the only targets in the Ottoman Empire, as hospitals and orphanages were also sometimes sought out for destruction. In the town of Marsovan, sixty-two girls were taken from the American school and sent to march to the adjacent town. Only forty-one of them were successfully recovered by the intervention of the American personnel, with the fate of the others dreadfully unknown (Elmer, 1915). In one case, a survivor of the Siege of Aintab describes how “Turks began dropping bombs onto the orphanages. The Turks knew the orphanages contained women and children, and they were trying to kill us in order to make sure the Armenians wouldn’t breed into the next generation” (Bartrop, 2014, p. 34). Although the testimony comes from someone who was a very young girl during the conflict, her memory is reasserted by Bartrop (2014) who states that the siege did in fact involve the manner of bombing described by the survivor, and that “it was in these orphanages that the majority of the genocide survivors – that is, the children – sought sanctuary” (p.37).

In another case, missionaries running the German orphanage witnessed the staff and children from the Armenian orphanage in Moush being burned alive (Dadrian, 2003). Furthermore, the orphanage in Deir Zor, instead of acting as the place for massacre, was transformed into a holding pen before transporting the children to their death about an hour away where they were subsequently burned alive as well (Dadrian, 2003). Hospital patients were also not safe, as shown by the events of June 15-20, 1915, when Armenian patients from Trabzon were dragged from the hospital and drowned in the Black Sea (Whitehorn, 2015). All of these spaces should have been protected by international law, yet no intervention came to save the Armenians.

In the Ottoman Empire, much like in many other genocidal states, these places of perceived safety – as proven by the repeated use of them regardless of historical proof contradicting this idea of safety – were not only conducive to mass murder but also to other acts of mass violence, including rape. During the conflict of the Hamidian massacres, “girls were collected into the churches and were kept there for days at the pleasure of the soldiers before they were killed” (Carpenter, 1896, p. 453). Thus, these spaces were strategically transformed into places where victims could easily be gathered, used and disposed of at the behest of the perpetrators. However, the use of these spaces for mass rape was not unique to the conflicts predating the genocide of 1915, but reoccurred during the genocide.

Dadrian (2003) states that, “another venue for rape on a massive scale was the use and misuse of Armenian churches as temporary brothels. Young Armenian girls were assembled and made available to Turkish officers and soldiers” (p. 428). Several cases of mass rape in churches have been recorded in the case of Armenia, including one in the province of Bitlis, where approximately 300 girls were gathered for the pleasure of the soldiers who passed by the city. As, inevitably, disease spread, the girls were punished for their indiscretion in infecting the soldiers, and consequently poisoned or killed (Dadrian, 2013). In another case, during an attack in Jezire, “the women and children were locked up in the Dominican monastery and the Syriac Catholic church. Here they were pressed for money, raped, and tortured” (Gaunt, 2006, p. 227). Other acts of mass violence also occurred within these spaces. In Adapazar, 500 men were imprisoned in the Gregorian church and tortured for ten days before being deported (Holt, 1916).

An important factor to note before continuing this analysis, is the fact that although World War I ended in 1918, the persecution and elimination of the Ottoman Christians did not. Having successfully displaced and eliminated a significant portion of the Armenian population, the Turks then focused on eliminating not only what was left of the Armenians, but also broadened their scope against Assyrians, Pontic Greeks, and other Christian groups present in the Turkish territory. These groups also showed a proclivity towards using cultural spaces as places for refuge regardless of the many times these spaces had been violated during the war. In the later massacres of the Greek population, occurring between 1916-1919, “churches became incinerators to burn alive as many Greeks as could be stuffed into one building” (Bedrosyan, 2014, par. 3).

This speaks to the inability of victims to go anywhere else for protection, which is a direct reflection of the international environment in which these massacres occurred. The lack of international intervention left the Ottoman Christians with no choice but to flee to spaces that allowed them to congregate in numbers but that did not guarantee their protection, regardless of the deeply rooted traditions of sanctuary in both Christian and Islamic faiths. The existence of this premise of protection in the dogmatic teachings of both conflicting parties, would suggest that mutual respect for these spaces could be expected. However, as the plight of the Armenians shows, genocidal violence does not allow for this respect and instead necessitates the destruction of both people and cultural heritage. This was also seen during the Bosnian War, which occurred eighty years after the violence against the Armenians, and in which both church and mosques were specifically targeted for destruction.

The end of the war led to the Allied control of Turkish territory, and the subsequent rise of the Turkish National Movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a general of the Turkish forces who was sent by the Allied forces into the interior of the country to disarm and demobilize Turkish troops, but instead organized the Turkish patriots and assembled the beginnings of a nationalist force (Barton, 1930). The Turkish War for Independence began in 1919, only a year after the end of the First World War, and the efforts to exterminate the Ottoman Christians continued. This was an effort made easier by the fact that the Allied powers had already repatriated a significant portion of the surviving Armenians to their homes without establishing any measures that would protect them.

One of the most devastated towns in the war for independence and the location for its first battle, was the town of Marash, a city first under British and then French control. Here, the Kemalist movement saw the opportunity to rebel and seek independence from foreign occupation in the winter of 1920. In the process, Christians paid the highest price. In his personal memoir, Stanley E. Kerr (1973) states that at the beginning of the fighting between the Nationalist movement and the French troops, “Thousands of Armenians fled to their churches, most of which were destroyed by fire, and those who had taken refuge inside were annihilated” (p. 3). Thus, there prevailed a pattern of violence within cultural spaces that continuously filled up with refugees from the violence.

One of these churches was the Armenian Church of Saint George, which had been used by the French army and Armenian legionaries as a place to quarter themselves in during the fight, a fact that transformed this space into both shelter and strategic military

targets. As a consequence, the Turkish nationalists set fire to the church and to the houses in the vicinity, killing approximately one thousand innocent Armenians, while the troops sought refuge in a different quarter (Kerr, 1973). On the other side of the battle, mosques were also strategically destroyed by the French, as they had become hiding places for Turkish snipers (Kerr, 1973). Fearing being caught in the cross-fire, Armenians sought refuge with each other in places that could collectively protect them, including churches, orphanages and prisons. Kerr (1973) states, “As the bands of irregular fighters continued their mopping-up operations, the Armenian families realized that this was a time for collective security and made preparations to move to one of the churches in their quarter” (p. 102). This proved counterproductive in several instances, including at the church of Saint Stephen’s, where approximately 500 Armenians were burned alive. Although seeking collective security, the congregation of entire groups of Armenians provided the Kemalist forces with massive targets for destruction.

The same process was seen in the burning of the orphanage of Sourp Asdvadsadzin, where 350 children lost their lives, and the church of the same compound, where Turkish forces poured kerosene from the roof into the church and proceeded to set it on fire. Out of all the compounds used as shelter in Marash, only four had survivors by the end of the fighting. All others had been killed or fled to neighboring towns (Kerr, 1973).

The Franciscan Monastery proved itself to be one of the safest places in this war zone, as a group of French troops was quartered in it and thus repelled the Turkish attacks, saving the 3,700 refugees who had sought shelter there. The Baitshalom

orphanage was protected by the arrival of French troops who stopped the repeated attacks against the orphanage. The First Evangelical Church provided refuge for approximately 200 Armenians and 300 French troops (who were later replaced by Armenian legionnaires), but was burned to the ground anyways by the Turkish forces. The refugees, however, managed to escape to adjacent buildings and survived the church's decimation.

Although a few buildings did manage to resist the onslaught, they were few and far between. Overall, the siege of Marash led to the total decimation of the French hold on the town and the Armenians living there. After the French retreat, the Armenians who were left behind gathered in their shelters and were not allowed to leave, but they were not fed either, except by the efforts of the Near East Relief. This was a task that proved difficult since the Turkish people refused to sell the organization any food or grains for the Armenians. Having not been able to eliminate all of them during the conflict, the Armenians were then selected to starve (Kerr, 1973).

The genocidal campaign, then, continued well after the timeframe of 1915-1918, relentlessly seeking to eliminate as many members of the "other" as possible. Having worked with impunity before, the perpetrators continued their campaign even as they attempted to recover from a defeat by the Allied powers. The fight for an independent Turkish state, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, continued the ideology of hatred, discrimination and death that had prevailed under the reign of the Young Turks. Thus, Armenians and other Ottoman Christians who had been repatriated found themselves targeted once more for massacre and extermination.

The Role of Cultural Safe Havens in the Armenian Genocide

Several important factors can be extrapolated from the Armenian experience in regards to cultural safe havens:

1. Cultural safe havens proved highly ineffective in the protection of the Armenian population.
2. The successful defense of these spaces almost universally hinged on the intervention of third parties and/or the presence of foreign troops.
3. Internal and external passivity in regards to punishment of massacres throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, led to a proclivity for this type of crime to be a normal condition.
4. The historical use of these places as places for mass violence did not deter the Armenian population from seeking shelter there before, during or after the genocide.

Overall, cultural safe havens were used by the Armenian population regardless of the true value of their safety, which had been challenged time and time again in previous bouts of violence. Churches seem to occupy the bulk of the spaces used for refuge since before the genocidal campaign of 1915. Their use during the Hamidian massacres, the Adana massacres and the genocide of 1915 and beyond, shows a pattern of repetition that does not change with new information. The fact that these places were used to massacre entire groups of Armenians by the Sultan in 1894-1896, and the enraged mobs of 1909, did not seem to deter subsequent groups from fleeing to them in times of need during the genocidal campaigns of 1915, or the subsequent nationalist conflict of the 1920s. This is

important to note, as it speaks to a deeply-rooted belief in sanctuary that is not discouraged by empirical information.

The problem that arises from this is one of severe cognitive dissonance, in which the idea of safety itself is challenged by the attacks on spaces that have always retained a shroud of sacrosanctity around them. As Christians, the Armenians held deep historical beliefs of sanctuary in places of worship, and although this belief was shattered time and time again, the Armenians continued to use these spaces to congregate in large numbers. The fact is that understanding these places as safe proves harmful in the context of genocidal violence. This was seen in Armenia repeatedly before the Young Turks declared a change of tactics and began the deportations of the Armenians. The cultural spaces that did prove successful were often protected by foreigners, not safe in and of themselves.

The continued use of these spaces for refuge, even when historical occurrences point at their potential danger, speaks to the lack of options available for protection to targeted populations in times of genocidal violence. In the Armenian case, victims did not have many other places to go other than the churches and missions that were central spaces in their communities. Staying in their homes usually translated to forced participation in death marches. At the same time, the international community was too busy fighting a world war to ensure the protection of the Armenians in any way, which meant that there would be no intervention on behalf of the Armenians.

This is something that needs to be addressed, as the premise of sanctuary itself must be challenged because there is no sanctuary in genocidal campaigns, at least not

within the walls of cultural spaces. This is because genocidal violence does not conform to international regulations or basic rules of engagement, and in fact trespasses all existing regulations in an attempt at eliminating as many people as possible. However, the fact that perpetrators do not abide by international law does not mean that the rest of the international community must neglect its responsibility to protect those in need of protection. As such, plans for the protection of the targeted population must be guided by existing humanitarian law, including the creation of safe havens in conflict zones. This is especially important due to the fact that many of these spaces are already promised international protection under international law.

The creation of safe havens must be done while all the while keeping in mind that the collaboration of perpetrators will be difficult if not impossible to achieve. In addition, it must be understood that providing protection will not always translate to the total safety of every individual under international haven. In fact, as the experiences in both Rwanda and Bosnia prove, the protection of every single person is almost an impossibility, but this does not mean that these spaces are not essential to the survival of many. During the latter days of the Ottoman Empire, 1.5 million people perished in great part due to the lack of international intervention available on behalf of the Armenians.

As stated above, the repeated use of cultural safe havens during the Armenian genocide also points to a lack of options available to the population. Armenians in the Eastern provinces had more opportunities, as they were allowed by the Russians to cross into the Caucasus regions and volunteer as fighting forces to combat the Young Turks. However, these options were lacking for the provinces that were not located in the

borders, and the places of refuge across the borders were not prepared to accommodate the massive influx of refugees they encountered at the time. As such, many Armenians had no other options than to seek shelter in cultural spaces. Sometimes, Armenians also fled towards the mountains, but conditions were dire and they were forced to return and submit to deportations, or die of cold and starvation. In the end, there was little safety provided to the Armenians by any international actor, thus limiting their options for protection.

The use of cultural safe havens during the Armenian genocide had some stories of success, as seen above. However, these successes were almost always connected to intervention by a third party. This is the case in almost all genocidal campaigns, where it is rare that the victimized groups manage to protect themselves effectively without some form of aid or intervention. In the Armenian case, this manifested in several different ways. Whether it was a respected community leader from a foreign country, or an actual army, the survival of the Armenians in these refuges necessitated the intervention of others. Without their efforts, the Armenians in these churches, missions and monasteries, would have been massacred on site or deported into the desert to die of starvation, thirst, or exhaustion. This further proves the potential danger of cultural safe havens, as their mere existence cannot be enough to provide safety in cases of genocidal violence.

Although many of the Armenians died because of deportations and death marches, many were killed within places that were supposed to be safe, not only due to their historical perception as such, but also due to their codification as protected spaces in international law.

The use of cultural spaces as places for mass violence weaved its way through Ottoman history, from the Hamidian massacres, through the Adana massacres, into the 1915 genocide, and the later Turkish War of Independence. Throughout each conflict, places of perceived safety were used as places for genocidal massacres. These genocidal massacres were largely unpunished by either internal or external actors, with the defeat of Turkey in WWI being the one instance of most international punishment. Even in this case, however, the armistice did not specifically address the massacres of the Armenians, but rather focused on dividing Turkish territory for the benefit of the allies.

The subsequent efforts made to quickly repatriate the Armenians without properly securing the Turkish territory, backfired when the Kemalist forces began the war for Turkish Independence, thus leading to another round of massacres against the Armenians and other Christians in the region. Again, these went unpunished, and since then, the Turkish government has gone to great lengths to cover up the truth of the Armenian experience. The international community, most until very recently, has allowed this denial to continue. The repeated use of mass killings as a method for elimination points to a deeply rooted culture of massacre, in which the elimination of groups, specifically the Ottoman Christians, was a normal part of conflict relations. The continued apathy of the international community simply added to this culture a sense of invincibility, as perpetrators were not punished, even when it was the state itself who did the killing. The lack of strong international humanitarian laws proved a dire factor in the case of the Armenians. The few laws established against the attack of hospitals and places of

worship were neither strong enough, enforceable enough, nor respected enough for them to be efficient in protecting the targeted populations.

Consequently, not only were these spaces not respected by the perpetrators, but they were also not formally protected by the international community, who intervened solely in relation to their territorial advancement and strategic interests in the war efforts. Whether the change of status of these cultural spaces as officially protected in international conventions made a difference in the true value of their safety is something that will be explored in subsequent sections. The advent of international conventions that demand international action in cases of genocide will be an important point to analyze, but one which will be discussed in later chapters. For now, it is important to also understand how a lack of formal international safe havens led to the blossoming of other types of intervention that in many ways defined the survival of many during the Armenian genocide.

International Rescue through Informal Venues

International humanitarian law had not officially developed at the time of the Armenian genocide. As such, the Armenian people were left mostly to find their own resources for survival. The few attempts at codifying humanitarian efforts were too limited to truly make a difference at the time of the conflict. While cultural spaces were protected under The Hague Convention, it was not until the Geneva Conventions of 1949 that the premise of safe havens was officially instituted as part of international law. However, the lack of state-sponsored aid opened an opportunity for foreign, non-state organizations, who moved into place and engaged in great efforts to save many

Armenians. These were the closest international safe havens available to the Armenians, and as the conflict dragged on, new efforts were established in regions such as the Russian border and Port Said in Egypt.

Foreign countries, however, were not ready to cope with the number of refugees coming out of Ottoman Turkey, and as such were incapable of providing the necessary resources to keep the Armenians alive and well in these shelters. Almost in every instance, non-governmental organizations were solely responsible for the relief efforts, mostly depending on funds received from abroad, and for providing livable conditions to thousands of refugees. Many of these efforts throughout the war required the approval of warring parties for these organizations to act within gained territories. In addition, many countries were appealed to in search for the necessary funding to maintain the relief efforts in the region. Thus, although not officially established by an international governing body, these spaces for refuge were highly contingent on international cooperation and approval.

One of the main players in these efforts was the Near East Relief (NER), which was founded in 1915 at the behest of American missionaries, and served the Armenian people in the region for the next fifteen years. Through the scourges of war, genocide, and recovery, the Near East Relief proved to be one of the most important foreign institutions to establish and maintain safe havens for the Armenians. As such, this section of the research will analyze both the successes and failures of the NER, in an attempt at understanding how this very early version of international humanitarian aid played such an important role in the context of genocidal violence.

The Near East Relief

The Near East Relief (NER) began as an American initiative, spearheaded by the American Mission Committee, which had people on the ground and witnessing the plight of the Armenians from before the onset of genocide. Its success involved persistent efforts by individuals to raise the funds needed for the work of the organization. The NER was incorporated by a special act of Congress in 1919 (Barton, 1930), but its work began early in the conflict during 1915. It was first known as the American Relief Committee, then as the Armenian and Syrian Relief Committee, then as the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and finally as the Near East Relief. Yet the changes of name never changed its mission, and the organization worked tirelessly to aid those in need in the Near East region. This, of course, included more than just Armenians, as the advent of war displaced people from all groups. However, the misfortune of the Armenians inspired empathy in the American hearts, and it was thus the driving force behind the relief efforts.

Early in 1915, the NER efforts became multi-organizational efforts that linked a network of relief committees already working in the area, including the Palestine-Syrian Relief Committee, the Persian Relief Committee, and others. These committees agreed to collaborate in the efforts (Barton, 1930). Thus, a collaborative and non-partisan model of relief came to life in the region, which allowed for the distribution of aid throughout a vast territory and to thousands of peoples.

There are several factors that aided in the success of the NER, including the fact that it remained neutral throughout the war, even after the United States joined the Allied

forces. This was important to the success of the efforts, because during the war period the NER worked in territories that comprised the interests of “twelve different countries, each with its own flag and independent government and extending into three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa” (Barton, 1930, p. 54). Many of these countries were in opposite sides of the war, which required the NER to retain an apolitical and neutral stance throughout the war to be able to keep the trust of the governments they needed to be able to reach the refugees in need. The apolitical nature of the NER also allowed the efforts to reach more just than just one group of people, as Kurds, Turks, Tartars, Arabs and Persians, were also given aid when needed (Barton, 1930).

In addition, the organization had the benefit of working with centers and personnel that had been established as part of ongoing missionary efforts in the region, and consequently already had a pre-existing structural and organizational network that needed only funding to work. Once the funding arrived and was distributed, the aid could be dispersed accordingly throughout the land. These missionaries, doctors, and diplomats all played pivotal roles not only in helping Armenians, but in saving them. Barton (1930) states that,

“without this large force of experienced men and women available for immediate service, without expense to the general funds, familiar with the language and with local conditions, the relief work during the war would have been impossible, even though ample funds had been generously contributed, for the country [Turkey] was closed under stress of war to new workers” (p. 48).

The availability of this personnel and its already existing relationship with both victim and perpetrators proved to be a deciding factor in the success of the mission, as many times these workers were responsible for making arrangements with Turkish and Kurdish officials for the protection of the Armenian citizens in their respective towns.

The work of the Near East Relief spanned fifteen years, including times of war and times of peace. As a consequence, the NER managed to provide life-saving resources and shelter all throughout the region to thousands of people. For example, in Tiflis, 20,000 refugees were kept alive by the efforts of the NER, and in Alexandropol, 58,000 refugees depended on the aid provided (Peterson, 2004). In Constantinople, approximately 500,000 people were dependent on the work of the NER, which provided 1,400,250 rations of food (Barton, 1930). In the regions of Aleppo, approximately 150,000 refugees sought aid from the NER. These numbers are only a few of the efforts in which the NER was present, with hundreds of thousands of people depending on their aid. During war time, the relief also aided several hundred thousand in the Russian caucuses (Moranian, 2004). The relief efforts of the NER began with a petition for \$100,000 in funds, but evolved to eventually provide over \$116,000,000 throughout its existence (Barton, 1930), with one of its main purposes being the protection, retraining and eventual integration of orphans into a post-war society.

In these efforts, the NER did not work alone, as other relief organizations were created throughout different countries and sought to cooperate in the relief efforts. The Armenian Relief Association of Canada (ARAC) and the Lord Mayor's Fund of Britain, both joined the efforts during wartime and expanded their services as needed. ARAC

provided funds for relief efforts, but also actively advocated for the resettlement of Armenian orphans in Canadian territory after the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, successfully swaying the government to allow 150 orphaned children into Canada, even though it had initially petitioned for the resettlement of 2,000 of them (Whitehorn, 2015; Kaprielian-Churchill, 1990).

The Lord Mayor's Fund began early in the war period, appealing to the British people early in the conflict for the necessary funds to aid the Armenians. The appeal stated: "Dear Sir (Or Madam) ... We [the members of the Fund] therefore send you this appeal in the confident hope that the desperate condition of these unfortunate people will move you to give them all the help in your power" (Armenian Refugee Fund, n.d.). In addition, the Fund created an "Armenia Day" on February 6, 1916, in which they appealed for funds for the Armenians with the help of the Catholic Archbishop (Armenian Refugee Fund, 1916), thus hoping that sympathetic Christians would be swayed into helping. Together, these organizations raised the funds necessary to help the Armenian people throughout the war and beyond. The Red Cross, another non-governmental organization, also provided aid for the refugees in need, partnering with the NER and providing \$500,000 between 1919 and 1920 to aid in the relief of the Armenians who were still not resettled after the war.

However, although highly successful at the time, these efforts faced incredible obstacles and witnessed the inevitable loss of thousands of people under their care, as sometimes the funds were not sufficient or were not distributed fast enough – usually due to wartime constraints – for the needs of the population. As such, many refugees perished

within the refuges provided by these non-governmental organization, as well as within those provided by foreign governments. Much like the missions and monasteries, many of the places established for safety within the four relief areas of Turkey, Syria, the Caucasus and Persia (Barton, 1930) were a double-edged sword, as most were keenly ill-equipped for the job. The places in which the NER worked were neither protected nor established by any international or foreign army, which meant that these spaces were unable to provide the safety expected of international safe havens. As places of charitable purpose, many of these efforts should have been protected under The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which already called for their protection. However, the regional and international context of the conflict did not allow for these laws to truly matter at the time.

Russian Caucasus, Port Said, and Baghdad

The NER was the leading non-governmental organization spearheading the movement to protect the Armenians, however, it had no specific territory to establish as a safe haven and did not count with any system of protection other than the missionaries and diplomats, and their efforts to lessen the violence. The NER was not alone in its efforts, as it was joined by governments who attempted to provide refuge to the fleeing populations as best they could. Two of these were the governments of Russia, in the Caucasus, and Britain, in Egypt, where refugee camps were hastily established and provisionally administered by each respective government in partnership with missionary efforts. These efforts provided protected territories for the refugees to recover from extended and grueling periods of violence. The British camps proved much more

effective than the Russian ones, as Russia found itself struggling not only with other countries but with changes within its own political and social structures.

In Egypt, Port Said was established as a refugee camp after the French extraction of the Armenians of Musa Dagh in September, 1915, yet further refugee flows forced the camp to remain open for four years, at the end of which all refugees were returned to the Turkish territory *en masse* (Shemmassian, 2008). The British government had control of the Suez Canal at the time, and thus took on the responsibility to arrange a space for the incoming refugees (Trowbridge, 1916). The camps were established as sectors in which the most able Armenians were designated as sector leaders, bread was commissioned from a bakery in Port Said, and efforts were established to provide at least one warm meal besides the daily bread. In addition, water systems were established to provide water throughout the camp, and a hospital was opened to aid the sick and dying (Trowbridge, 1916).

Many of the efforts within the camp itself were provided by the same American Committee working as part of the NER, and by the Red Cross. Efforts to raise money for the Armenians were spearheaded by the former U.S. Ambassador to the region, Henry Morgenthau, who failed to quell the violence when it began and found his efforts to bring international attention to the issue to be futile, regardless of the reports substantiating his claims. The atrocities of the Armenians continued, unpunished, in full sight of the international community. By 1919, an approximate 10,000 people were taking refuge in Port Said ('News from Many Lands', 1919). Under the protection of the British officials, this camp was one of the closest things the Armenians had to an international safe haven.

As in any war, the refugees were vulnerable to attack even within the refugee camps. In March 23, 1919, Arabs attacked the camp as a method of retaliation against the British forces. Overall, however, the camp in Port Said was a successfully established haven for the Armenian refugees through a combination of governmental approval and protection, and a non-governmental administration that encouraged the refugees to engage in the policing of their own communities and in the administrative success of the camp.

Russia, on the other hand, struggled to accommodate the masses of refugees. Armenian refugees from the eastern provinces chose to flee to the Russian territories. This provided a steady influx of refugees who were at once disorderly and desperate. From Van, 200,000 people sought refuge in Russia, and thousands of others reached the Caucasus from other provinces (as qtd in Barton, 1930). The Caucasus was filled with hundreds of thousands of people in need, and “every type of shelter was overcrowded; food was scarce in famine frightfulness; clothing consisted of the garments of flight’ and the health conditions, with no facilities for cleanliness, became appalling, often breaking out into epidemics” (Barton, 1930, p. 83). Russia could not efficiently care for the massive influx of refugees that came into the region during the war, and found itself overwhelmed solely by attempting to provide the sanitary precautions necessary to keep as many refugees alive as possible (Armenian Refugee Fund, n.d.). The NER’s job in the Caucasus was complimentary to the Russian government’s and did not evolve with the same efficiency or rapidity as it had in other refugee camps. Although secondary to the government aid provided, this charitable work managed to create some form of stability

for the refugees by providing work as financial aid. Here, women were employed to spin cotton and wool while men were employed as carpenters (Barton, 1930).

The efforts were soon challenged, as Russia was in a period of radical transition, with the Bolshevik Revolution beginning to destabilize the country in the later years of the war and eventually taking over in 1917. As a consequence, governmental aid ceased to be available for the refugees and the forced evacuation of almost all American personnel, most of whom had fled with the refugees and who were the only connection between the refugees and the NER, was mandated. These new governmental policies in Russia left the refugees in the Caucasus to fend for themselves. The effects were catastrophic, with approximately 250,000 people dead by the winter of 1918, and 15,000 more between December and April of 1919 (Barton, 1930). Without any permanently established camps or methods for protection, the Armenians had no system that could lessen the gravity of their situation. The retreat of the Americans also meant the retreat of the funding. The Armenians in the villages who tried to help by taking in some refugees into their own homes and villages, could not hope to accommodate the entire refugee population. In the end, the Armenians taking refuge in the Caucasus had to wait until the end of the war and the signing of the Armistice to receive much needed help.

On the other side of the Turkish territory, in the refugee camp of Baqubah, a few miles from Baghdad, thousands of people sought refuge under the protection of British officials in the later years of the war. The camp was established to provide shelter to approximately 40,000 – 50,000 refugees, including Armenians and Assyrians from the Turkish territories, who had fled the violence by the autumn of 1918. The main route of

communication between Baghdad and the Caspian Sea was occupied by the British forces (Austin, 1920), and consequently it was to this region that the refugees began to flee in search of safety. They arrived to be parsed out into three distinct groups: those who could join the irregular forces and fight back along with the British forces, those who could be part of labor forces to improve the work in the roads of communication, and those who were to be sent into the Baqubah camp (Austin, 1920).

The camp itself was guarded and administered by personnel encompassing approximately 3,000 British and Indian individuals, and was structured in much the same way as the camps in Egypt: with a working system for water dispensation, a hospital and medical area, defined sections for better organization, a system of policing and justice, and with help from able-bodied refugees to manage the day-to-day activities of the camps. British Senior Officers oversaw the larger sections, and the subdivisions of each section were also administered by British personnel. The British government undertook the care of the refugees at great expense to itself, and debated whether taxpayers should continue to fund the camp after the war. Churchill remarked that it was a humanitarian question that needed to be considered, and that all the efforts to repatriate the refugees was being put forth (House of Commons, 1919). Although these efforts of repatriation were often premature, the refugees themselves desired to return to their homeland, and the British government did everything it could to aid in that transition.

Here, too, the American Mission Board had influence, as it managed to create a working industry of garment production in which approximately 4,500 women and children produced, “during the first three months, over 12,000 pieces of clothing, some

3,000 quilts, besides mattresses, pillows, and over 15,000 lbs. of yarn” (Austin, 1920, p. 12). The yarn was supplied by the Mission, the refugee employees were paid by the American payroll, and the products were freely given to the refugees in need. A similar system was established by the British forces, through which they employed groups of refugees in districts outside of the camp for agricultural purposes, and they too were paid by the Labor Office in the camp or by the Government Department to which they were on loan in their districts. In addition, refugees were employed for fixing the railway systems, canals, roads (Austin, 1920), and anything else that might help the smooth operation of the camp, as well as the British interests. This way, many refugees found purpose again, and “by means of congenial employment were thus given an opportunity of rapidly forgetting the horrors of their dreadful exodus” (Austin, 1920, p. 12). As such, the establishment of a semi-functioning economy led to stability and normalcy in the midst of chaos.

Although Baqubah was a highly functioning camp, there remained an inability to successfully deal with all the challenges faced. Here, the health conditions were rapidly addressed by the establishment of hospitals, quarantine zones, and sanitation areas, but in the months of September to December 1918, a total of 3,000 refugees still died, mostly of causes related to the long marches and the violence previously suffered. The quick assembly of hospital areas, quarantine sections for newly arriving refugees, and sanitation areas in the camp led the death toll to level at approximately 20-25 per week in a camp with over 40,000 people (Austin, 1920). Although still a high number of deaths, the camp at Baqubah was more successful at keeping the refugees alive than the ill-fated camps of

the Russian Caucasus. In addition, Baqubah managed to survive an attack by Arab rebels that prompted the evacuation of the camp as a result of the inability to resupply the camp at the necessary rate for survival. Both refugees and British forces engaged the rebels and managed to keep them at bay, but the fighting led the British forces to dismantle the camp and move the refugees – The Assyrians to Mosul, and the Armenians to Bashra (Cunliffe-Owens, 1922).

Little has been written or translated into English about these camps, and our knowledge of them is still limited. However, their existence has been verified not only by accounts of those who were there, but also by photographs, drawings, and other records available in archives such as those in the Imperial War Museums of England. These refugee camps proved essential in the survival of many Ottoman Christians, including thousands of Armenians, who had no other place to go. Although not completely successful at protecting the refugees from disease or attacks, these camps proved far more effective in providing a safe haven than the cultural safe havens used by the victimized populations inside the conflict zones.

It is important to note that these camps were not safe havens as defined by international law later in history, since they were not established within the conflict zones. As such, access to them was significantly limited and those who could not make their way to Baquba or Port Said were left to fend for themselves inside the Ottoman territory. However, their existence provided a space for Armenians to seek shelter and await the end of the war without feeling vulnerable to destruction. The success of these spaces is important in understanding available options for the future protection of

populations. Providing safe passage to safe zones established outside of the conflict zone may prove imperative in the survival of many, since it would provide a safe location outside of the reach of the perpetrators and protected by the international community. As such, the expansion of the premise of safe havens to include safe passage is an idea that will need further debate. This option would be able to provide a path for victimized populations to be moved out of danger while underlying grievances are resolved within the conflict zones. A more detailed discussion of this option is provided in the 'Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations for Action' chapter of this research.

The Role of International Intervention in the Armenian Genocide

Havens for Armenian refugees, as well as for other Ottoman Christians, were not established by agreement of the international community, but rather by the felt responsibility of the governments the refugees came to rely upon. As places of safety and security, these refugee camps were protected by foreign troops and aided by foreign funding, yet they were not established as safe zones that fit into the definitions available at the time in international law. In essence, these spaces were outside of the conflict zone and as such provided more safety than any refuge within the areas of violence could have achieved. These camps found it challenging to keep everyone alive, as disease and violence eventually reached these areas. However, their distance from the conflict zone, as well as the presence of foreign troops for their protection, led to a relative safety that did not need to be total to be successful, with thousands of people surviving the genocide as a direct consequence of the existence of these spaces.

The Hague Convention of 1907 afforded protection to religious, historical, or charitable buildings, as well as to hospitals, if they were not being used for military purposes, but it did not allow for the creation of entire demilitarized areas. These refugee camps, then, were no part of the limited protected areas as delineated in international law at the time. However, their existence was the difference between life and death for many. Unlike the safe havens purported by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in which parties agree to their establishment, these havens were clearly not neutral, as they were protected by states that had their own strategic goals during the war.

Several factors can be extrapolated from the Armenian experience regarding international intervention:

1. The lack of official policies regarding safe havens led to the sprouting of efforts that were coordinated and executed by non-governmental organizations.
2. Camps that relied on the help of non-governmental organizations were most successful, while camps that relied solely on governments at war had more challenges in providing protection.
3. The search for safety, as well as the expectation of it, were defining factors for the decisions taken by the refugees to seek protection in these areas.
4. Although unable to provide total protection, these spaces were still successful at keeping many alive throughout the conflict and as such can be deemed successful instances of intervention.

For the Armenians, there was a lack of available options for safety. The Armenian population, as seen above, rushed to some of their most central communal spaces, including churches and mission complexes, because there was no other choice for them. This same lack of options led the Armenians to attempt to find safety at the hands of governments who were fighting against the Young Turks. To the east, the Armenians rushed into the Russian border as the Russians retreated from the Turkish territory. In other areas, however, access to places of safety was much more limited. This did not deter the Armenians to try to reach these spaces, and many reached places like Baqubah and Port Said in search for safety. However, it was the efforts on the ground by organizations like the Near East Relief and the foreign missions that provided some relief for thousands of Armenians.

Although limited in scope, the refugee camps still managed to provide a modicum of safety for those who managed to reach these spaces and as such were successful in their endeavor to protect the targeted population. In Port Said, a combination of government protection, engagement from non-governmental institutions, and refugee-led administration at the lowest levels, gave the camp a better chance for success. By providing opportunities for the refugees to engage and be responsible for the functioning of the camp, the British government ensured that a semi-stable and autonomous system took root in the camp, which allowed the refugees to care for themselves as much as possible. In addition, the intervention of non-governmental institutions allowed for the responsibility to be shifted from the government, which was already attending to the war efforts, to organizations that had spent years ensuring the safety of the victimized peoples

throughout the Ottoman territories. Because of their long-running commitment to the Armenian people, these organizations had the knowledge and skills to create a functioning camp that provided livable conditions to those within and that were efficient enough to keep the refugees from perishing from sickness, starvation or cold. These organizations also provided funding from places like America and England, which translated to more aid and more opportunities for both the camp at Port Said, and the one in Baghdad.

On the other hand, the refugee camps that were solely under the administration of the Russian government proved to be less efficient. The camps in the Russian Caucasus were hindered by the expulsion of the American missionaries, who had the resources and the experience to help, and subsequently failed to keep the refugees protected while trying to deal with both the continued war efforts and the domestic changes occurring in Russia. These camps lacked the structural stability found in Baqubah and Port Said, and were less clearly established. Consequently, no sense of permanence was available for the refugees, and no lasting systems were established to deal with their basic needs. Many refugees survived because of the kindness of Armenians who lived in the Caucasus and took them in, but these villagers could only do so much. The sudden lack of funds from the government proved fatal to thousands of refugees who had fled the eastern provinces of the Ottoman territories expecting safety behind the Russian front lines.

An expectation of safety permeated the Armenian experience, as the Armenians in the east advanced and retreated with the Russian army due to the available protection of their troops, and the Armenians in the west expected the British troops to help. The

British forces had sent a small unit to help the resistance efforts of General Agha Petros.

This unit was supposed to be backed by the British Army joining them later, but instead found itself retreating to Baghdad without the promised reinforcements. On their march to Baghdad, the refugees repeated “Where are the English soldatti [soldiers]?”

(Benjamin, 2000, par. 23). The Armenians were expecting help, and kept moving forward in their attempt to find it.

Overall, the refugee camps that were established for the Armenians and other Ottoman Christians were much more successful at keeping them alive than cultural safe havens. The reasons can be understood, as the refugees camps had international protection and were out of the reach of the perpetrating forces. Cultural safe havens, on the other hand, were within the conflict zones, unprotected for the most part, and vulnerable to attack, especially when there was no third party intervention to lessen the violence.

It must be understood that the Armenian genocide occurred within a context in which there was no established international law that necessitated intervention in cases of genocidal violence, or that protected establishments within intrastate conflicts. International humanitarian law was just beginning to emerge, and it had years to go before its final evolution into a global institution. The question, however, is whether the rise of this international law, of international institutions such as the United Nations, and the codification of international law in the form of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, led to the betterment of conditions regarding safe havens in the context of genocidal violence.

Conclusions

The plight of the Armenians continues to be vastly denied by many international actors, yet its occurrence is a fact. The Armenians, along with other Christians in the Ottoman Empire, suffered through a history of violence in which they were repeatedly targeted for destruction. In these campaigns of extermination places of preconceived safety were repeatedly attacked by the perpetrators. Churches, mission complexes, monasteries and orphanages, were all used as shelter and targeted because of it. Armenian history had preconditioned the population to flee to many of these spaces in times of conflict, especially to the mission complexes that were so deeply embedded in Armenian life and relationships. Although historically many of these spaces had proven fatal already, especially the churches, the lack of available options meant that these were the most accessible spaces for protection. In addition, international law had already protected many of these spaces and as such, their preconception of safety was codified in legal documents that were supposed to aid in the protection of the targeted populations.

It is important to note that places such as the foreign missions were in fact protected by international agreement. As charitable spaces that were not being used for military purposes, these structures were legally protected by The Hague Convention of 1907. A total of forty-four countries had signed and ratified this convention by 1907, including Turkey, Germany, France, Russia, and the United States, among others (ICRC, n.d.). As such, these spaces were meant to be safe for those who sought refuge within them. In addition, The Hague Convention also provided protections to religious spaces, which meant that the Armenian churches should have been off-limits to the perpetrators.

The codification of laws that protect these spaces add to the already engrained cultural perception that these spaces are sanctuary in times of violence.

As international humanitarian law was only beginning to bloom in the international arena, with only forty-four countries signing up to abide by these conventions at the time of the First World War, the Armenians were left on their own and only the intervention of dedicated non-profit organizations such as The Near East Relief managed to provide some safety. Armenians also found safety in refugee camps established outside of the conflict zone and managed by foreign powers. However, these refugee camps were not entirely successful and at times proved fatal to many Armenians.

Overall, the Armenian people found safety only at the hands of foreign intervention – a factor that is repeatedly seen in cases of genocidal violence. This occurred sometimes in the form of military campaigns or simply through the efforts of the missionaries in the Ottoman territories. Cultural safe havens proved to be at best dangerous and at worst fatal, and the lack of international safe havens provided no available options for the targeted populations to turn to in times of need. In the end, over 1.5 million Armenians perished during the genocide without any intervention from the international community, and without any form of accountability established in the years after the First World War. The development of international law should have changed these odds, yet as the following chapters reveal, the institution of international humanitarian law did not directly translate to the successful protection of cultural spaces, or to the successful establishment of international safe havens.

Chapter 6: Rwanda Descends into Violence

“The West's post-Holocaust pledge that genocide would never again be tolerated proved to be hollow, and for all the fine sentiments inspired by the memory of Auschwitz, the problem remains that denouncing evil is a far cry from doing good.” – Philip Gourevitch

Introduction

The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 showed the world that the international community was still ill-equipped to deal with cases of genocide. The case of Rwanda provides clear examples of both cultural and international safe havens, and puts into perspective their individual roles in the context of genocidal violence. Cultural safe havens in Rwanda became some of the most violent locations during the conflict, with thousands of people butchered within the confines of spaces they had deemed safe. On the other hand, the humanitarian zones established in Rwanda were linked to France's strategic interests, and consequently proved highly controversial in practice. Meanwhile, success in other places of refuge hinged on the availability of protection, either from troops belonging to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), or to those UN troops who chose to stay in the country regardless of the evacuation orders in place. Unlike in the case of the Armenians, international law was well developed by 1994, with premises such as international intervention, safe havens, and genocide conventions established to avoid exactly what happened in this small African nation.

A Build Up to Genocide

Addressing the danger of cultural safe havens without addressing the case of Rwanda is almost an impossibility, as the churches, schools, and hospitals of this country

are still marked by the memories of the thousands who died within. The establishment of memorials in many churches across the country serve as eternal reminders of the violence that ensued in places that were considered untouchable by violence. The use of these spaces as places for genocidal massacres is intrinsically tied to Rwanda's history of violence and the recurring use of these places as spaces for refuge. In Rwanda, a population already conditioned to seek shelter in cultural spaces was abused by those who knew of these traditions, and who would use it for their advantage when seeking the most effective methods for the elimination of the victimized populations. The success of these spaces in previous bouts of violence allowed for victims to perceive them as places of safety. To understand the use of these cultural spaces as both shelters and slaughterhouses, it is important to first understand Rwandan history. Although a detailed account of this history is not the purpose of this research, a basic understanding of the conditions that led to the violence in 1994 is necessary.

Rwanda, much like the Ottoman Empire, suffered from a culture of violence difficult to escape. Transgenerational memory transformed into transgenerational violence that was ever-present in the nation, so that when the conditions for mass violence became ideal, genocide occurred. This transgenerational resentment began with the colonial institution of power after WWI, when Germany was stripped of its territories and both Rwanda and Burundi were given to Belgium under a League of Nations mandate. The German control of Rwanda had not changed much of the monarchical structure of Rwanda. In this society, the Tutsi were part of the monarchy, as well as the provincial chiefs; the Hutu oversaw the running of the neighborhoods by following the

orders of those from above, who were usually Tutsi; and the Twa were pygmies who made up a very small section of the population and thus played a minor role to the social order. The Belgians, seeking to establish a more hierarchical society, began a campaign of classification in which the population was arbitrarily distinguished between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, with the Hutus being the most discriminated segment of the population (Melvern, 2006). The divide that came from the expanded Belgian policies of 1933, including the establishment of identity cards, haunted Rwanda all the way to 1994.

The first waves of violence began in 1959, when the death of the king was blamed on the Hutu population, which led to a Hutu leader being attacked by a Tutsi. This, in turn, led to a wave of retaliatory violence that escalated to claim a total of 2,000 victims, most of them Tutsi (Melvern, 2006). This violence was rooted in the perception of Tutsi supremacy and in the growing resentment that festers when a majority is ruled over by a minority in an oppressive and discriminatory way. The 1957 publication of the “Bahutu Manifesto,” a document calling for the end of Belgian rule and the disenfranchisement of the Tutsi, among other things, brought to light a deeply rooted frustration felt by the Hutu and ignited the fire needed for an eventual revolution.

The lack of access to political life established against the Hutu during Belgian colonization, as well as the social discrimination suffered by them in all spheres of life, led to the perfect conditions for revolt in 1959 against the Belgian colonizers and their Tutsi allies. In the years between 1959 and 1994, the use of mass violence and genocidal massacres became more than just extraordinary cases in the life of the Rwandan people; they became a staple of Rwandan life, as a culture of massacre became deeply engrained

in social and political interactions. During these years, “the idea of genocide, although never officially recognized, became a part of life” (Melvern, 2006, p. 8). This is an important factor to understand in the development of the country’s history, as this culture of massacre became so engrained in the problem-solving mentality of the population, that it was almost the *de facto* solution to political and social problems in Rwanda. Much like in the Ottoman territories during the 1800s and 1900s, this pattern of violence was seen repeatedly in Rwanda.

The second wave of violence came in 1963, when Tutsi guerrilla fighters, composed of exiled Tutsis living in Burundi, attempted to enter the country and oust elected Hutu President, Gregoire Kayibanda. Their failed attempt led to another wave of retaliatory violence, in which thousands more perished, most of them Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The killings of 1963 were considered “the beginning of state-sponsored systematic massacres that targeted the Tutsi” (Karuhanga, 2013, par. 2). In addition, these killings led to massive migrations of Tutsi into neighboring Burundi, where many already resided in refugee camps established during previous violent campaigns. The refusal of the Hutu government to permit Tutsi refugees to repatriate allowed for the eventual formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

The massacres of 1963 were rooted in the same ethnic divide created years prior and fomented by the Hutu government and its propaganda. These killings, much like the Hamidian massacres in the Ottoman Empire, went unchecked and unpunished by the international community, which refused to acknowledge the violence as genocide and instead neglected to act entirely. This occurred regardless of the fact that the “Convention

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” had been in existence since 1948. These acts of mass violence were only a few within the history of Rwanda, and both were perpetrated by the Hutu majority. However, to blame all instances of violence on the Hutu is to neglect the violence ensued by the Tutsi only a few years after 1963, this time in Burundi, in 1972.

Although occurring in the neighboring country and not within the borders of Rwanda, the violence of 1972 in Burundi was directly related to both the preceding and succeeding violence in Rwanda, as it led thousands of Hutu to flee into Rwanda and become part of the social order that would seek revenge only a few years later. The violence in Burundi was also directly related to the Belgian policies instituted during colonial rule, where Tutsis were given positions of power over their Hutu counterparts in Burundi as well as in Rwanda. In 1972, a planned insurrection by the Hutu, occurring in the towns of Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac to the south, led to retaliation from the Tutsi and to a violent campaign of genocidal proportions. The failed Hutu coup occurred in April 29, 1972, and by May 31 of that year, *The New York Times* reported that at least 50,000 people had been killed in one month (‘Editorial Page Columns’, 1972); by July 29, 1972, the same periodical reported estimates of 109,000 – 200,000 dead (‘Editorial Page Columns’, 1972). The coup attempt, on the other hand, had cost between 2,000-3,000 lives (Lemarchand, 2009).

The repression of the Hutu by the Tutsi in Burundi was brutal, with many beaten to death in schools and universities by their own classmates and hundreds fleeing for their lives into neighboring Tanzania and Rwanda. The massacres in Burundi became “deeply

etched in the collective memory of the Hutu people, not only in Burundi but among the older generation of Hutu in Rwanda” (Lemarchand, 2009). Lemarchand also remarks that the violence in Burundi against the Hutu was rooted in much more than just opportunistic violence. It was rooted in the memory of the Hutu massacres of 1959-1962, and an increasing fear of reprisals. He states,

“Fear of an impending Hutu-instigated slaughter of all Tutsi elements, nurtured by lingering memories of what happened in Rwanda in 1959–1962, certainly played a crucial part in transforming the repression into a genocide. That many Tutsi perceived the Hutu attacks as posing a mortal threat to their survival, there can be no doubt; nor is there any question, that many viewed the wholesale elimination of Hutu elites as the only way of dealing effectively with what they perceived as a clear and present danger — a kind of “Final Solution” to a situation that threatened their very existence as a group. In the short run, their calculation proved entirely correct: The wholesale decapitation of the Hutu elites insured peace and order for the next 16 years [in Burundi]” (p. 414).

The fear of another round of massacres against the Tutsi led to a repression that transformed into a genocidal campaign, and to the creation of a new collective memory in the minds of the Hutu. Much like collective memories of violence shaped the reaction of the Tutsi population in 1972, so did the collective memory of this event, compounded by the decades of repression that molded Hutu collective identity, shape the violence of 1994. Again, the international community was silent and the genocide went unpunished, thus continuing the cycle of violence and impunity.

The 1973 government takeover in Rwanda by Juvenal Habyarimana led to the institution of a highly segregated system, in which “there were no Tutsi prefects of burgomestres, only one Tutsi minister, two Tutsi members of parliament, out of 70, and one Tutsi officer in the army” (Melvern, 2006, p. 12). The roles had been reversed, and the Tutsi became a highly repressed minority in Rwanda. The Tutsi exiles in Uganda, having established themselves as the RPF mounted another insurrection on October 1990, consequently bringing forth the beginning of Rwanda’s civil war. The RPF fighters represented the 900,000 Tutsi who lived outside of Rwanda after being driven out of their country during the violence of 1959 and 1963 (Melvern, 2006), and their efforts were funded by Rwandan diasporas all over the world.

The first invasion by the RPF was a failure, with its commander perishing only days into the war. The repressive aftermath became deadly to those Tutsi still inside Rwanda, with government forces accusing them of complicity with the RPF and engaging in new massacres against them. A second attack by the RPF in 1991, this time organized by Paul Kagame, led to more violence against the pastoral people of Rwanda, with a death toll difficult to ascertain and a renewed silence from the international community. A third attack by the RPF in 1993, which came amid peace negotiations between the RPF and the Rwandan’s government, led to more government reprisals that were backed by paramilitary militias known as the *Interahamwe*.

The peace deal was known as The Arusha Accords, which was signed on 4 August 1993, and sought to put an end to the violence between the Hutu government and the RPF rebels. However, less than a year later, the violence in Rwanda re-emerged in

unthinkable proportions. The violence of 1994 erupted on April 6-7, after the death of President Juvénal Habyarimana, when Hutu Power extremists blamed the Tutsis for his death and took over the government in one fell swoop. The morning of 7 April 1994, saw the culmination of decades of cultural and international acceptance to massacres, in the form of a structured and systemic push to rid the country of every Tutsi that could be found. The death toll of the genocide is estimated at 800,000 – 1,000,000 people, a number that took only 100 days to achieve and which was enabled by the vast use of cultural safe havens as places for mass violence.

Cultural safe havens and mass violence in Rwanda

Throughout these bouts of violence, victimized populations sought shelter in communal spaces, including churches and schools. The culture of massacre established in Rwanda for decades had conditioned the population to seek shelter in these spaces when it was needed. As such, the preconceptions of safety were reinforced, and the habitual conduct of gathering *en masse* within these spaces became as much a part of the culture as the massacres themselves. As violence erupted in 1994, Tutsis again sought refuge in the same places they had before: the churches, schools, convents, and other public spaces. Francine Umutesi (2014), a Rwandan exile who lost much of her family to the violence, states that

“During previous killings, and I believe in European wars and revolutions it was the same; people had sometimes survived by hiding in churches, with priests often times providing protection. So, naturally, the first reflex of many Tutsi [in 1994] was to seek refuge in churches. Radio broadcasts declared that churches were

exempt from being attacked, as well as stadiums, and public places such as schools” (p. 62).

This information is confirmed by one of the interviewees in Totten and Ubaldo’s (2011) *We cannot forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, in which the interviewee states that the radio was “informing the community that Tutsis, all of the Tutsi, should gather at the same place – churches, halls at administrative offices in communes, sector offices, schools, and other public structures or anywhere there was a large space where people could gather – so that they could be protected” (p. 69). Consequently, the preconception of safety was reaffirmed by a perpetrating group that already knew the tradition and that would take advantage of it to seek its goal of extermination.

As the churches, schools, hospitals and stadiums filled up, the Hutu perpetrators waited for their orders to attack. People seeking refuge thought themselves safe for several days, and at times weeks, before they realized the violence would reach them regardless of their shelters. “In some cases, authorities did not order the massacre immediately after people assembled, apparently because they were waiting to gather either the maximum number of people or the forces necessary to attack them” (Des Forges, 1999, p. 301). Once the orders were given, propaganda-filled institutions such as the Radio Television Libre de Milles Collines (RTML), broadcasted the locations of these safe havens and encouraged Hutus to attack. Since the churches, stadiums and schools were quickly filled by Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the Hutu extremists could quickly begin their work of extermination. The events that followed were a series of

genocidal massacres of unrivaled proportions, the worst of which occurred between April 11 and May 1, 1994 (Des Forges, 1999).

The most targeted of these spaces were the churches, to whom the RTML eventually pointed to as harboring RPF soldiers and weaponry (Article 19, 1996), thus encouraging attacks on these spaces. Two of the churches that became centers for mass killing during the violence were those of Ntarama and Nyamata, in Kigali prefecture, both of which have become sites for memorializing the dead.

In Ntarama, approximately 10,000 people fled to the church, which was a place they considered safe (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011). As the masses gathered in the church compound, the perpetrators attacked sporadically, with the biggest attack occurring on April 11, when thousands of Tutsi were killed inside the church by government-backed *Interahamwe*, military personnel, and members of the Presidential Guard. Those outside the church were killed first, with those inside the church killed with the windows destroyed and grenades thrown in. Those who did not die in the blast were killed later, when the *Interahamwe* entered the building and “began beating and cutting and killing the people” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119) with machetes and other rudimentary weapons. Approximately 5,000 people were killed in one day at the Ntarama compound. Preconceptions of safety had brought the victimized populations into the church, and the perpetrators had manipulated these preconceptions to their benefit. In the end, Ntarama, like many other churches, became a place to congregate the targeted population in large numbers, which made it substantially easier to murder as many of them as possible in a very short amount of time.

Nyamata's Catholic Church, located a short distance from Ntarama, was the site for another widespread massacre in which an estimated 10,000 people had gathered. The region of Nyamata was destroyed, with 50,000 out of the 59,000 Tutsis living there before the genocide, killed from April 11 to May 14 (Hatzfeld, 2003). The killings in the church were "a special day" for the killers (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 21), as they got to kill those who had gathered inside the church for days. For some, like Fulgence Bunani, the killings in the church were their first taste of murder. In Nyamata's church, the killers struck out without knowing who they were striking, overwhelmed by the numbers of dead who fell beneath them. Fulgence recalls that they were hampered by the crush of bodies in the church. Adalbert Munzigura, also a perpetrator at the church, recalls striking "home on all sides" every time he swung a blow with his machete.

Other places were also attacked with similarly tragic results. In Mugonero, the Seven Day Adventists compound, which included a church, a school and a hospital, was attacked. Inside, refugees who had been urged by their pastor to gather, soon discovered that safety was not available there (Osborn, 2010). On 16 April, 1994, "the attackers advanced toward the church from all sides chanting "Eliminate the Tutsis!" They worked methodically with guns and machetes, moving from church to school to hospital" (Osborn, 2010, par. 7). A total of 3,000 Tutsi sought refuge within the compound, and almost all perished in the attack; 2,000 of them died within the sanctity of the church itself (Osborn, 2010).

The churches in Gikongoro and Cyanika were also attacked, with over 40,000 people gathering in Gikongoro compound, which included a church and an elementary

school. Once again, preconceptions of safety led the Tutsis to seek shelter there, even when the killings had started in other parts of the country. This is similar to the use of churches in Armenia, and again points to both a lack of options and a deeply rooted perception of safety regarding certain communal spaces. The first attack on the compound occurred on 11 April, and an attempt at resistance began even when the victims had nothing but stones and screams to defend themselves with against the perpetrators (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011). The attackers were successfully blocked, and a week later, the refugees were told to move to Murambi, where there was more space in a different school compound. The refugees were also attacked there, as soldiers from the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), or Rwandan Defense Forces, threw grenades inside. Without anywhere to escape, people attempted to hide within the compound itself, but were soon discovered and killed. Emmanuel Murangira, a survivor, states,

“Within the school, the killers were killing the girls and women with machetes and massues. They tortured them before killing them by slashing them with machetes and hitting them by pounding them with massues. Also inside the classroom buildings were some men who had attempted to hide, and escape death, by hiding up in the rafters, and when discovered they were shot and killed” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 87).

It is important to note one factor from the attack on Gikongoro, which has surfaced as a consequence of survivor accounts and witness testimony, and that may have much to do with the ease with which the killings occurred within sacrosanct spaces in a country where the majority of the population shared the same religious beliefs.

Murangira's account tells of the slogans chanted towards the Tutsis hidden in the Gikongoro church. One of these slogans was: "The God of Tutsis is no longer around," closely followed by "There is only the God of Hutus remaining!" (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 83). In addition, Hutu killers reportedly sang Christian songs as they killed, demonstrating the premise that "God was on their side, while their enemy was deprived of God's protection" (Loumakis, 2016, p. 74). A perpetrator of the violence, Leopord, admits that perpetrators "no longer considered the Tutsis as humans or even as creatures of God" (Hatzfeld, 2003).

This points to a disassociation between the sanctity of the space and the act of mass killing within the space. Killing within the walls of spaces protected by a "Tutsi god" or occupied by those who were no longer God's children, would be easier than killing within spaces protected by a "Hutu god." This also points to a religious identification based on ethnicity, because both Tutsi and Hutus at the time of the genocide, were mostly Catholic. Christianity's monotheistic beliefs do not allow for this differentiation of gods, yet the Hutu extremists used this demarcation as an added stratum to the already deeply-rooted differentiation between an "us" and a "them." Thus, killing the already dehumanized "cockroaches" was much easier than killing their fellow Rwandans with whom they shared beliefs and Sunday mass. In addition, the killing of victims in the church denotes the power of dehumanization and othering, in which the historical practice of sanctuary in the Catholic tradition was overlooked by the perpetrators. The consequences were tragic, as thousands upon thousands died in between church pews.

The church in Cyahinda locality, located in Butare prefecture, also fell victim to the violence. Here, the *burgomaster* (mayor) of the locality urged the Tutsis to go into the church in search for safety. The Tutsis in Cyahinda, however, did not go down without a fight, and in fact managed to hold off their attackers for several days. As a consequence, several groups of refugees managed to escape the violence in this compound. When the attacks took place, the refugees “took a stand on the large soccer field behind the church and school. There, near the summit hill and protected by school buildings on either side, they again hurled rocks to defend themselves” (Des Forges, 1999, p. 573).

Reinforcements were called in from Butare and moderate Hutus were killed by Burundian refugees working with the Hutu extremists. These murders were blamed on the Tutsi in Cyanhinda, and the mayor went around stating that the church was filled with RPF soldiers. This proved to be incendiary rhetoric, and led the National Police to join in the repression of those inside the compound. The attacks began again, and since the refugees had nowhere else to go, they stayed put in the church compound as the killings began. Like workers, the killers arrived at the compound at 7am and killed until 5pm, returning each morning at the same time to continue the slaughter (Des Forges, 1999). The death toll is estimated at 20,000 people killed within the compound in just three days (Melvern, 2006).

Accusing the churches of harboring RPF soldiers was a strategic move similar to that of the Turkish forces that accused the missions of harboring Armenian rebels. Both had the intended effect: They broke down all doubt from the attackers as to their mission, and allowed for growing resentment to present itself in the form of violence. However,

whereas the mission compounds in Van successfully resisted repeated bombings and were saved by the arrival of the Russian army, the church in Cyahinda could not resist the onslaught of the attackers, nor did it count on the arrival of a third party to save those inside.

The Sainte Famille Catholic Church in Kigali, one of the main cultural centers of Rwanda, was used as refuge by many refugees because the premises were large, with a church and a school as part of the compound. Here, they found that the leaders of the church themselves were in line with extremist Hutu ideology. Father Munyeshyaka, the leader of this congregation, insulted the refugees and blamed the Tutsi for the death of President Habyarimana (Kayigamba, 2006). In addition, he provided lists to the killers of those inside who had pledged allegiance to the Tutsi cause, and allowed for them to be taken away and killed. “Munyeshyaka is said to have worked closely not only with the Interahamwe militia, but also senior government and military officials at the time, and they were always seen together at the church premises” (Tashobya, 2015, par. 7).

Other attacks on churches included attacks in the churches at Simbi, Kansi, Karama, Nyumba, Mugombwa, Rugango, Busongo, Busasamana, Nyamirambo, Gikondo, and many more (Des Forges, 1999). The church was a prominent and well-established institution in Rwanda, and most Rwandans were Roman Catholics in faith. Much like the mission complexes in Turkey at the time of the Armenian genocide, the church was a trusted institution in Rwanda, one that had offered protection before and was expected to offer such protection again. Yet whether as targets for violence, or themselves in line with the perpetrators, churches were prime places for destruction in

1994. However, massacres within places of preconceived safety did not occur only within places of worship, even when these do seem to have encompassed most of the places for mass murder. Instead, schools, hospitals, stadiums, convents and universities, all previously used for safety in times of conflict, became targets for destruction. Some of them, like the Ecole Technique Officielle (ETO) became infamous not only for the violence that occurred within them, but for the circumstances surrounding the violence they witnessed.

The ETO was a small school run by Salesian fathers in Gatenga. It was a base camp for the Belgian UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) forces that were in the country prior to the genocide, observing the cease-fire that had become effective with the signing of the Arusha Accords. The school provided strong preconceptions of safety for the victimized populations, since the presence of UN peacekeepers translated to strong beliefs of international protection and responsibility. Karasira Venuste, a survivor from the ETO compound, spoke in 2009 about his ordeal, and remarked that him and his family fled to the school “believing that might be safe because of the small contingent of Belgian United Nations soldiers stationed there” (Abramowitz, 2009, par. 3). Des Forges (1999) reported that by 10 April, only four days into the violence, approximately 2,000 people had already sought refuge in the school, many of them children. The United Nations, however, retreated from Rwanda after the loss of ten Belgian peacekeepers and consequently abandoned the refugees to their own fate. Almost all 2,000 people were slaughtered shortly after the retreat of the UN soldiers,

with the few who survived running to Amhoro stadium, where more UN soldiers were located. Here, they found safety until the end of the conflict.

The Sovu convent, a place where people fled to because they “thought they were in a place of sanctuary” (Castle, 2014, par. 1), also became a site for mass killings. Here, nuns of the convent betrayed the refugees by calling upon the *Interahamwe* to get rid of the refugees, as well as by providing some of the necessary tools for the killing. A total of 7,000 people were killed in this massacre, with approximately 500-600 of them burned alive in the garage of the convent as one of the sisters, Sister Maria Kisito, provided the fuel and the leaves needed to set it on fire (Castle, 2014). The sisters were tried in a Belgian court, with Sister Gertrude and Sister Maria Kisito found guilty of homicide (Castle, 2001). The nuns were sentenced alongside a physics professor, Vincent Ntezimana, and a factory manager and former government minister, Alphonse Higaniro – all guilty of murder during the genocidal campaign.

In the University Teaching Hospital in Kigali, people were taken from their beds to be killed in the mortuary, as no protection was available to those who sought refuge there. Caritas Mankakubito, a survivor from the hospital states, “Many patients and those badly wounded by killers from all around Kigali who were brought in for treatment were pursued and killed here” (Mugabo, 2015, par. 15). Once again, hospitals, which were one of the first institutions protected under international law, were used as places for mass violence without little retribution from the international community. Other spaces were used for safety, not because of preconceived notions of safety, but because of the promises of safety made by the perpetrators.

The Gatwaro stadium, located in the Gitesi commune in Kibuye prefecture, was the site of another massacre. Here, Tutsis were promised protection by the government officials, and allowed to congregate for several days before being attacked. The prefect, Clement Kayishema, gave explicit instructions for refugees to seek refuge in Kibuye, and many fled to the stadium expecting to be safe. An approximate 20,000 people were gathered in the stadium by the time the attacks began on 18 April, 1994 (Melvern, 2006). Grenades were thrown into the stadium and firing began from above, leading to the death of approximately 12,000 people on the first day alone. The killing continued during the subsequent days, with *Interahamwe* waiting outside to kill anyone attempting to escape. The promise of safety from the government officials was blatantly betrayed.

More importantly, the promise of safety was a strategic tool for the amassing of thousands of people belonging to the victimized population to make their extermination easier. Stadiums, much like church complexes and schools, provided the perfect mediums for this violence, as they not only allowed the congregation of thousands, but were also trusted enough as places of safety to not raise any doubts from the part of the victims when directed to these spaces with false promises of safety.

The Adventist University at Mudende, which was forced to close several times between 1991 and 1994 due to violence in the area, was targeted shortly after the fall of Habyarimana's plane on 6 April, 1994, with approximately 1,000 people killed within the science auditorium in a span of only a few days (Richli, n.d.). "A large crowd including Burundian students and wounded soldiers took on the task of massacring hundreds of people at the campus..." (Des Forges, 1999, p. 299). The university had served as shelter

during previous bouts of violence, but had itself not become the epicenter of violence until 1994. Having been used as shelter before, the university was both a preconceived place of safety and an easier target for destruction.

It must be noted that not all Tutsis fled to places where they had found safety before. In fact, many fled to the papyrus marshes and the nearby hills for shelter. Innocent Rwililiza, a survivor, recalls noticing how this violence was not the same as in years past, and how churches would not protect them this time. He states,

“As for me, I said to myself: “Things are completely out of hand. They are going to kill there [in Nyamata church] too for sure, and in any case I do not want to die in a church.” Which is the reason why I ran all day without destination. I spent the night in the undergrowth and the next day reached Kayumba [a nearby hill]. Up there, two or three kilometers from the town, there were about six thousand of us in good health, waiting in the eucalyptus forest to see how events would unfold” (Hatzfeld, 2000, p. 68)

Innocent’s wife and child perished in the church massacre, and out of the 6,000 refugees he encountered on the hill, only a few survived the hundred days of violence.

However, the death toll encountered within cultural safe havens points to a proclivity from the part of the refugees to seek shelter in these places. Between 20,000 – 30,000 people perished in the Nyarambuye church compound (International Justice Tribune, 2004); 5,000 in Nyamata, 5,000 in Ntarama (Wambua, 2001); 2,000 at the ETO, 8,000 in Mugonero (Maykuth, 2008); 7,000 in the Sovu Convent, 30,000 in Cyanika (Bucyesenge); 8,000 in Rukara church (Pflanz, 2014), among others. Waller (2007) states

that the “worst massacres occurred in churches and mission compounds where Tutsi had sought refuge” (p. 224), as these spaces allowed for the consolidation of unarmed members of the victimized populations. The central role of the church in Rwandan life, as well as the deeply-instituted relationships with mission compounds, led the Rwandan victims to seek shelter in these spaces, which had themselves proved successful in previous times of violence. Unlike in the Armenian genocide, where the use of these spaces had historically been problematic, in Rwanda, these spaces had succeeded time and time again and thus cemented their perception as places of safety.

In 1994, massacres repeated themselves throughout the country. Schools, churches, convents, hospitals, and many other culturally revered spaces all transformed into slaughterhouses in Rwanda. Massacre after massacre, Rwanda saw the sequential repetition of mass violence as the pillar that sustained a systemic campaign of extermination with the intent to destroy the Tutsi population. In the mind of the Hutu killers there was no fear of retribution, not only because there had not been any punishment before, but also because there would be no one left to plead for justice. The perpetrators had seen the international community evacuate Rwanda, and counted on their silence to be an accomplice to their crime. As recounted by one of the killers, who stated, “the blue helmets did nothing at Nyamata except an about-face to leave us alone. Why would they come back before it’s all over?” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 92). The perpetrators expected the “act to be total” and to “have no grave consequences for anyone left alive” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 71). With a history of immunity in cases of genocidal

massacres before, and an added dimension of international apathy demonstrated by the retreat of the UN, the perpetrators could set about killing without any fear of reprisals.

Knowing the victims would be gathered in cultural safe havens, many times as a consequence of the government forces asking them to gather there for their own safety, the perpetrators set about to the destruction of the Tutsi population without any fear of reprisals, and in most cases, they succeeded. According to Des Forges (1999), “authorities did not order the massacre immediately after people assembled, apparently because they were waiting to gather either the maximum number of people or the forces necessary to attack them.” The more Tutsi gathered in these spaces, the more effective the campaign of extermination proved in the end. However, much like in the case of the Armenian genocide, there were cultural safe havens that proved successful in providing safety, and analyzing their success is an imperative part of developing future models for prevention in these spaces.

Safety not found in numbers, but in intervention

Rwandan refugees in 1994 sought safety in numbers, as they assembled in places that had communal history and allowed for many to go through the violence together, finding comfort in each other and protecting each other as best they could. However, it was not the number of refugees within a place that succeeded at keeping them safe, but rather the availability of intervention from third parties to the conflict. Like the Americans, Russians, British and French to the Armenians, the UN soldiers who decided to stay after evacuation was mandated, proved imperative in providing protection to thousands of refugees. In addition, places of refuge that were surrounded by RPF troops

were also protected from violence. These places were only safe because of the armed intervention that made it harder for the perpetrators to pursue their goals without risks to their own safety.

The most vivid proof of this was the resistance at Bisesero, a town with approximately 50,000 Tutsi refugees that engaged in resistance for six weeks during the violence. The victims fought back wave after wave of violence from the Hutu powers, including *Interahamwe*, in an attempt to remain alive. Yet by late June, only an approximate 3,000 were still alive, and by the end of the genocide, only 1,000 remained (Totten, 2007). The number of people gathered together to survive did not make much of a difference. Instead, the resistance proved a challenge to the Hutu government, and they sent some of their most vicious fighters to Bisesero in order to end the resistance. Bisesero was too far from RPF or UN troops, which could not reach the community in time. As such, those that gathered in Bisesero were alone in their attempts to survive, and although they put up the greatest resistance recorded during the Rwandan genocide, they did not succeed. The resistance fighters only had clubs and spears to defend themselves, but they were being attacked by FAR and *Interahamwe* forces that were equipped with machetes, pistols, grenades, and more (Totten, 2007). As such, what the Bisesero fighters needed was the arrival of armed intervention.

The presence of some form of military force proved essential in saving many victims in Rwanda. In the Nyarushishi camp, approximately 8,000-10,000 Tutsi were saved by the National Police, under the leadership of Col. Bavugamenshi, who suspected violence would erupt from very early on (DesForge, 1999). The Colonel protected the

refugees until the arrival of the French troops under Operation Turquoise. The Nyarushishi camp was one of the first camps to receive aid from the French troops and the refugees in this camp were the only survivors of Cyangugu province (ICRC, n.d.). In the church of Sainte Famille, the advance of the RPF proved pivotal to the safety of hundreds of refugees. Dallaire (2003) describes the importance of the RPF troops by stating that,

“The story of the Sainte Famille raid illustrates the level of competency and daring of the RPF troops. Thousands of Tutsi had taken refuge in the Sainte Famille church, on the eastern side of central Kigali. One night in mid-June, the RPF sent a company two kilometers inside what was enemy territory, recovered six hundred Tutsi from Sainte Famille, and pulled them out to safety through RGF [Rwandan Government Forces] lines” (p. 420).

The situation in Sainte Famille was dire, as seen in the previous section, yet the arrival and maneuvering of the RPF led to hundreds being saved.

The King Faisal Hospital was protected by UNAMIR troops, and as such provided protection for the almost 4,000 people who sought shelter there. However, the militants still managed to attack, and chose to fire bullets into the hospital, leading to the death of thirty-nine people and injuring over one hundred (Mugabo, 2015). The mandate of the UN prohibited the troops from firing back or persecuting the perpetrators, thus, their ability to protect refugees was hindered. This same inability was seen in the Amahoro Stadium, which was also protected by UNAMIR soldiers, and in fact managed to save thousands of people from the violence. However, much like the mission

complexes in the Armenian genocide, these places were ill-equipped to contain and protect the masses, and as such proved to be deadly in many ways. In Amahoro, although the killers could not get into the stadium to kill everyone inside, “they arrived on a regular basis with execution lists and would extract targeted Tutsis for selected killings” (Sinema, 2015, p. 114). In addition, thousands of people died of disease and starvation (Sinema, 2015), as the UN did not have the necessary supplies to keep up with the most basic needs of the refugees.

In the end, the UN could not avoid all attacks in these spaces, yet it still managed to keep the killers at bay long enough to save thousands of people sheltering in these spaces. Between the refugees at the King Faisal Hospital and the Amahoro Stadium alone, approximately 10,000 people were saved. As such, the presence of UN soldiers literally meant the difference between life and death for thousands of people, and the retreat of the UN forces meant that many thousands who could have been saved, were instead left to a terrible fate.

Although armed intervention seems to have been the most successful method of resistance, in some cases, armed intervention was not necessary, as foreign intervention and clout were enough to keep the killers at bay. One of the most successful cases of safety in Rwanda was the Hotel de Milles Collines, which became the main subject of Hollywood in the film *Hotel Rwanda*. The hotel had sporadic protection from UN troops and was not saved by the advancement of the RPF soldiers. Rather, the hotel was saved by those inside who called their connections outside to plead for safety. The manager of the hotel, Paul Rusesabagina, a Hutu, also did his best to keep those in the hotel alive by

bartering hotel goods to buy the refugees another day. “He bartered fine cheeses, wine and cognac from company stores to keep the killers at bay” (Vasagar, 2005). The refugees fled to the hotel, expecting it to be a safe place because it was filled with foreign, white, expatriates. However, the evacuation of the foreigners left the Rwandans on their own, especially after the retreat of UNAMIR forces from the country.

After the RPF took over Kigali and ended the genocide, the refugees were still not safe, as the RPF came in and took away refugees who were suspected killers – these people were never seen again (DesForges, 1999). Without a fair trial, it was only assumptions what led these people to disappear, regardless of whether they were innocent refugees or killers.

Many of the successful cases of protection in Rwanda were a consequence of individual actions, rather than organizational efforts. Individual willingness to intervene was exemplified by men such as Paul Rusesabagina, Romeo Dallaire and Henry Kwami Anyihodo, but it was also found in missionaries. Although most foreign nationals fled Rwanda as soon as the violence began, individuals such as Carl Wilkens, an American Missionary, stayed and sought to do anything possible to help. Wilken’s plea to the Rwandan Prime Minister saved the orphans housed in his mission compound. Here, the Prime Minister saw the opportunity of saving the orphans as a way to incur favors with the international community.

“With defeat increasingly certain, the extremist Hutu regime was collapsing.

Some genocide leaders now sought to curry favor with the international community. They wanted to deny that all Tutsis had been targeted for killing. So,

in a strange twist, the Gisimba orphans were escorted through the bloody streets of Kigali by a top militia leader to a sanctuary at the Church of Saint Michael” (*The Few who Stayed*, 2004).

The orphans of Gisimba had been under the care of Carl Wilken and Damas Gisimba. Wilken’s advised the Prime Minister during one of his visits to the village that he suspected that the militia would kill the orphans. The Prime Minister mentioned his knowledge of the orphans and promised that they would be secure (*The Few who Stayed*, 2004). Although the decision to save the orphans was a selfish one, it was Walken’s courage in mentioning it to the Prime Minister what saved them.

The success of cultural places in offering protection was thus not defined by the numbers of victims gathered together for protection, or by the innate strength of the buildings they sought refuge in; but rather by intervention. Whether it was the presence of UNAMIR troops, the National Police, or the RPF, these places successfully protected those inside because they had the means to retaliate against the violence issued upon them. The victims sought protection from anywhere they could, and in some cases, the intervention of others was imperative in offering such protection.

This is very similar to the protection provided by the missions to the Armenian victims in 1915, as it was the unfurling of foreign flags, diplomatic interventions that helped to keep these places free of violence, and foreign funding. This is a pattern found in genocidal violence, and one that may seem obvious. After all, genocide always necessitates the intervention of a third party to end or lessen the violence. However, this does not change the fact that these spaces are still preconceived as safe for a variety of

reasons, including their use as safe havens in history. Thus, intervention is, and has always been, needed to protect victimized populations in genocidal campaigns because genocidal violence has the capacity, and indeed the purpose, of breaking cultural traditions, including those traditions that make certain places too sacred for violence.

It is important to recognize that the amalgamation of refugees inside churches, schools and hospitals also provided the perpetrators with an infinite supply of victims for horrific acts of violence that did not involve killing. In Kamoyi, Perpetue was hiding in an old church after having been repeatedly raped by a group of *Interahamwe* by the banks of the Nyabarongo River. While hiding in the church, *Interahamwe* fighters came and took her away to a building nearby, where she was again raped while others were burnt alive in the church (Human Rights Watch, 1996). This was a common experience for many women in Rwanda. In one case, a refugee sought refuge in two different churches. Both times the priests allowed the Hutu killers to come in and butcher those inside. The second time, the woman was kept in the church for an entire month while being raped every single day (Horton, 2011). Many women were taken from the churches and the schools to be kept in houses of individual Hutus who repeatedly raped and mutilated them until they became disposable.

Overall, the use of cultural safe havens did not provide protection to the victims, even though they had been successful in previous bouts of violence. This can be explained by several factors, including the fact that previous bouts of violence were not full-fledged genocidal campaigns but targeted and strategic attacks on the Tutsi population to attempt to keep the population under control. As such, previous bouts of

violence sought to destroy only part of the Tutsi population, not the entirety of it. In 1994, however, the goal was the complete elimination of the Tutsis in Rwanda and as such, no space was safe.

The Role of Cultural Safe Havens in the Rwandan Genocide

A discussion of Rwanda's tragedy cannot be had without addressing the importance of cultural safe havens. As seen in the previous section, these places were sought out repeatedly for protection, mainly because they were trusted. Several other factors can be extrapolated from the Rwandan experience,

1. Rwanda's history of violence had conditioned the population to seek shelter in cultural safe havens, which were preconceived as places of safety. The success of these spaces before had cemented their importance as places for sanctuary.
2. This same history had provided the perpetrators with assured targets for destruction, as they could predict where the victims would go.
3. Individual action was a decisive factor in the ability to intervene on behalf of the victimized population.
4. The use of these spaces reflects a severe lack of available options for the victimized population, as international safe havens were not available until late in the violence.
5. The evolution of international law did not ensure the protection of these spaces, regardless of the international conventions that specifically prohibit their attack and consequently add to their preconception of safety.

Much like in the case of the Armenian genocide, Rwandans were no strangers to genocidal violence. Starting with the persecutions of Tutsi beginning in 1959, Rwanda saw frequently repeated genocidal massacres as a method of resolving emerging conflicts, with persecutions occurring in 1961-1962, 1973, and during the civil war of 1990-1993. In fact, genocidal massacres became a tool often used by the Hutu government to achieve its aims. This repetition of violence saw the use of cultural safe havens as bastions of protection, which led to the strengthening of already existing ideas of sanctuary. This reflected in 1994, when the victimized populations sought refuge in the same spaces as before, but this time the perpetrators took advantage of this tradition and turned safe spaces into slaughterhouses.

The massacres that occurred within churches, convents, and schools, involved not only thousands of victims but hundreds of perpetrators. In some cases, the killing went on for days, as the thousands hiding were too many to kill all in one day. The congregation of victims in the same space, whether by their own choice or by the manipulation of government officials, created larger targets for destruction that allowed for the extermination of more people. This technique allowed the Rwandan genocide to take the lives of approximately 800,000 to 1,000,000 people in only one hundred days.

The rumors of church massacres permeated Rwanda, and Tutsis heard of these massacres sometimes before heading to their own shelters. However, they continued to go to these places because they had no other options. Their homes were raided, their villages emptied, their school attacked – there was nowhere to go except to the places that had provided protection before and that were legally supposed to be protected by

international law. Those who were lucky enough to find places with UNAMIR forces were sometimes able to survive, but many of the victims were left to their fate by these same troops. The marshes and papyrus fields were filled with people hiding, but they were not safe there either. This, of course, reflects the apathy of the international community and its inability to intervene in time and with force. It was not until Operation Turquoise that places for protection were established, and even these places encountered a plethora of issues. The UNAMIR force that did decide to stay, under the command of Luitenant General Romeo Dallaire, were so miniscule that they did not provide enough options for safety across the country. Dallaire and his troops focused their efforts in the places that they knew people would look at for safety, such as the King Faisal hospital and the Amhoro stadium, and there they attempted to save as many people as possible.

Although international humanitarian law had been largely codified and established by 1994, and although these laws specifically protect non-combatants and civilian structures, the international community refused to act quickly at the outset of violence. This is important, because the protection of these spaces in international law enhance their perception as safe and thus help in shaping victim behavior in cases of mass violence. Article 53 in the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, specifically states that cultural objects and places of worship are to be protected and are off-limits to the warring parties. In addition, Article 52 of the same protocol states that civilian objects are not to be attacked. This includes schools, hospitals, places of worship, houses or other dwellings, and basically anything that is not used for military purposes. Yet all this was irrelevant in Rwanda, since no formal war was occurring and these rules

did not apply for the perpetrators. The international community should have acted in reaction to the endless destruction occurring in cultural safe havens, as they had worked on creating documents that protected them. In addition, the Genocide Convention of 1948 had been signed and ratified by many countries who stood silent as Rwanda descended into chaos.

Cultural safe havens in Rwanda proved deadly to the victimized populations, much like they did during the Armenian genocide. However, unlike the Armenian genocide, most of these spaces did not belong to foreign missions and were therefore not protected by the tireless advocating of foreign nationals or by the fear of international intervention as retaliation for violence against them. Rwandans, unlike Armenians, were mostly abandoned by foreigners, as they rushed to evacuate as soon as the violence began. Consequently, there was nothing and no one that could save them.

International Safe Havens Prove Counterproductive to Justice

A discussion of international safe havens in Rwanda may be thought to include the spaces that were protected by UNAMIR, such as the ETO school or the Amahoro Stadium. However, this would be a fallacy, as these places were not established as safe havens but as command centers for UNAMIR troops to monitor and observe the ceasefire agreed upon by the RPF and Habyarimana's government with the Arusha Accords. Once the evacuation order was given to UN soldiers, places like the ETO were abandoned even though they were filled with thousands of refugees in only a few days. Those UN soldiers that did stay, under Dellaire's leadership, attempted to establish safe havens wherever they could, yet their resources were scarce. As such, these spaces were protected by

international actors, but did not count on the international support or access to supplies that formal safe havens would have received.

The only formal international safe havens in Rwanda came as a French initiative in the form of Operation Turquoise. In the midst of uncertainty regarding whether or not there should be international intervention, France volunteered to lead a force into the country. The motion was narrowly approved by the United Nations through Resolution 929, which stressed the humanitarian character of the mission and reiterated the impartiality and neutrality of the forces, which would not interpose between the parties (SC Res 929, 1994). This was not the first resolution passed by the UN regarding the situation in Rwanda, as resolutions 912, 918, and 925, were all passed beforehand. Collectively, these resolutions tackled the question of UNAMIR's mandate, an arms embargo on Rwanda, and the deployment of more troops. It is important to note that by Resolution 925, agreed upon on 8 June 1994, the United Nations had considered the possibility that the situation in Rwanda had escalated into a genocide by noting, "with the gravest concern the reports indicating that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda and recalling in this context that genocide constitutes a crime punishable under international law" (SC Res 925, 1994, p.1). Yet intervention by the international community did not arrive in Rwanda until the French troops, comprised of over 2,500 French troops and over 300 Senegalese troops, established safe humanitarian zones (*Zones Humanitaires Sures*) that covered a fifth of the Rwandan territory by the end of June (Haspeslagh, n.d.).

Much has been written about the failure of these zones, as they provided the Hutu extremists with protected spaces to continue their violence. However, it must be noted

that the mandate of the mission itself called for neutrality and impartiality, which meant that all those who were within these zones were to be protected, regardless of ethnicity. The mandate also did not call for the French troops to disarm those Hutu extremists they encountered, thus making it easier for weapons to continue to be held and used by extremists within these zones. In these zones, “Extremist Hutu militia members who were still armed operated in the zones, intimidating moderate Hutus and killing Tutsis” (Haspeslagh, n.d., p.1). This is part of the failure of this mission, not only because the mandate expressly instructed participating members to “immediately bring to an end all killings of civilian populations in areas under their control” (SC Res 929, 1994, p. 3), but also because the mandate provided that members states should use *all available means* necessary to achieve the humanitarian mission (SC Res 929, 1994). As such, disarmament needed to be an essential move from the part of the French troops to end the violence and achieve the humanitarian mission, yet it did not occur.

Instead, the Hutu found in the humanitarian zones a path to safety outside of Rwanda into Zaire. In the end, over two million Hutus, *genocidaires* included, managed to flee Rwanda and regroup on the other side of the border. At the same time, for the Tutsi, the humanitarian zones provided a refuge that came attached to a restriction on their right to seek asylum outside of Rwanda, as they could now be protected inside the humanitarian zones and thus did not need to seek asylum. In fact, “France blocked the application of Rwandans’ asylum demands on the basis that they were being protected inside their own country” (Haspeslagh, n.d., p. 2). By blocking their right to seek asylum, France restricted the ability of people to flee the violence still occurring even inside the

humanitarian zones. Much like the areas protected by UNAMIR soldiers, the humanitarian zones established by the French were not truly equipped with mandates that could benefit the victimized population, nor were they truly impartial enough to be effective at their mission.

“Krosiak (2008), in her review of France’s role in the Rwandan genocide, states, In the early phase of [Operation] Turquoise, the French had three main goals: to be seen to be doing something, that is save their own face; diplomatically, to maintain the credibility of the interim government, at least to the extent that it would be involved in subsequent negotiations; militarily, to fight the RPF” (p. 228).

The French operation was not about saving the persecuted Tutsis, but establishing a clear French political and diplomatic position in post-genocide Rwanda. To compound the problems within the Humanitarian Zones, the relationship between the French troops and the RPF were not ideal, as the RPF did not trust the French. The French, for their part, were doing everything possible to maintain the status-quo, including aiding the perpetrators of genocide escape justice.

These issues, however, do not take away from the fact that these spaces were announced by the international community as international safe havens that would be established for the protection of the population. In fact, a Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda (1994) states that this initiative was announced by France as an effort to “provide protection to the large number of civilians uprooted from their homes by the fighting” (p. 2). In addition, Resolution 929 itself states that Operation

Turquoise would be strictly humanitarian in character, conducted in an impartial manner, and would not constitute an interposition force between warring parties (SC Resolution 929, 1994). As such, although rooted in an effort from France to keep Francophone Rwanda under its wing, the humanitarian zones were established by the international community as places of safety and thus carried an expectation of safety that was not achieved on the ground.

An important aspect to explore when looking at the humanitarian zones established by the French is the increased inefficiency created by a rivalry between the French troops and the UNAMIR II troops, regardless of the fact that Resolution 929 urged the member states to ensure their troops' collaboration with UN forces on the ground. UNAMIR II was created by mandate of the Security Council under Resolution 918, and deployed into Rwanda to expand UNAMIR. Although the resolution was created in May, 1994, it took nearly six months for member states to provide all troops requested. This new mission added more than 5,000 troops to Dallaire's forces and under Resolution 929 was approved not only to monitor, but to help enforce peace in the country alongside the French troops ("UNAMIR," n.d.). Although both missions were there with the same official goal – that of bringing peace to the country and ending the violence – there was a deep mistrust between them. This translated to a lack of communication that would have made both missions more effective in achieving their shared goal. This was a direct result of the divide between the official purpose of the French operation, and its unofficial and strategic mandate. On one hand, the French were supposed to create humanitarian zones that would have protected the victimized

populations, but on the other hand, the French had volunteered to lead these efforts in an attempt to provide aid to the Hutu extremists on the ground.

Right from the start, Dallaire and his force were opposed to French intervention. In Dallaire's mind, the intervention of the French was hypocritical, as it was France's allies that were masterminds of the violence (Dallaire, 2003). The tension between both missions was established early on, as Dallaire refused to put the UNAMIR forces as subordinates to the French mission. In fact, both missions split the territory of Rwanda, as UNAMIR attempted to stabilize RPF-held territory, while the French created the safe zones in RGF territory (Dallaire, 2003). The arrival of the French troops was a challenge, not only because of the historical ties of the French government to the Hutu government, but because their presence made UNAMIR's attempt at reconciliation with the RPF much more difficult since the RPF did not trust the French at all (Dallaire, 2003).

Therefore, the establishment of these zones was problematic, and it led to a deep mistrust between the newly formed government of post-genocide Rwanda and the French, whom the RPF viewed as biased towards the Hutu killers. Khadiagala (2004) states, "On the verge of gaining control of the country, the RPF was implacably opposed to French intervention, seeing it as a means to save the faltering regime" (p. 85). Operation Turquoise was thus perceived by Kagame and his forces as an effort to keep the RPF from taking over the entire country (DesForges, 1999), instead of as an effort to bring an end to the violence. After all, the French troops did not arrive until the end of the genocide, right before RPF soldiers reached Kigali. This meant that the French did not truly end the violence, but simply helped those that should have been taken to justice

escape their fate. Although the humanitarian zones did protect thousands of people, they did not completely abolish the violence.

In Bisesero, the French did not immediately ensure the safety of the 2,000 Tutsi who were left in the area, returning three days later instead (Kroslak, 2008) to find many had been killed. As reviewed previously, Bisesero had seen a population of Tutsi who refused to be killed without a fight, and much like the Armenians in Musa Dagh, they fought back until they could not fight anymore. The French arrived in Bisesero to an ongoing massacre. As Schimmel reports, “Bisesero was not a secret massacre. The French troops who came to Bisesero in the midst of the massacre listened to pleading Tutsis who begged them to stay and protect them, to ensure that the killings would stop. But the French left the area for three days even while the killers were in sight...” (par. 10). Although officially part of the area in which the humanitarian zones were being established, Bisesero was not protected under Operation Turquoise, and in the end, only a few survived.

It would be a mistake, however, to speak of Operation Turquoise only in a negative light, as it also helped bring stability to a nation in chaos. “The French SHZ had stabilised in the south-west around 1.2 million people who could start moving again at any time if they feared that their temporary situation was about to change” (Prunier, 1995, p. 299). This meant that those who had fled their homes during the violence could now begin to return, or at least attempt to find those they had left behind or were missing. In addition, estimates of those saved by the operation range between 10,000 and 17,000 (Kroslak, 2008). Although this number is small compared to the thousands saved by a

force of less than 500 UN soldiers throughout the country – themselves being credited with saving 32,000 people (Chrom, 2014) – it is still a significant number of deaths averted in the wake of the violence and the retreat of the *genocidaires*.

In addition, the retreat of the perpetrators towards Zaire allowed the RPF to regain control of the country without having to continue fighting, an effort that would have translated into the loss of even more Rwandans on both sides of the conflict. With the retreat of the *genocidaires*, Kagame managed to stabilize the country as much as possible after such catastrophic violence. A few years later, Kagame sent his troops into Zaire in search for vengeance and managed to repatriate the thousands of refugees who had stayed outside of the country for fear of reprisals. As such, these zones were controversial, but still important. Without the incursion of the French into Rwanda, the violence would have continued in the zones that were not held by the RPF, and the retreating perpetrators would have ensured the death of every Tutsi they could find on the way to the border. Therefore, although safety was not total in these spaces, it was still prevalent and translated to the saving of thousands and the end of the genocidal campaign.

Violence after the genocide

Violence within the humanitarian zones was not the only issue faced in Rwanda after the genocide. While attempting to recover under a new government, an estimated 3,000,000 people were internally displaced, many of whom settled in refugee camps that were allowed to exist by the new Rwandan government until 1995. These camps were established both within Rwanda and outside of its borders, with thousands of Hutus fleeing their homes in fear of reprisals from an RPF-led government. The closing down

of the camps that was agreed upon at the start of 1995 was part of UN Resolution 997, in which the Security Council agreed to “assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities” (SC Res 997, 1995, p. 2). The return of the refugees to their homes was necessary and urgent to re-start Rwandan society, as well as to ameliorate the destabilizing force of the refugees in a country recovering from violence (Independent International Commission, 1995). Yet in approving a move towards resettlement, the Security Council failed to accurately gauge the level of tension still present between ethnic groups, and consequently failed to protect the refugees from new massacres. One specific example that is overwhelmingly deemed a failure of the international presence in these camps, is the massacre that occurred in the camp of Kibeho.

In an attempt to mobilize the refugee population, UNAMIR began Operation Hope, through which they disarmed the camp from the inside while troops from the RPA maintained security on the outside (International Commission of Inquiry, 1995). This was closely followed by Operation Return, in which UN agencies and other non-profit organizations attempted to develop a plan of action that would clear the camp of refugees by the deadline of December 1995. These efforts were stymied by the fact that refugees did not wish to return home for a variety of reasons, including security concerns outside of the camp. As the year continued and the process seemed hopeless, the Rwandan government decided to send troops to eight of the remaining refugee camps, including Kibeho (International Commission of Inquiry, 1995).

Kibeho was the last camp to be closed inside Rwanda in 1995, and thus it was home to many refugees who fled there as other camps began to close. It was populated by approximately 100,000 people, many of whom were Hutu extremists who had participated in the genocide. Consequently, an exasperated Rwandan Patriotic Army entered the camp and engaged in mass violence in front of the UN peacekeepers, nonprofit organizations, and international witnesses. Kibeho was administered by UNAMIR forces, and as such had a shroud of safety over it that incited the refugees to move into this camp. According to Terry (1999), “internally displaced people in the Kibeho camp believed that UNAMIR soldiers would protect them from the RPA” (p. 12). Kibeho, even after all the violence witnessed in 1994, still retained a preconception of safety that shaped refugee behavior.

The massacre in Kibeho occurred on 22 April, 1995, as RPA troops allegedly reacted to weapons used by the internally displaced persons inside the camp, which caused several casualties on the side of the RPA. Witness testimony confirms that the RPA used automatic rifles and machine guns, as well as engaged in summary executions of IDPs during their retaliation (International Commission of Inquiry, 1995). The exact death toll is uncertain, and accounts range from a few hundred to a few thousand. The International Commission of Inquiry established to understand the tragedy, in the end, found that the RPA had no genocidal intent, and that there was no clear evidence that this was an effort to eliminate a group. Yet it also found clear evidence of human rights abuses against IDPs and declared that the killings were also not “an accident that could not have been prevented” (International Commission of Inquiry, 1995, p. 12).

This last observation is of extreme importance when discussing international safe havens, since the events at Kibeho were a direct consequence of the inability and unwillingness of both the French and UNAMIR troops to disarm those within the safe zones. The inability of the French to disarm the humanitarian safe zones, meant that during their retreat from Rwanda they handed UNAMIR humanitarian zones that were still militarized. This, in turn, translated to militarized refugee camps. The mandates of both operations stressed the importance of the humanitarian mission, yet the inability to disarm and distinguish *genocidaires* from refugees proved fatal in Rwanda. In addition, the slow screening process to return the refugees home, added to the pressures from the Rwandan government to close the refugee camps as quickly as possible, led to administrative problems that enabled the violence to go unhindered.

Another important point to recognize is that neither in the French humanitarian zones nor in the subsequent refugee camps, were perpetrators of genocide held accountable for their actions. In many ways, these humanitarian zones allowed them to escape rather than face either Rwandan or international justice systems. As such, these humanitarian zones proved counterproductive to justice and were not established quickly enough to provide enduring protection. As stated above, these zones were established too late during the conflict, and their lack of demilitarization led the violence to continue against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu who did not only wish for, but in fact expected, safety from the approaching international forces. Their safety was not as holistic as expected, but did in fact prove to be an important move in ending the violence. Once the roles were reversed and the RPF-led government took over Rwanda, the refugee camps

provided the RPA troops with easy access to Hutu individuals whom they deemed guilty of genocide, and thus retaliation became part of the political and military context.

The Role of International Safe Havens in Rwanda

The Rwandan genocide occurred almost eighty years after the genocide of the Armenians, yet the circumstances revolving their safety were not that much different. In Armenia, it was up to non-profit organizations to ensure that funding, resources, and safety could be provided. Even when funding was provided by international players, such as the United States, the money came with no promise of intervention on behalf of the Armenians. Decades later, the Rwandans were left to fend for themselves by the international community until it was too late to save them.

It is important to remember that international law was significantly different in both cases, and that the advent of World War II and the Holocaust had paved the way for robust international conventions that both delineated the gravest of crimes and established a responsibility to protect from the part of the international community by the time of the Rwandan genocide. The Rwandan genocide, occurring shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and thus the end of a polarized global context, gave the United Nations an opportunity to show what it was meant to do. Yet much like in the case of the Armenians, the world looked the other way and pretended it did not know the magnitude of the conflict.

Although international intervention did arrive for the Rwandans, unlike for the Armenians, there are several factors that must be discussed in regards to the roles of these international safe havens:

1. International law allowed for the formation of international safe havens, yet there was an obvious incongruence between the theory and the practice.
2. The establishment of the Humanitarian Safe Zones under Operation Turquoise was problematic at best, and catastrophic at worst, because although established as official safe havens by the international community, these spaces served to promote France's strategic gains and allowed perpetrators to escape justice.
3. The lack of action in regards to demilitarization of those seeking refuge in these zones, and in the subsequent refugee camps, heightened tensions and the increased probability for renewed violence.
4. The lack of efficient methods for repatriation of the refugees played a huge role in the advent of post-genocidal violence.

The global context of 1994 was vastly different than that of 1915, as repeated efforts had been made to create laws that would not only temper the losses of conflict in cases of war, but to also bring humanitarian concerns to the forefront of international relations. As such, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 had officially established the creation of safe havens within conflict areas, albeit requiring the consent of the warring parties. However, as conflict raged on in all parts of the world, the international community soon realized that consent was not always an option and that instituting these spaces by force was sometimes the only option available. In Rwanda, there was no agreement between the RPF and the Hutu Power government to create areas in which

people could be protected, and as such, the international community was forced to intervene.

However, safe havens in theory proved to be much more different than in practice, as the complete protection of the population was not achieved, in part due to the strategic interests of those involved in creating these areas. Yet these efforts cannot be seen solely as futile, because although they were not perfect, they still provided some safety for thousands of people who needed respite from the violence. As such, the definition of safety itself was challenged. While the UN Resolutions called for the total elimination of violence against the targeted populations within these zones, this mandate could not have possibly been expected to truly be achieved when there was no capability to ensure the demilitarization of the zones.

As has been seen, once the international community was forced to act, it encountered a myriad of problems in instituting safe zones for the victimized populations. The lack of consensus in the Security Council, the limited mandates for the UNAMIR troops, and the use of French troops for Operation Turquoise – regardless of the knowledge that France had been previously aligned with the Hutu government – all aggregated into the establishment of humanitarian zones that continued to be used by Hutu extremists to instigate violence, as they could remain armed within the zones and take weapons with them as they crossed into Zaire.

These decisions had lasting consequences, as it was the Hutu regrouping across the border that led the new Rwandan government to follow the refugees and ensue violence upon them. Adelman (2001), states that “The ex-FAR and

their *interahamwe* minions quickly took over control of the camps [in Zaire], began to regroup and make plans for the recapture of Rwanda and, presumably, the completion of the unfinished genocide of the Tutsi” (par. 3). As a consequence and due to a heightened fear within the newly instituted Rwandan government of a repetition of the violence, the cycle of violence continued, with thousands of people perishing in the retaliatory raids of the RPA against the Hutus hiding in refugee camps. The violence, much like within Kibeho and other refugee camps in Rwanda, was indiscriminate of civilians and unconcerned by the presence of international witnesses. The lack of effort to demilitarize the humanitarian zones led to the creation of highly militarized refugee camps inside and outside of Rwanda, in which violence continued from both the Tutsi government and the Hutu extremists even after the genocide had ended.

Although the international community failed at providing safe havens to the persecuted Rwandans both during and after the genocide, it began to assess the situation more carefully after the new government was instituted. Whether out of guilt or responsibility, the international community began to send millions of dollars into the region, spending “approximately U.S. \$2.5 billion on the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania, while devoting about U.S. \$572 million to programs in Rwanda itself” (HRW, 1996). The bulk of this money went to the refugee camps outside of Rwanda, many of which were housing perpetrators of genocide. Thus, the money that should have been used to establish safe havens during the genocide, was used to attempt to make reparations that sometimes benefitted those most guilty for the violence of 1994. Much like the humanitarian organizations that continued to work in the camps regardless

of the knowledge of *genocidaires* inside, the international community continued to fund the refugee camps without truly being able to differentiate between victims and perpetrators.

The role of international safe havens in Rwanda is challenging to assess. The arrival of Operation Turquoise and the extended mandate of UNAMIR did not reach the victimized population in time to save them, and although it did provide a method for stabilization in a post-genocidal society, the establishment of humanitarian zones and the subsequent refugee camps were problematic for a multiplicity of reasons. Although international humanitarian law had evolved from the time of the Armenian genocide, the many conventions that were created to avoid mass violence and genocide, as well as a heightened use of internationally-sanctioned safe havens – used in 1990 and 1993 in Iraq and Bosnia, respectively – were not sufficient to ensure the safety of the Rwandan victims. Once established, these safe zones proved incredibly problematic, with much violence still occurring within them.

Conclusions

The case of Rwanda is one that will forever haunt the international community as one of its biggest failures. Former Secretary-General to the United Nations, Kofi Anna, stated, “The international community failed Rwanda and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret” (BBC, 2004, par. 5). This is because even after having created a myriad of covenants that necessitated action in the face of such tragedy, the international community stood still, watching and waiting until it was too late to act.

In Rwanda, frightened victims took shelter in spaces that they had used before. These were mostly communal spaces, such as churches, convents and schools. Within these walls they sought sanctuary, a premise deeply rooted in the Christian religion of which Rwandans were a part of and in international law, which claims to protect these spaces in cases of violent conflicts. Thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu crowded the churches attempting to escape the violence, but instead found nothing but violence within. In many cases, those who were not killed immediately were tortured or raped. This was especially true for Tutsi women, who found themselves being raped repeatedly and sometimes within sacrosanct spaces. Cultural safe havens proved counterproductive to safety in Rwanda, as they did in Armenia, because they allowed for the accumulation of large numbers of people belonging to the targeted population who could then be easily exterminated. Consequently, these spaces were strategically used for violence in Rwanda, as the perpetrators knew exactly where the victims would go for protection.

The institution of international safe havens was problematic in Rwanda, as France's seemingly selfish voluntarism was a strategic move to keep its relationship with the Hutu-led government. As such, the humanitarian zones established proved controversial and in many ways failed as a humanitarian effort. However, the true value of their safety must be assessed in the numbers of people who found safety within these areas and who managed to start leaving their hideouts and moving back to their villages and neighborhoods in search of their families. Although unable to save everyone within the zones, and acting as a clear escape route for the perpetrators of genocide, these zones also managed to provide some stability to the country and allowed for thousands of Tutsis

to continue living. Had these zones not been established, the killings would have continued in larger numbers in regions that the RPF had not managed to reach. In addition, the subsequent fighting between RPF soldiers and Hutu perpetrators would have had a grim toll in the noncombatants caught in the cross-fire.

As such, while it cannot be said that France or the international community had the best interest of the victims at hand, the establishment of these areas did provide some safety. This is important, because in genocidal violence, any safety is imperative for survival, and any safety is better than no safety at all. Relative safety, then, is the premise to which the international community must look upon when assessing whether to institute safe havens in cases of mass violence. This is because total safety, in the end, is nothing but a theoretical dream in cases of genocide.

Chapter 7: Nationalism in Bosnia – A Recipe for Disaster

“I am hopeful that no one will forget what happened in Bosnia. Let us try to learn from the mistakes of the past” – Fatos Nano.

Introduction

The history of Bosnia is the history of the Balkans, and to speak of one without speaking of the other is to neglect the impact that centuries of nationalism and war had on the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. Although a detailed history of the region has already been assembled by various scholars in the field, there are certain aspects that need to be emphasized in this discussion. The region of the Balkans, much of it under the control of the Ottoman Empire for decades, is a region that has been marred by violence, mostly within the context of civil wars and wars of independence. However, interstate wars such as the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 led to huge casualties in the region and helped shape the future of the countries that would eventually become independent.

Bosnia found itself perpetually amid warring parties in the period between the fall of the Kingdom of Bosnia, when the Ottoman Empire annexed its territories and finally reached Herzegovina in 1481, and the late 1990s. The territory and its people were passed around from the Ottoman Empire to Austria-Hungary, to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, to being occupied by Hitler’s forces, to becoming part of a socialist Yugoslavia, and eventually finding its own voice after the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. As such, the history of Bosnia is one that could take up entire tomes, but it is a history from which several aspects must be extrapolated to understand the violence of 1992-1995.

Bosnia's history of violence may have prepared, and in fact instigated, the massacres witnessed during the Bosnian War. In particular, the period of violence under the Ustasha leadership seeded the roots for mass violence in the nation.

The territory of Bosnia, having been passed around throughout the centuries, is one that is bestowed with diversity. Malcom (1994) states that,

“There is no such thing as a typical Bosnian face: there are fair-haired and dark-haired Bosnians, olive-skinned and freckled, big-boned and wiry-limbed. The genes of innumerable peoples have contributed to this human mosaic” (p. 1).

As such, Bosnia is a kaleidoscope of stories, brought about by centuries of history that created a melting pot of peoples from different places, who spoke different languages and followed varied ideologies. Yet this same variety is what proved fatal to the Bosnian state, as the rise of nationalism in the 1940s and later in the 1990s, led to a fracturing of the Bosnian identity and to the escalation of violence.

Although Bosnia's history is filled with important events that shaped the nation, including the attempted creation of an Ottoman identity for all peoples under the Ottoman Empire and their eventual Islamization, the rise of the Third Reich in Germany and its expansion throughout Europe proved imperative in shaping the region. It was Hitler and Mussolini who brought the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the rule of the Axis Powers and recognized it as part of the Independent Nation of Croatia (NDH). This nation included Inner Croatia, Slavonia, Srem, parts of Dalmatia, and all of Bosnia-Herzegovina (West, 1995), and it was considered a puppet state of the Axis Powers, with the Ustasha left to rule the region. The Ustasha, a fascist, nationalist, Croatian movement

the was formed out of the want of Croatian secession under King Alexander I, sought to cleanse the new nation of undesirables, including Jews, Gypsies, and Orthodox Serbs. As such, this regime seeded the roots of violence that would later destroy Bosnia, as the Serbs would not forget the misery that was brought upon them and, in fact, delivered the same brutal treatment to the Muslims and Catholics only a few decades later. Overall, violence during the war was not only ensued by the Serbs, as Croats and Bosnians also engaged in violence against each other and against the Serbs, as all three parties attempted to gain ultimate control over a crumbling system.

The Bosnian War cannot be understood without this context, as to see the Bosnian War and its atrocities as an isolated event is to ignore the existence of generational trauma and the consequences that arise from mass violence. Throughout the conflict of 1992-1995, Bosnian citizens were targeted for destruction by Serbs much like the Ustasahas had targeted the Serbs for destruction during the 1940s, yet the reactions of both the victims and the international community were different to what was seen in Rwanda and Armenia, as the victims did not seek safety in cultural spaces, and the international community reacted swiftly to the violence. Trying to understand this difference is the aim of the next section.

Cultural Spaces Targeted for Destruction

Although the use of cultural safe havens by the targeted population was minimal during the Bosnian War, it is important to note their use in previous bouts of violence in the region, and attempt to understand why these spaces were not as sought out for shelter as they were by the Armenians and Rwandans. Throughout the period of Ustasha

violence, Serbian Orthodox churches were prime targets for destruction, with many being burnt down with hundreds of people inside. This was a consequence of genocidal policies that sought not only to destroy the physical existence of the Serbs in an independent Croatia, but also to destroy any trace of their existence by eradicating their most important cultural sites. This practice of destroying cultural spaces continued during and after the Bosnian War, including in Kosovo in the late 1990s, where Serbs burnt down mosques and in retaliation Serbian Orthodox churches were also destroyed (Bytyçi, 2015).

The most well-known use of a cultural space as a place for mass violence during the Ustasha period occurred in the town of Glina, where the church was used as one more weapon in the ever-growing arsenal of the Ustasha. The church was strategically used by the perpetrators as a holding pen, where hundreds were gathered to await their fate. The Ustasha soldiers pushed as many people inside of the church as possible, and prepared for slaughter. Ljuban Jednak, a survivor of the massacre, describes the scene of that day in haunting detail. He states, “They throw us in the church. “Get in, Get in. Get in.” They push us in, as many of us as they can. They lock the church and leave” (Jasenovac Committee, 2012). For the next few days, the Serbs in the church were taunted until the massacre began, with a few allowed to leave for having previously converted to Catholicism.

Jednak goes on to narrate the first two deaths inside the church, and his story points at a floodgate of violence opening after. He states, “...when they slaughter those first two, they start slaughtering, slaughtering, slaughtering – next and next and next –

and take them away. The blood is flowing through the church” (Jasenovac Committee, 2012). The final death toll of the Glina massacres – two of them perpetuated in a few months – has been debated, with some quoting numbers as high as 1,200 (Lieberman, 2013), while others estimate much lesser numbers of “less than four hundred, but certainly higher than three hundred” (Goldstein, 2013, p. 135), during the first instance of violence in Glina, and another one hundred killed in August of that year. Jednak states that besides those massacred in the church on August 1941, at least 600 more were added to the mass graves later – those being the Serbs whom the Ustasha could not cram into the church (Jasenovac Committee, 2012). Three mass graves were later discovered, with hundreds of bodies lying within.

It is important to note that the Serbs who were sent into the church did not conceive of this as an opportunity for safety. In fact, Jadnek states, “The church is filled with people. We think – we are finished!” (Jasenovac Committee, 2012). Unlike in Rwanda, where gatherings in the church sometimes came with false promises of safety from the perpetrators and where there was a predetermined idea of safety in churches from previous conflicts, the Serbs in Glina were neither given false hope nor predisposed to recognizing the church as a safe space. It has been reported that the Serbs sent to the church were promised they would be allowed to convert to Roman Catholicism; however, although a few people were in fact released after admitting their conversion, Jadnek’s testimony does not point to any actual attempt at providing such an opportunity. Instead, “when they arrived at the church, the doors were locked and the Government’s security forces slit their throats” (Englerberg, 1991, par. 13). Invariably, the Serbs knew that the

Ustasha's amassing of so many Serbs in a single place could mean nothing more than violence. Serbs had been massacred before and therefore the victims could predict the outcome of their entrapment. Unlike the Armenians, for which previous violence in these spaces did not translate to staying away from them, the Serbs knew that these spaces had been strategically used and targeted for their destruction. This type of violence was not uncommon during the Ustasha period, and it often came hand in hand with the destruction of the cultural buildings themselves. West (1995) states that "the Ustasha burnt down or dynamited a third of the Orthodox churches, frequently with the faithful inside" (p. 92). Thus, the genocidal policies of the Ustasha reflected the need for the cultural eradication of the Serbian community.

The Ustasha period and its wanton destruction of cultural spaces is important to understand, as its methods of destruction were seen again during the Bosnian War, but with the roles reversed. In the period of 1992-1995, the Serbs persecuted the Muslim and Croatian Bosnians who had contributed to their demise in the decades prior, not only through acts of physical violence, but also through the destruction of their cultural symbols. The Bosnian War evolved from a partisan, nationalist civil war, to a genocidal campaign that sought the physical and cultural destruction of specific groups of people. Throughout this conflict cultural spaces were used as places for mass violence, yet their use as places for sanctuary was minimal.

The violence in Bosnia in the years between 1992 and 1995 was varied in scope, with genocidal violence occurring in several places, but not becoming the norm. This was mainly because many of the cities remained protected by Bosnian enclaves, which meant

that they were besieged by shelling and sniper fire, rather than cleansed due to either the presence of Bosnian Muslim fighters or of UN protection. The massacre in Srebreniça is still not officially recognized as genocide, and the entire period of violence is most often referred to as a campaign of 'ethnic cleansing.' The difference between these two is one of degrees of direct violence, with 'genocide' used for the more extreme cases of mass killing with intent to destroy a specific group, in this case the Bosnian Muslims, and 'ethnic cleansing' referring to the mass expulsion of victimized populations from their dwellings, cities, and territories. This is an important distinction to understand, but one that is irrelevant for the victims themselves, as their expulsion from their homelands and the loss of their family, friends and cultural roots is tragic and at times violent.

The distinction, then, is simply made in the realm of international law, as the label provided to the violence defines international intervention and responsibility. In addition, the term 'ethnic cleansing' is itself redundant when speaking of genocidal campaigns, as the persecution of a specific ethnic group and the imposition of conditions intended to cause the group's destruction, are already codified as part of the definition of genocide. As such, no distinction should be made between these two. However, the term 'ethnic cleansing' has been repeatedly used by the international community, including in the discussions regarding Bosnia, to describe a situation in which violence against a specific ethnic group has escalated but does not necessitate immediate action by the international community. By law, labeling these events 'genocide' would necessitate immediate international intervention.

In Bosnia, much of the violence occurred through a barrage of shelling, which left no infrastructure, including basic utilities, and forced the Bosnian Muslims to move from one village to the next in search for safety. As a consequence, when discussing cultural and international safe havens, the distinction between genocide and ethnic cleansing is important to address because the different levels of violence determine much of victim behavior. In places where the violence was meant to expel the population but not exterminate it, victims sought refuge in cellars and nearby forests for as long as possible, until they were forced to move to the next village. In places where the violence was meant to eradicate the physical existence of the victims, the Bosnian Muslims did not have many places to escape to, as they were rounded up, forcibly kept in makeshift prisons, marched to different locations, and executed. In Bosnia, perpetrators would begin campaigns of ethnic cleansing, which moved “street-by-street, house-by-house” in search for Bosnian Muslims (Tanovic-Miller, 2001, p. 107). This meant that in some cases, members of the victimized population had a chance to run, but running did not guarantee their safety. In Bosnia, the use of cultural safe havens was minimal and it was the cellars and forests that were pivotal to the survival of many, as they were the only available recourse to the victims.

Cellars: Refuge in the Home

The style of fighting of the Serbs and the Croats, characterized by mortar attacks and sniper fire on main cities and buildings, meant that the safest places to hide were any available buildings. This was the case in many cities, including Sarajevo, and it was a staple of the war from early in the violence. Only a year before the Bosnian War erupted,

in 1991, when Serbia attacked Croatia, this pattern of behavior was also seen – “In the early part of the war in Croatia the city of Vukovar was almost destroyed by Serbian artillery during a three-month assault by shells, missiles, and grenades, driving its inhabitants and defenders into their basements for a precarious survival or fleeing for their lives” (Bert, 2011, p. 115). Vukovar was one of the first instances of violence from the Serbs that showed signs of ethnic cleansing, and, occurring in 1991 before the war began, it was a trial run for the paramilitary groups that would later use the same tactics against the Bosnian citizens. These mortar and shelling attacks targeted main buildings and cultural spaces, such as universities and mosques. By the time the Serbs began their attacks on a newly independent Bosnia, their strategies were well-known, and the Bosnians could thus act accordingly.

According to a survivor from Banja Luka, during the war the only place that felt relatively safe was home (D.M., in Lešić, 1995). Another refugee states that during the years of the war, “people tried to stay at home, indoors, as much as possible” (V.S., in Lešić, 1995, p. 92). This was a direct consequence of the method of fighting between the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims, as mortar attacks and shelling were common against main buildings in the cities. At the same time, cities were besieged by the perpetrators with sniper fire, so that leaving the buildings and cellars was not truly an option. Mosques, as symbols of the Muslim Bosnian identity, were targeted and destroyed during this period, with approximately 534 of them destroyed or damaged during the war (Radovanovic, 2016).

The safest place inside the home was the cellar, or basement, as it was far enough away from the shattering windows and stray bullets to provide a modicum of safety. For many, cellars became the only safe place to hide in, and live in, for months at a time. One refugee recounts how they spent “four months living in agony and fear, mainly hiding in the cellar” with their family (V.K., in Lešić, 1995, p. 97). Sometimes, they hid not only with their families, but with other members of the community. Dijana Muminovic, a child during the war, relates the story of many Bosnian children when she states that she “spent her childhood” hiding in basements (Alexia Foundation, 2013). Elvir Ahmetovic, a Bosnian now living in Missouri, was 14 when the war began, and he lived in the cellar with his family, “trying to survive day to day in the midst of constant bombing” (O’Brien, 2015, par. 3). The use of cellars was, after all, a direct consequence of the strategies of war chosen by all sides of conflict. Even within the cities established as safe havens by the United Nations, cellars were important for protection. In Žepa, “Many of the 16,000 Muslim villagers trapped in the mountainous eastern enclave hid in basements or in caves...” (Wilkison, 1995, par. 2), yet even these spaces were not always safe.

Tanovic-Miller (2001) recounts her experience during the war and remembers running to the kitchen cellar for protection once the worst attacks began on Sarajevo. It was not an easy existence, as food, water, and electricity were scarce and the constant fear took a heavy toll on the survivors. One of them, from Sarajevo, states that in an attempt at sanity “while sitting for hours in the darkness of the cellar,” poetry was used to keep calm (A.S. in Lešić, 1995, p. 54). Given that cellars were underground, away from the hailing bullets, and provided safety from the bombs destroying major buildings all

around the cities, it stands to reason that the Bosnians would have seen them as the safest place to hide, and in many places they were. In the city of Mostar, people lived for months in groups inside cellars while trying to hide from the violence. One woman lived with six others “in a lightless concrete cellar” (Schmidt, 1994, par. 5) under the rubble of the buildings that had been destroyed by direct hits.

In Srebreniça, cellars were also of importance. Rukija, a survivor of the violence, tells of the bombing of Srebreniça and the destruction of the adjacent building, a bakery, which led her to hide in the cellar where she stayed for two years (Leydesdorff, 2011). Cellars were one of the only options for safety in Srebreniça, as Diego Arria, a witness to the violence, stated, “the people living there were with their backs to the wall and the only possibility they had was to flee below ground” (Leydesdorff, 2011, p. 119). Cellars, unlike mosques, churches or universities, could not be directly destroyed because they were underground.

The use of cellars was seen across the warring territories, but was prevalent in cities under siege because there was no other option available, even after many of these cities were designated as safe areas by the international community. Sarajevo, by far one of the most well-known Bosnian cities under attack, was a city filled with inhabited basements. This was understandably so, as populations within these cities were not allowed to leave by the perpetrating forces, and were thus forced to find methods of survival within. As the bombing continued and buildings were not safe, cellars were the most viable option for survival.

However, although an important aspect of safety, cellars were also dangerous places, because they limited the options to flee in case of an attack. As such, those hiding in cellars only had a precarious sense of safety; knowing that at any moment it could all change for the worse. “Most days we spent in the cellar, in fear that the enemy might storm our part of the city, and start looting, raping and killing. The fear was the worst of all” (A.O., in Lešić, 1995, p. 101). In some instances, cellars also proved fatal as houses were burnt down with those hiding inside. In Ahinici, a man who decided not to flee, hid his wife and children in the cellar, but the cellar provided no safety from the fire and his wife and four children were found later having burned to death, described as “almost indistinguishable from the charred beams that had fallen around them” (Lewis, 1993, par. 6).

This lack of safety in cellars was especially true in the areas of Bosnia that suffered the most direct acts of genocidal violence, such as the seven municipalities of Bratunac, Foca, Kljuc, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Vlasenica and Zvornik. In these places, cellars offered no protection, as entire homes were burned down and cultural sites were destroyed. The people of these cities were rounded up and sent to concentration camps or expelled from the cities completely. In some cases, non-combatants were murdered by the hundreds, and women were used as sexual slaves for months. The only safety available for the citizens of these towns was to attempt to flee. It has been argued by the perpetrators that no genocide occurred in Bosnia, and that the opportunity to eradicate as many Bosnian Muslims as possible was not grasped by the Serbs, since too many of them in Bosnia were left alive to truly prove genocidal intent (Justice Report, 2013). In

addition, Serbian perpetrators have argued that Serbs were equally persecuted by both Muslims and Croats and that their plight has been ignored by the international community, which has put too much weight on their crimes and not on the crimes of the other warring parties. As such, Serbs have accused authorities of “practicing selective justice” (Zuvela, 2012, par. 2) by ignoring the atrocities committed by the Muslims and Croats against the Serbs during the war. The nature of the Bosnian War, in which all parties had fighting forces, meant that violence was ensued from all sides and atrocities committed in search for individual victories. However, regardless of who the perpetrators were, it was the noncombatants caught in the cross-fire who suffered most.

In many cases, cellars served as temporary hideouts, from which plans for escape were planned. As the fighting got closer, many victims left the safety of these spaces and sought refuge outside of Bosnia proper, by requesting asylum in other countries. In this aspect, the Bosnians were better favored than other victims of mass violence, as the borders of other countries were not shut to them, and political asylum was provided to thousands who sought refuge elsewhere. The United States alone received approximately 18,845 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1993 and 1995 (USDHS, n.d.). In that same period, only 126 Rwandans arrived to the U.S. as refugees (USHDS, n.d.). Young Bosnians were better equipped to flee abroad, most times leaving their loved ones behind, and arriving to places such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Austria, Holland, and others. In addition, programs were set up by different communities to help as many Bosnians as possible. Projects such as the Bosnian Student Project solicited \$3.5 million in scholarships for Bosnian citizens to study in the U.S. during the war (Fink,

1996), and helped many Bosnians to flee the chaos and relocate. Other methods of aid were also established, with funding being sent to Bosnia through a variety of methods, including organizations such as Women for Women in Bosnia, through which American women could financially help women in Bosnia (Fink, 1996). These funding efforts were similar to those of the Near East Relief, as they provided life-saving help to Bosnians both at home and abroad, were not established by the international community, and helped save many from dire conditions.

Overall, limited available options for shelter, combined with the failure of the international community to keep the safe areas secure, mean that cellars became one of the most important spaces in providing safety during the years of violence in Bosnia. Yet they failed at keeping at bay the genocidal violence that occurred in several towns. The Serbs, after all, were looking to cleanse the Bosnian state of as many 'others' as possible, and doing so required the elimination of their cultural and physical existence. When cellars were not an option, the victims looked to another important venue for safety: the Bosnian forests.

Running for Safety

The experience of the Bosnian non-combatants was defined by a single overarching action: Running. The Bosnian cities fell, like dominoes, one after the other, with some of them being lost to the Serbs and Croats completely, while others were lost and gained sporadically as the fighting continued through the years. However, the non-combatants in Bosnia were defined by having to flee from their homes, their villages, and sometimes their country. The loss of their homes reflected more than just the loss of

infrastructures, it reflected the loss of country and community. Moving from village to village was not an option, but a necessity. The creation of safe areas in 1993, less than a year from the start of the violence, saw thousands of people reconsider their position and attempt to run to the closest of the six safe areas established by the United Nations.

Moving from one town to another was not an easy task, yet it was one that saved lives. In many cases, the non-combatants had to flee to nearby hills and forests looking for cover.

Sabaheta, a survivor and one of the women whose story is chronicled in Leydesdorff's *Surviving the Bosnian Genocide: The Women of Srebreniça Speak*, tells of having to live in the forest for twelve days to escape the violence (Leydesdorff, 2011). This was a recurring action taken all throughout the nation. Edina, a survivor from Bratunac, was forced to say goodbye to her sister, who fled into the woods, knowing that "Muslims had fled there from all the other villages" (Leydesdorff, 2011, p. 59). She also fled later, and soon encountered men, women and children, all living in tents through relentless weather – "I remember it rained every night. I'll never forget it" (Leydesdorff, 2011, p. 60). K.A., a refugee, moved to the woods after the Serb invasion of Zvornik, and describes the woods as a place "where thousands of people tried to find shelter" (K.A., in Lešić, 1995, p. 68). In the winter, living in the forests became more difficult – "it was too cold for the children to sleep under birches. There was no food" (Leydesdorff, 2011, p. 94). In one instance, six men thought dead after the massacre in Srebreniça in 1995, found their way through the forest and into Muslim-held territory in Tuzla after nine months of living in the woods (CNN, 1996).

In stark contrast to Rwanda, where the papyrus fields and forests provided no respite from persecution and murder, the Bosnian forests proved more effective in keeping people alive. This was in part because the Serbian militias did not usually hunt down the victims into the forest, like the *Interahamwe* did in the marshes of Rwanda, but were instead often content solely with their expulsion from the villages. This is not to say that they did not engage in violence against those in the forests, as they often shot at the fleeing victims. However, there was no systematic campaign of persecution into the forest as was seen in the fields of Rwanda. Life in the woods was ultimately difficult, with little food and little shelter to be found, and it was mostly temporary, as people made their way through the forest from village to village in search of safety. As in all genocidal conflicts, desperation led the Bosnian Muslims to seek shelter wherever it was available, even if it meant living in the forests during harsh, cold winters. Staying in the villages would have meant death or imprisonment, with women highly vulnerable to become victims of genocidal rape. As such, living in the forests was the best available option for those outside of the UN safe areas.

Cultural Sites as places for Mass Violence

The lack of use of cultural spaces such as mosques, hospitals and schools when it came to sanctuary does not mean that these places were not strategically used during the war by the perpetrators. In Bosnia, much like in Armenia and Rwanda, these places became places for mass violence, ranging from torture and killing, to mass rape. The spaces provided by these infrastructures were essential for the perpetrators, as they

allowed for the congregation of many victims at the same time for their subjugation or their elimination.

In war-torn Bosnia, “classrooms became holding cells filled with men standing shoulder to shoulder” (Lieblich & Boškailo, 2012, p. 103), as former schools became concentration camps for those caught by the advancing Serbian forces. In Tišća, the gym of a former school was used for the torture and murder of 600-700 people (Leydesdorff, 2011). In Potočari, men captured in Srebreniça after its fall were kept in a school, filling the classrooms. Schools acted as holding pens, where men were kept bound and beaten, waiting to be transported in trucks to the places where they would be killed. A survivor details his stay in a school when he states, “They kept us there a while, bound fast. Later in the night, we had to climb into the truck, bound, naked, and barefoot” (Leydesdorff, 2011, p. 145). Helsinki Watch reported that all parties to the war reported the use of schools, military barracks and stadiums as concentration camps in which enemies were kept. In Bratunac, a survivor tells of the school full of Muslims from adjacent villages, in which at least 1,000 were kept and killed. In the school gymnasium, the Serbs began to call names off a list, “they began to call the roll of people by their names and family names. They were killed on the spot” (Leydesdorff, 2011, p. 57). During the fall of Srebreniça, schools were used as holding pens while Bosnian Muslims waited to be transported in trucks to their deaths by the Drina River (Engelberg, Weiner, Bonner & Perlez, 1995).

Some of these schools became infamous detention centers, in which mass rape became a tool of war. In Foča, detention centers were established in Foča High School,

Partizan Sports Hall and Kalinov Primary School (International Criminal Tribunal, 1999), where Serbian soldiers were granted free access, not only to the detention centers but to the women inside. Here, soldiers were “allowed to select and take away girls and women who they then raped, tortured and humiliated in the cruelest possible ways” (Fiori, 2007, par. 8). As such, these places served as holding pens for a never-ending supply of women to be tortured and raped by the Serbian forces. Rape in Bosnia was both a method of torture and a weapon of genocide, as it ensured that future generations would be born as Serbs, not Muslims. Women in these camps were sometimes attacked so repeatedly that many were unable to recall exactly how many times they had been violated (Fiori, 2007). The brutality encountered in the Bosnian rape camps, often established in cultural spaces, led the international community to try perpetrators for the crime of rape for the first time in international courts.

Schools were not the only places for mass violence. In Brčko, approximately 100 to 150 men were kept in a mosque, made to squat in a single line and beaten at random (Helsinki Watch, 1992). In Srebreniça, women were taken to the hospital and undressed for the Serbian soldiers (Leydesdorff, 2011). In Tuzla, the hospital was bombed, causing the deaths of seven people outside of the hospital and an unknown number of losses from those inside the building (Helsinki Watch, 1992). The Helsinki Watch concluded that Serbs were targeting “civilians (including journalists), hospitals, heavily populated city centers and cultural and religious objects” (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 196). These locations were used as detention centers, sometimes marred with mass violence, and were found all over Bosnia. By June 1992, only a few months after the conflict began, the

Bosnian government already had a list of ninety-two prison and detention camps run by the Serbians (Malcom, 1994). These centers existed in direct violation of international humanitarian law, since they were instituted in civilian spaces protected by international conventions, targeted specific groups of people, and violated the protection of non-combatants established by the Geneva Convention of 1949. In Bosnia, unlike during the persecution of the Armenians and Rwandans, these conventions fully applied, as the Bosnian War involved a multiplicity of warring parties that should have been bound by the rules of war.

Cultural spaces were purposefully and strategically targeted by perpetrators, as their destruction was essential to the success of the campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Tanovic-Miller (2001) said it best when noting that Serbian forces were

“sent to destroy the libraries, the museums, the archives, the schools, the theaters, the hospitals, the galleries, the mosques and churches, the sports centers, the radio and television stations, the bakeries, the newspaper buildings, the post offices, the buses and streetcars – anything and everything that makes a city and its civilized life” (p. 8)

In Bosnia, then, cultural safe havens were specifically targeted for destruction as part of the attempt at cleansing the region of the ‘others’ from very early in the conflict. As such, these spaces could not provide any safety, nor were they looked upon as places of safety by the victimized population. In addition, these spaces were used as holding pens for those captured, not only for the purposes of elimination throughout the war, but also for easy access to victims that were put through endless arrays of torture and sexual violence.

The Role of Cultural Safe Havens in Bosnia

As has been seen, cultural safe havens played a minimal role in the survival of Bosnian victims. Instead, the safest place were the cellars, which were the farthest away from the reach of sniper bullets and mortar shells. In cases where staying in the home was not an option, the forests were the best option for survival. The lack of available safety in places such as mosques, schools and hospitals as places for safety, speaks to the importance of providing effective options for protection to the victimized population. In Bosnia, however, unlike in Rwanda and Turkey, the victimized population was provided with international safe havens for protection, which allowed for the survival of thousands.

Unlike in the case of the Armenians or that of the Rwandans, the Bosnian conflict began as a war in which Serbian forces and their paramilitaries fought a coalition of Croats and Bosnian Muslims, which later split into two individual warring parties. As such, there was more balance in the conflict than has been seen in other cases of genocide, where one party has utter superiority over the other and the campaign is a systematic attempt at extermination. In Bosnia, genocidal intent was seen through the purposeful cleansing of villages of Bosnian Muslims, including their removal from the towns and the destruction of their heritage, yet genocidal violence was more localized and centered around the areas that were not protected by military factions or UN troops, thus speaking to the importance of the institution of international safe havens.

The large-scale destruction of cultural spaces on all sides of the conflict, allowed these spaces to be immediately deemed as dangerous. The destruction of cultural sites was seen in Bosnia's past, during the Ustasha period, but also continued during the

Bosnian War and into the period afterward, with the war in Kosovo in 1999 witnessing a continuation of this method for destruction. As such, there was a historically-rooted understanding that these spaces were not safe in times of conflict. This was only compounded by the methods used by all parties in the conflict, which included mortar attacks and sniper fire. The large-scale destruction of these spaces throughout history in Bosnia, whether emptied out or filled with victims, was so prevalent that it overruled the premises of sacrosanctity that permeated similar spaces in the Armenian and Rwandan genocides. In these latter cases, victims sought shelter in cultural safe havens without an assessment of their true safety, even when history had sometimes proven them to be dangerous, as was the case for the Armenians.

During the Bosnian War, Serbs, Croats and Muslims were fighting each other while genocidal violence was being issued on non-combatants. However, the preference for shelling and sniper fire, as well as the presence of international troops in several cities, allowed for the genocidal violence to be tempered. These factors led to fewer deaths than could have otherwise been expected if the violence had been issued as a systemic campaign for extermination, not only of the enemy forces, but also of all Bosnian Muslims encountered in the region.

This does not mean that the losses were not significant or tragic, as 65% of the total death toll belonged to the Bosnian Muslims, with the other casualties being 22% Serb, 9% Croatian, and 5% belonging to other ethnic groups (Zwierzchowski & Tabeau, 2010). However, the highest death toll in Bosnia was seen in the military ranks, with an approximate 36,185 military deaths and 21,807 civilian deaths from the Muslim Bosnian

groups (Zwierzchowski & Tabeau, 2010). On the other hand, the Serbs lost an approximate total of 6,370 civilians and 13,028 military personnel. These results reflect not only the differences in goals, with the Serbs adding to their goal of territorial conquest that of genocidal violence, but also the differences in strength from each group. In addition, these numbers point to two important factors. First, the lack of use of cultural safe havens as places for shelter, meant that the victimized population was more dispersed than in other cases, in which the victims congregated in large numbers and thus made the overall extermination of the group easier for the perpetrators. Second, these numbers also point to the success of international safe havens as methods of protection, even when thoroughly imperfect, as the total death toll in Bosnia was an approximate 100,000 in the three years of the war (Zuvela, 2012). In the Armenian genocide, a complete lack of international intervention led to the deaths of an approximate 1.3 to 3 million people, most of them Armenian; and in Rwanda, the late intervention from the international community allowed the numbers of dead to rise to an estimated 800,000 people.

The Bosnian Muslims had the help of the Croats at the beginning of the conflict, but as nationalist sentiments heightened, they began to be attacked by both Croats and Serbs. In addition, the weapon's ban imposed on the region by the international community was fatal to the Bosnian Muslims, as they were ill-equipped to fight the Serbian forces long-term. The Serbian forces, on the other hand, were formed by the Bosnian Serb military and backed by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), and they

were strengthened by paramilitary forces such as the Serbian Voluntary Guard and the White Eagles.

The use of paramilitaries is of great importance in the case of Bosnia – and in fact in all three cases in this study – as these groups proved to be some of the deadliest aggressors. In fact, there was a dichotomy between the plans of the Serbian government and those of the paramilitaries. James Ron (2002) explains that there were differences between official authorities and paramilitaries, as the authorities tried to provide safe passage to Muslims in some cases, but the paramilitaries refused to acknowledge this. He states that, “the paramilitaries did not respect the police-issued permits, however, grabbing civilians as they exited police stations, ripping up their passes, physically abusing them, and even taking some off to impromptu detention camps” (p. 300). Thus, paramilitary groups played a crucial role in the escalation of violence between all groups and it was at their hands that many Bosnian Muslims perished.

The creation of UN safe havens in six cities across Bosnia was the international community’s way to attempt to save as many people as possible. Although the institution of these came almost a year into the violence, the actions of the international community were relatively fast compared to many other conflicts. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 824 was approved on 6 May 1993, and declared Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Gorazde, Bihać and Srebreniça as safe areas, which were to be “free from armed attacks and from any other hostile acts which endanger the well-being and the safety of their inhabitants” (UNSC Resolution 824, 1993, p. 1). Even earlier than this, in April 1993, the UN Security Council approved a resolution in which Srebreniça was deemed a

safe area and called for the warring parties to stop the human rights abuses present on the ground (UNSC Resolution 819, 1993, p.1). Much like in Rwanda, the expectation of safety within these spaces was one of total security as phrases such as “free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act” suggest. The reality on the ground was much more complex, and safety could never have been total. However, this expectation was shattered when Srebreniça fell, and the tragedy within this safe area was enough to deter the creation of similar spaces in any conflict since; ignoring the fact that the other five cities had indeed provided important, relevant and relatively successful security for those inside.

In contrast to the Bosnian War, the international community looked away from Armenians throughout the brunt of their victimization. In Rwanda, international intervention did not arrive until after the RPF had taken over the capital and thus ended the Hutu repression. In Bosnia, the international community took some time to intervene, but once it was decided, the UN deployed its forces throughout the country to keep as many victims safe from violence as possible. In addition, an added layer of protection was provided by cooperation with regional forces, in this case NATO, which was a decisive tool in the cessation of violence. Added to this active intervention from the international community, there was the fact that borders remained mostly opened for Bosnians regardless of the creation of safe havens, and those who could flee the country could seek refuge in other states. These two factors combined guaranteed the safety of many Bosnians, even when it could not save all of them.

Overall, cultural spaces were not seen by Bosnians as places for safety, which reflects the fact that these spaces were almost immediately targeted for destruction. Riedlmayer (2002) reports that Islamic religious cultural sites were repeatedly attacked and singled-out for destruction, with 255 mosques – out of the 277 mosques from 19 municipalities surveyed in the study – found to have been heavily damaged or destroyed. Riedlmayer (2002) goes on to states that “the damage to these monuments as clearly the result of attacks directed against them, rather than incidental to the fighting” (p. 11). The strategic destruction of mosques, universities, and other structures was a well-known fact amongst the victimized population, and as such they did not seek refuge in these spaces. Instead Bosnian Muslims flocked to the cities established by the United Nations as safe areas, yet what they found in these places sometimes led to cognitive dissonance, in which the expectation for total safety and security was shattered by the reality of sporadic but repeated violence.

Safe cities in Bosnia: An attempt at providing safety

Much of the literature regarding international safe havens in Bosnia surrounds the failure of the safe area of Srebreniça and the tragedy that occurred there, with approximately 7,000 to 8,000 people killed by Serbian forces after the retreat of UN troops from the area. Sarajevo is the second most well-known safe area in Bosnia, and its story has been depicted in both literature and film. However, before a detailed discussion of Srebreniça and Sarajevo is developed, the existence of four other safe areas, as well as their successes and failures, must be discussed. The cities of Tuzla, Bihać, Zēpa and Goražde all acted as safe areas during the conflict and to truly understand the importance

of international safe havens in genocidal states, their existence must be evaluated.

Although Srebreniça has become the poster child for the failures of the United Nations and its attempted safe havens, the discussion regarding the other cities is more limited in literature. As such, this section will develop an assessment of each of the cities, with the aim at determining if together, as a collective entity of safe areas, these cities provided the necessary safety for the survival of the Bosnian citizens targeted for destruction.

Goražde

Goražde, a city bordering Serbia, was established as a safe haven in 1993, and was an enclave of resistance for the Bosnian Muslims. While the plight of those in Srebreniça and Sarajevo has been amply discussed, the fate of Goražde has been overshadowed. Having been assigned as a safe area in 1993, the city itself received a meager number of UN Peacekeeping troops for its protection, with approximately 500 in total (Posen, 2001). However, although precariously located and barely protected, Goražde is one of the stories of success in the attempted establishment of safe areas in Bosnia, as it was a city that did not fall to the Serbian forces. This does not mean that the city was entirely safe, as it suffered casualties from mortar attacks and shelling (Posen, 2001), as well as clear attempts at takeovers from the part of the Serbian forces. However, by the end of the war in 1995, Goražde had not fallen and genocide had not occurred within its boundaries.

The success of Goražde as a safe area cannot be wholly attributed to UN forces, as UNPROFOR troops left Goražde when it was attacked by Serbian forces. The retreat of the UN forces was a consequence of the zero-casualty policies established by

intervening powers, as well as the fact that although part of a UN peacekeeping operation, the troops were under direct command of their governments. As such, when Britain ordered its troops to retreat after fighting intensified, they did so (Tanter & Psarouthakis, 1999), without regards for the safety and security of the citizens trapped in Goražde. The successful defense of Goražde, instead, was a consequence of the 10,000 Bosnian Muslim troops who resisted the Serbian attack, and the eagerness of NATO forces to strike against the Serbs in 1995 (Seybolt, 2007).

It is important to note that the existence of a Bosnian Muslim military resistance within Goražde immediately called into question the impartiality of the safe cities, and consequently painted a target on the safe area that the Serbian forces insisted on taking over. However, a push to demilitarize the Bosnian Muslims would have left the civilians without much protection, as it occurred in Sarajevo. The Bosnian Muslim resistance used Goražde as a base from which to carry attacks against the Serbs prior to the designation of the city as a safe area (O'Shea, 1998); however, once the safe area was instituted, the UN did not effectively demilitarize the area and the attacks against the Serbs continued. These repeated attacks eventually led to the Serbian offensive against Goražde, with both parties disregarding the status of the city as a protected area.

The shelling against the city was incessant, as Serbs targeted homes and hospitals alike. A doctor working inside the city tells of the shelling of houses and hospitals, and of the sniper fire that targeted those who survived – “People’s houses were shelled, and if any of the survivors managed to get out onto the streets they risked being shot down by snipers, at times there were shells falling in the inner city and the hospital every two

seconds” (McLoughlin as qtd in Sudetic, 1994, par. 5). Those inside the city were not safe, not even in hospitals, which were supposed to be protected under international humanitarian law. The advance of the Serbs led to their takeover of the high ground around the city. As such, the Serbian forces “were left in control of all the high ground overlooking the town and retained the potential to shell it whenever they wanted to” (O’Shea, 1998, p. 47). It was the threat of retaliation from NATO and the promise of airstrikes what kept the Serb forces at bay. Thus, military intervention proved crucial in saving the citizens of this enclave.

Although unable to physically protect the population and mandated to only fire when fired upon, the UN peacekeeping forces did have an important role to play in Goražde. Having failed as buffers to attacks, the UNPROFOR troops were imperative in negotiating a ceasefire after the Serbian attack, as well as negotiating the removal of the wounded and the access of humanitarian forces (Seybolt, 2007). Like most other safe areas, Goražde was a besieged city to which access was controlled by the perpetrating forces, which meant that securing access of humanitarian aid into the area was essential for the survival of those within.

Goražde is considered a successful safe haven because it did not fall to the Serbs. However, its successful resistance was a consequence of militarized resistance, not of UN protection. As such, the institution of this safe area cannot be considered an exemplary international safe haven, but should also not be dismissed as entirely failed. As shall be discussed later, the institution of these spaces comes attached to a deeply rooted preconception of safety and incites victims to seek shelter in these places, even when the

international community is ill-equipped to provide the promised protection. Instituting Goražde as a safe area led many to flee to this city, and thus ensured their survival during the war. This, of course, was the case for almost every one of the safe areas established in Bosnia during the war.

Bihać

Bihać was another safe area also established in 1993, as part of an ongoing effort to end the violence and keep non-combatants safe. Bihać, located in the northwest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had a rich history of ethnic diversity before the violence broke in 1992 (O'Shea, 1998). After the escalation of violence, it became a pocket of resistance against the Serbian attacks, and was assigned as a safe area along with all other cities in 1993. However, much like in Goražde, the lack of demilitarization in the area had problematic consequences.

In Bihać, the situation was incredibly complex, as several different warring parties all vied for the territory. In Bihać, the 5th Corps (Part of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina), APWB (Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia), BSA (Bosnian Serb Army), and the Krajina Serbs (from Bosanska Krajina), all had a stake in the violence. In addition, there was the later addition of the HV (Croatian Army) into the conflict. In this case, individual cease-fires had to be constructed between these groups when violence emerged, as was seen in 1994 with the creation of three independent cease-fires between these warring parties (O'Shea, 1998). Throughout the war, "no fewer than seven military formations operated in and around the Pocket" of Bihać (Ingrao, 2013, p. 214). This points, once again, to the inability to demilitarize the area,

consequently being unable to secure the non-combatants and make the areas truly neutral. The enclave of Bihać was 2,000 square kilometers of territory, with 250,000 inhabitants, out of which 90% were Muslim (Ingrao, 2013). It was also better suited for resistance against the Serbian forces, especially since many military groups created alliances between each other to stand their ground. Yet in the end, as some forces organized within the area of Bihać and others attempted to take it over, the citizens were caught in the crossfire.

As 1994 progressed, the situation worsened, and by November-December of that year, Bihać became one of the most explosive situations of the Bosnian War when tensions ignited between the warring parties (Burg & Shoup, 2015). This situation was exacerbated by the fact that UNPROFOR troops did not have the resources to deal with the violence. The French UN troops, which had succeeded in negotiating several ceasefires during the summer of 1994, left the area and were replaced by “1,200 ill-equipped Bangladeshi troops” (Burg & Shoup, 2015, p. 155) to protect the enclave, four of whom would perish during the violence that erupted during December of 1994 (O’Shea, 1998). The fighting continued, with mortar attacks and shelling becoming a staple of everyday life in Bihać. From 1992 to 1995, the warring parties gained and lost ground sporadically, with cease-fires being established and neglected often. In 1995, The Croatian Army crossed into the territory and shattered the advance of the Serbian troops, while simultaneously and systematically cleansing the territory of Krajina Serbs, with approximately 300,000 fleeing their homeland. In this region alone, the Serb population declined from 29,398 to 1,609 (Calic et al., 2011) during the war. The conflict in Bihać

proves that ethnic cleansing and genocide occurred on all sides of the conflict, as ruthless practices were witnessed from non-combatants in every ethnic group.

Almost a replica of Goražde, it was military intervention, not the humanitarian and neutral nature of safe areas, what saved the Bosnian Muslims in Bihać, and condemned the Krajina Serbs to being expelled from their territory. It could be said that the endless fighting between all the parties involved kept the area balanced enough not to lead to the genocidal massacres that were witnessed in Srebreniça. However, this does not mean that life within the enclave was easy. Within this safe area the non-combatant citizens suffered, as basic goods and services became scarce and surviving became a challenge. People were forced to beg for food and children were underdeveloped as they were unable to obtain balanced diets (O'Shea, 1998). The besieged city was at times blocked from all types of access, including humanitarian aid. The institution of Bihać as a safe area was challenging, but its success at keeping those inside relatively safe should be the defining factor when discussing its role as a safe area. It would be unrealistic, after all, to expect total security in a war-torn environment.

Tuzla

Tuzla, located in the northern part of Bosnia, was the safe area that attracted the least attention from the international community during the conflict, as it was not fully encircled by advancing forces and retained a low possibility for a humanitarian tragedy to occur, as it occurred in Srebreniça (Ingrao, 2013). Tuzla, much like Bihać and Goražde, was one of the strongholds of Bosnian Muslim resistance, yet unlike the other two safe

areas, it was not as frequently targeted by the Serbian forces. In fact, it was to Tuzla that the women and children survivors of Srebreniça fled to in search for safety.

Although targeted less often than some of the other safe areas, Tuzla was not completely spared the violence, and on May, 1995, in retaliation to NATO airstrikes, the Bosnian Serbs shelled Tuzla in an attack that killed approximately seventy people (AP, 1995). A defining factor in the violence against this safe area, as in many of the others, was the perceived lack of neutrality of the UN by the Serbian forces who saw Tuzla as a pocket of resistance from which the Muslim forces attacked. As such, these places were often threatened or targeted outright without much fear for retaliation, regardless of the fact that UNPROFOR's expanded mandate allowed for the UN troops to call for airstrikes against the Serbs (Crary, 1995). In 1995, Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic, stated that his forces "had every legitimate right to strike back and chase the enemy as far as Tuzla, even into Tuzla if necessary" (Crary, 1995, par. 10). Tuzla, along with Sarajevo, Srebreniça, and Žepa, composed the smaller safe areas available, yet they were all overcrowded. This limited space was problematic, not only for the defense of the cities but also for the survival of those seeking shelter within. Tuzla was, as a consequence, one of the cities entirely dependent on humanitarian aid (Seybolt, 2007).

Although attacked on several occasions, Tuzla was relatively successful at providing safety, especially when compared to other safe areas such as Srebreniça and Sarajevo. Tuzla was, in the end, a city neglected by the Serbian forces unless provoked. As such, those who fled to Tuzla, including the survivors of Srebreniça's genocidal

massacres, found relative safety from the violence. As such, this safe area can be considered one of the most successful during the war.

Zěpa

Zěpa, located southwest of Srebreniça, was a small safe area in Bosnia that fell to the Serbs shortly after Srebreniça. It is because of this that these two areas are usually analyzed together, as they fell like dominoes, one after the other. Having conquered Srebreniça, the Serb troops made their way to Zěpa, and attempted to recreate their previous victory. Everyone expected it, as Esma Palic, wife of Bosnian leader Avdo Palic (who led the Bosnian resistance in Zěpa), stated during her trial testimony against a Serbian general: “When Srebreniça fell, that automatically meant that Zěpa would fall” (Irwin, 2014, par. 10). Those inside Zěpa knew that if a safe area with more UN troops than theirs could fall, then theirs could as well. However, to the relief of many, this city did not see the same level of brutality that was seen in Srebreniça, because the UN troops stayed in the city during its fall and helped negotiate the release of innocent civilians.

As a safe area, Zěpa also became a pocket of resistance, with the Bosnian ARBiH (Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) refusing to give up their weapons to the UNPROFOR troops, who did not have a mandate to disarm them in the first place. In addition, the safe area was continuously shelled by VRS troops (The Bosnian Serb forces, named The Army of Republika Srpska), who besieged the town and all those inside. UN troops in Zěpa did not have the necessary capabilities to stop the violence or enforce any agreements between both parties. As these safe havens were established without the agreement of any of the warring parties, their legitimacy was perpetually in question and

the abilities of those working to provide a modicum of protection was undoubtedly hindered.

On 18 July 1995, Zēpa fell to the advancing VRS troops (Ingrao, 2013). However, much like in GoraŹde, the job of the UN revolved around diplomacy rather than military intervention. In Zēpa, the UN troops did not flee, and instead remained and helped coordinate an agreement to evacuate the civilians in the safe area. Consequently, in Zēpa, there was no repetition of the massacres witnessed in Srebreniā, even when the forced displacement of the Bosnian population was part of a greater policy of genocide. The fact that thousands were not killed does not mean that killing did not occur, as the disappearance and subsequent execution of Avdo Palic demonstrates. Overall, it could be said that Zēpa succeeded even though it fell, as many of those who sought safety within its limits were saved from the worst of the war, including 5,000 civilians who were removed during the Serbian seizure of the town (Ingrao, 2013).

Zēpa is one of the cases that can be used when discussing the very definition of safety, because even though it fell, the presence of the UN troops and their efforts to ensure the safe removal of the thousands who were hiding in the city saved thousands of lives. As such, 'safety' does not have to mean the total and physical protection of the area, but can include the successful protection of the population by other means, such as providing a safe pathway out of the safe havens or negotiating deals with the perpetrators to ensure that those who need protection manage to receive it.

Sarajevo

The capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, became popular after the 1984 Winter Olympics, through which people all over the world came to know the city. Sarajevo was also later inserted into popular culture when Hollywood took its story to the big screen with *Welcome to Sarajevo*, a journalist's account of his time in the besieged city. As a designated safe area in Bosnia, it was expected to provide a modicum of normalcy and safety amid violence. However, Sarajevo saw itself besieged from all sides, trapping those who sought shelter in the city without any way out.

Sarajevo was besieged for almost the entirety of the war, with food and water shortages rampant throughout the conflict. Even after being declared a safe zone by the United Nations, the attacks on Sarajevo did not cease. The only respite for the city was found in the unreliable ceasefires that emerged sporadically throughout the conflict. Located in a valley, Sarajevo was vulnerable to destruction from above, and as such the Serbian forces took to shelling Sarajevo for weeks and months at a time. According to Tabeau, Żółtkowski and Bijak (2002), the death toll in Sarajevo amounted to 3,798 people, most of which (2,381) were soldiers. In addition, a total of 12,919 individuals were wounded in the siege. The losses were significantly higher in the Bosnian Muslim population, with 2,340 of the 3,798 who perished belonging to the Muslim community. In addition, most of the deaths (2,160) occurred due to shelling. Demick (2012), recalls her experience in the siege and states that in Sarajevo some had electricity, food, sometimes even running water, and at times drove inside the city in armored cars; but they were all still "as vulnerable as anybody under constant mortar fire" (par. 3).

The attacks against Sarajevo began on April, 1992, just as soon as the tensions were high enough for war to begin. The first attack consisted of sniper fire, which targeted a peaceful march in Sarajevo protesting the Serbian barricades that had been erected to enclose the city, with a total of fourteen people killed (Demick, 1996). The march for peace began with only an approximate forty students, and swelled to almost 100,000 people in only two days (Pejic, 2012). On April 6, 1992, shots were allegedly fired from within the Holiday Inn hotel that had been built for the 1984 Olympics and which became the headquarters of foreign journalists during the war. The hotel was then raided by Bosnian government troops and the snipers arrested (BBC, 2013). This was the first of many attacks on Sarajevo, and the beginning of many lives lived in the darkness of basements as Serbian forces tightened their grip on Sarajevo.

The attacks escalated shortly after, with mortar attacks becoming a staple of the Serbian strategy. In May, 1992, only a few months into the fighting, the mortar shells struck a line of people waiting to buy bread, killing at least sixteen, and wounding over 100 others (Burns, 1992). Not even a year later, on January, 1993, the shelling of a local brewery left eight dead and twenty wounded (Demick, 1996). Throughout the war, more of these attacks occurred, including the deadly shelling of a street market in February, 1994, where sixty-eight people were killed with a single mortar shell.

The Markale Massacre became a turning point in the war and has been a matter of contention since its occurrence, with differing opinions regarding who shelled the market (Ramet, 2016). The bomb did not discriminate between Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Serbs, and instead left innocent dead and wounded from all groups. By 10 February 1994,

NATO gave the Bosnian Serbs a ten-day ultimatum to withdraw their artillery from the outskirts of Sarajevo or put them under the control of UNPROFOR troops. The Serbs were threatened with airstrikes by NATO forces if they failed to accomplish these changes. According to a NATO press release from 21 February 1994, the withdrawal or surrender of “virtually all heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo” had been successful. As such, recommendations were given to not use airstrikes against the warring parties (NATO Press Release, 1994). The press release further reassured the international community that if shelling again became a threat to Sarajevo and those hiding within, NATO was ready to “respond immediately” with air power (NATO Press Release, 1994). The tragedy in the Markale market allowed the international community to apply specific and credible pressure against the warring parties, yet it was not until 1995 that decisive action by NATO was taken to ensure the end of the war.

As a consequence of the constant barrage of bombings, the people of Sarajevo sought shelter in the basements of their homes or other structures they believed to be the most secure space available to them, including the city orphanages and schools. In Logavina Street, Sarajevo, an old orphanage that had been used as shelter during both World Wars, was sought as shelter again during the Bosnian War (Demick, 1996). The Razija Omanović School, with no students in the classrooms, also transformed into a bomb shelter (Demick, 1996). Many other orphanages and schools were used as places of refuge.

From 1992 to 1995, the Serbs were relentless in their shelling of Sarajevo, with very few periods of respite for the population in siege. This occurred regardless of

international intervention or of declarations that Sarajevo was a safe area. The ceasefires agreed upon throughout the war gave minimal respite from the bombings, which began again shortly thereafter. It was not until August, 1995, three years into the war and two years after the creation of the safe areas, that the allied forces of NATO resolutely intervened in the war. After a massacre on 28 August, 1995, which left forty dead, NATO's airstrikes targeted the Serbian forces relentlessly, eventually leading to the end of the war.

The end of the siege of Sarajevo was not officially declared until February, 1996, when Bosnian Muslims officially took over the remaining Serb suburbs in the region (Barber, 1996), yet the experience of those who lived in Sarajevo for the entirety of the war is one that will never be forgotten. At times, this small territorial space proved restricting and often fatal, especially since Sarajevo was highly dependent on humanitarian aid. Whenever the humanitarian aid receded for any reason, those inside the city starved. Sarajevo, a city surrounded by mountains, became easy prey to the perpetrators who eliminated the city's access to electricity, water and food.

It must be noted that had it not been for the UN's takeover of Sarajevo's airport, and their humanitarian airlifts, the people of Sarajevo would have been slowly starved by the Serbs, proving that genocide can be accomplished from afar. In addition, those in Sarajevo were privy to what was known as the 'Hope Tunnel', which connected the neighborhoods of Dobrinja, within the city, and Butmir, located outside of the besieged area. Throughout the war, the tunnel was used by the Bosnian Muslim forces to transport weapons, food, and medical supplies (Donia, 2006). However, although the UN and the

tunnel did much to help those in the city, it was, in the end, NATO's intervention that ended the violence and saved the Bosnians. This cooperation between regional organizations such as NATO, and global ones such as the United Nations, is one that proved essential in the survival of thousands in the Bosnian War, and one that has become more prevalent when dealing with international conflicts in modern times.

Srebreniça

Srebreniça is a city that will forever be linked to tragedy. As such, it is the safe area with the most literature surrounding it, as people have debated for years how it was that the massacres in Srebreniça came to be. The enclave of Srebreniça was located north of Žepa, and surrounded by Serbian-held territories, which meant that it was also besieged from all sides and struggled to resist the onslaught. As the first of the safe areas established by the international community, Srebreniça was, in all aspects, an experiment.

The establishment of Srebreniça occurred almost as if by accident, with UN General Philippe Morillon storming the enclave in 1993, during a particularly violent time in the region, and, after having negotiated a ceasefire between the Serbian and Bosnian forces, proclaiming that the city was to be under UN protection (Ingrao, 2013). This was not, however, a sanctioned judgement, and the international community found itself scrambling to make this proclamation into a reality. This does not mean, however, that the idea of creating safe areas in Bosnia was not already in existence, as the first intimation of this idea occurred in 1992, when then-President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Cornelio Sommaruga, proposed the creation of protected zones that would be agreed upon by all parties to the conflict (Honig & Both, 1997). The

idea was popularly rejected by the international community and quickly shoved aside, yet it resurged in the spring of 1993, when Srebreniça seemed set to fall to the violence.

Although both parties to the conflict agreed to the creation of Srebreniça as a safe area, with Mladic (leader of the Serbian forces) and Halilovic (General in the ARBiH) agreeing to its creation (Honig & Both, 1997), neither party ever truly lived up to all the agreements, as Serbian forces did not stop their attacks, and Bosnian Muslims did not give up their weaponry inside the safe area. From its inception, and once established as a safe area, Srebreniça was riddled with a myriad of issues, including its location and size, which allowed for the Serbs to easily target and attack the small enclave. In addition, the safe area was protected by UNPROFOR troops that had been given an extended mandate that they could not easily decipher – as the mandate called for demilitarization of the safe areas but allowed for ARBiH forces to remain in the enclave (Honig & Both, 1997).

Although the extended UN mandate stated that the UNPROFOR forces could engage in military action for self-defense, it did not clearly define exactly how or at what level was military action allowed to take place. As such, many of the UN troops observed, after the tragedy, that they had been there simply as observers, not allowed to do much more.

Sergeant Arthur Batalona stated, “As far as I knew, we had not been sent to Srebreniça to defend the enclave, but rather as some kind of spruced-up observers” (as qtd in Honig & Both, 1997, p. 14). This lack of a clear directive, compounded by a lack of proper weaponry, supplies and staff, proved fatal to those inside the safe area.

Like all other safe areas, Srebreniça emanated an expectation of security, leading thousands of people to seek refuge within its limits. Although the city continued to be

under attack for most of the war, the refugees poured in with an expectation of safety that was shattered in the summer of 1995. Monette Zard (2006) states, “The limited rules of engagement of the peacekeepers, in addition to a lack of will on the part of the international community to bolster their numbers, meant that civilians were effectively gathered for the slaughter with the collusion of the international community” (p.32). This gathering for the slaughter was, of course, not the intent of the international community, yet its failed policies led to the congregation *en masse* of a population targeted for destruction. In Srebreniça, the consequences of this proved to be devastating. Overall, the safe area of Srebreniça was a definite failed attempt at providing safety within the context of war and genocide, and in fact may have exasperated the result by providing a larger target for destruction that had did not have the means for an effective defense, neither in the form of Bosnian forces, or UN peacekeepers.

Assessing the Success of the Safe Areas

It is easy to look at the tragedy in Srebreniça and condemn the use of safe areas in conflict zones as dangerous to the populations that need protection. However, considering all six safe areas reveals that five of them provided some form of protection to the refugees. As such, the question of what is considered a successful safe area must be addressed. Must safe areas established within conflict zones guarantee the safety of every person inside? Does the fact that most of those who perished in the war were military mean that these areas provided safety to the non-combatants? Can these efforts to provide safe haven truly be considered a failed attempt?

The establishment of these areas was an experiment for the international community, as never had six entire cities been deemed safe havens for the victimized populations. As such, these spaces should not have been expected to be perfect and the lessons that were learned from their establishment should be used to perfect the use of safe havens in conflict zones, rather than as a justification to never attempt their establishment again. Although Srebreniça was indeed a tragedy and a blatant failure, four of the other five areas did not fall to the Serbs, and the one that did fall, Žepa, did not see the same violence as was witnessed in Srebreniça, with most of the thousands of people inside finding safe passage out of the area.

Overall, as five out of six areas saw hard times but no acts of genocide, the establishment of these safe areas can be considered a successful institution of international safe havens. Unfortunately, the focus on the tragedy in Srebreniça has not allowed the international community to attempt to perfect this tool for protection and instead has pushed the conversation away from ever attempting anything like this again. In fact, recent reports speaking against the institution of international safe havens in Syria are quick to address the failures in Srebreniça as the reference point to avoiding this strategy. Gould (2016), states, “A crucial lesson from Srebrenica is that if civilians’ safety cannot be guaranteed, concentrating civilians in such an area can make the even more vulnerable to the attacks the safe zone was intended to shield them from” (par. 10).

Of course, this is an important and valid argument, yet it neglects to recognize that five other areas provided relative protection to the Bosnian Muslims during the war. While the failures of these safe havens are important to note, their successes should not

be ignored. This is because the institution of safe havens may be the only way forward in many future conflicts. This is especially true within the context of an isolationist worldview that has begun to restrict refugees' access to other countries and has consequently left many to fend for themselves within conflict zones. What the international community needs to focus on, is the development of better methods for the institution and protection of these spaces, not in the complete dismissal of their possibilities.

The Role of International Safe Havens in the Bosnian War

Although an effort to protect the non-combatants during the Bosnian War, the establishment of safe areas in the country proved to be at its best a challenging endeavor, and at its worst, a fatal failure. Out of six enclaves transformed into safe areas, four did not fall to the Serbian forces, meaning that this experiment in safety could be considered highly successful. However, this begs the question of what is considered success. Sarajevo itself did not fall, yet living conditions inside the enclave were miserable, and thousands perished or were injured in attacks against the city. In addition, the structural damages to the city itself were irreparable, with many buildings forever erased from the cityscape. Does the fact that these enclaves did not completely fold under the pressure of the conflict make them inherently successful? Not necessarily. But neither do their failures make them inherently obsolete. Therefore, understanding the conditions that led to the survival of these towns, and the military intervention needed to save most of them, is a stepping stone to developing better models of protection.

The major challenges faced by these areas were a direct consequence of the mandates provided to the UNPROFOR troops, whereby the troops could only return fire if they were being directly attacked, not if the civilians they were there to protect were being attacked. The mandate of the mission changed from its inception in 1992 through UNSC Resolution 743, and the subsequent Resolution 836, which expanded the mandate and required the troops to protect the safe areas, including by asking for the aerial reinforcements that NATO would provide. However, the necessary resources, including the number of troops needed on the ground to successfully protect the cities were not provided, nor could they have been realistically so, as too many troops and resources would have been needed to stabilize the situation during such a complex war. Yasushi Akashi (2009), who served as the United Nation's Special Representative for the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia, states that UNPROFOR

“was faced with a peculiar situation: on the one hand, there was a strongly stated commitment by the Security Council to protect the civilian populations in the safe areas, while on the other hand, none of the Security Council members, including those most supportive of the creation of the safe areas mandate and some of whom already had troops within UNPROFOR, were willing or able to provide the resources necessary to carry out the mandate” (p. 316).

As a consequence, the UN troops deployed to the safe areas were often ill-equipped, in both mandate and resources, for the tough decisions they faced. In addition, the troops on the ground faced a myriad of bureaucratic nightmares that often delayed or completely inhibited the reaction time of the UN troops. In the case of Srebreniça, during its final

hours, “getting the go-ahead for air support was a time-consuming process that usual took at least two hours” (Honig & Both, 1997, p. 18). In a war zone, two hours can be the difference between life and death, and in Srebreniça this was no different. This bureaucratic ladder, which requires permission for action from those not on the ground and often in different time zones, is one of the most damaging aspects of UN peacekeeping operations, as was seen in Srebreniça and in Rwanda.

Often, the discussion of safe havens brings to light the success of the Open Relief Centers in Sri Lanka, which were established by the agreement of both warring parties, highly respected by these parties during the violence, and overall considered a success. In some instances, the safe havens in Bosnia are directly compared to these Open Relief Centers to highlight the importance of a multiparty agreement in the establishment of these spaces. However, as the Bosnian case shows, agreement does not always equate to action. The first safe area in Srebreniça was agreed upon by both parties, but shortly after abused by both parties as well. The agreements to demilitarize the area and to create a perimeter of safety was violated in Srebreniça repeatedly. The other five safe areas were established by the international community and without agreement from the warring parties, and here too the ceasefires and perimeters were ineffective.

It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss these areas as total failures, as the case is much more complex. The advance of the Serbian forces almost guaranteed that Srebreniça would fall in 1993, but the rushed efforts of the international community to create a safe area saved the thousands who were inside the city. Consequently, thousands more fled to Srebreniça and other safe areas throughout the war, as one town after

another fell to the advancing Serbs. Although the conditions inside these areas were often deplorable and highly unsafe, with many living in basements for months at a time, these spaces still provided the only modicum of safety available for the Bosnian Muslims at the time. Much like for the victims of the Armenian genocide and the genocide in Rwanda, there was little choice as to where to find safety; but unlike their counterparts, the Bosnian Muslims had the support and relative protection of the international community.

In the end, changing allegiances at the tail-end of the war, relentless fighting by the rebels, and military intervention from NATO, proved essential in saving these areas, as the UN troops were ill-equipped to do so themselves. This means that although the establishment of the safe areas is an important step in the protection of victimized population in genocidal states, it is not enough to trust that the humanitarian nature of these places will deter the attackers from fulfilling their mission, as the mission is the complete extermination of the other regardless of where they might be living. When safe areas are established without the necessary military protection that is needed in a war zone, they fall at the whim of the perpetrators, as was the case in Srebreniça and Zëpa.

Yet Bosnia proves that this does not mean that safe areas should not be established at all, as four safe areas did not fall and in fact provided safety to thousands of people. This is an argument that will be developed further in the next chapter and that is essential in the development of new safe haven strategies for current and future conflicts. Appropriate peacekeeping and peacemaking mandates for UN troops on the ground are essential to the development of true safe areas, as it is the troops on the ground, not the administrators abroad, who must make split-second decisions regarding the safety of

thousands of people under their command. Bosnia's safe areas were an international experiment in humanitarian action, and have since not been recreated.

Conclusions

The case of Bosnia is complex and multifaceted, with a variety of warring parties and deep underlying issues that transcended the time of the war by being rooted in a history of nationalist sentiments that were always simmering barely beneath the surface. In regards to safety and safe havens, Bosnia provides an interesting case for analysis, as it is the one case in this study that provides no use of cultural spaces as places for safety. Instead, Bosnian Muslims were forced to either live inside cellars in besieged cities, or run for safety in the forests around their villages. This is because the tactics of war in Bosnia, historically, included the immediate targeting of places of cultural importance as places of mass violence. Rooted in nationalist sentiments, the decimation of cultural establishments that belonged to the 'other' were part of the Bosnian conflicts even before the Bosnian War.

This does not mean that these spaces were not used at all during the conflict. Like in Armenia and Rwanda, these spaces were not only strategically targeted for destruction, but used by the perpetrators as tools in their arsenal of destruction. Schools in Bosnia saw themselves transformed into concentration camps and rape camps in which hundreds were kept, tortured, and eventually marched off to be killed. These spaces provided ample room for hundreds of prisoners to be controlled at the same time, and thus facilitated their destruction at the hands of the Serbian forces. As such, Bosnia proves that these spaces have two distinct perceptions: for the victims, these spaces are sometimes

the only shelter available to them, and for the perpetrators, these spaces are a way to increase their yield of destruction and murder.

In midst of violence between a multiplicity of parties, the international community did what it could to intervene by creating six safe areas that could provide some form of protection for the targeted population. In doing so, the international community extended the premise of conventional safe havens, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and created a new model for safety that moved beyond the conventional model. This new model did not require the consent of all parties involved, and hinged on the cooperation between regional and global organizations. The fact that the United Nations and NATO worked together to bring about the protection of the Bosnian Muslims, is proof that the process of establishing international safe havens is one that requires everyone in the international community to buy into the need for them and to commit themselves to their promises of safety and security. It is only when this occurs that the lives of the victims become more valuable than the sovereignty of the state engaging in genocide.

Furthermore, the case of Bosnia forces us to ask what the true measure of safety is in cases of mass violence. This is because although none of the six areas were completely safe (i.e. free of any form of attack), their existence also saved thousands of people who would have otherwise perished. The fact that the Serbian forces were not allowed to continue pushing into these cities, and that within them pockets of resistance continued to fight, allowed for these enclaves to stay afloat for the period of the war. The death toll, then, was lessened. And is that not, in the end, the true purpose of a safe area – to lessen

the death toll and provide at least some protection? This is a question that needs further analysis and one that will be addressed in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 8: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations for Action

*“We have the means and the capacity to deal with our problems,
if only we can find the political will” – Kofi Annan*

International Law and Genocide

This research sought to analyze genocidal campaigns throughout different time periods and attempt to understand exactly what are the roles of cultural and international safe havens in genocidal states are and the relationship between them. Starting with the Armenian Genocide, during which international law was still not established, to Rwanda and Bosnia, during which international humanitarian law had already been signed and ratified by most of the major powers in the world. The objective of analyzing these different periods was to determine if the establishment of international law had made a difference in the way the international community reacts to mass violence. The creation of safe havens has been a consequence of the expansion of international law, which includes taking steps forward in the commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This premise of R2P came about in 2005, during the UN World Summit. R2P means that,

“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability” (World Summit, 2005)

The creation of safe havens, then, is not only embedded in some of the most important documents that rule international law, but also an important part of this responsibility to protect. Safe havens are an integral process in protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

However, although an essential element of humanitarian law and indeed a recurring element in the historical progression of these laws, their institution has not always been as successful as expected. In both Rwanda and Bosnia, these spaces were places for continued violence in which perpetrators continued to abuse their power. The Armenians, Rwandans and Bosnian Muslims were all neglected by the international community, but the Armenians had no international law to protect them. On the other hand, the Rwandans and the Bosnian Muslims were neglected for a time before the safe havens were established as per the international community's attempted compromise to the phrase 'Never Again.'

Yet it must also be recognized that the institution of these spaces has indeed led to the safety of thousands of people and that to completely dismiss them as failures is to suppress the importance they had in quelling the violence. In Armenia, the complete neglect of the tragedy led to the decimation of 1.3-1.5 million Armenians. In Rwanda, intervention came, albeit too slowly for the magnitude of the genocidal campaign, and the final toll reached an approximate 800,000 people. In Bosnia, the institution of six safe areas led to the protection of thousands, with a total death toll of approximately 100,000, out of which the majority were members of different military groups. As such, the expansion of international law has been beneficial to the victimized populations, even

when it has not perfected their protection within safe havens. Of course, the context in which these conflicts occurred were essential in the creation of these spaces and these should be understood. However, in all three cases the persecution of a group defined the conflicts, and the international reaction should have been similar according to international law. There is still much to be improved in international law, and the premise of safe havens must be analyzed and perfected to continue their establishment in cases of mass violence. As international law moves forward, it must focus on perfecting the loopholes that allow for the delay of the creation of safe havens, and should move towards making these spaces into the new standard of international protection, even in cases of intra-state violence.

In addition, the premise of safe havens must conform to an idea of safety that is not rooted in ideological expectations of perfect security, but rather grounded in the true value of these spaces as places in which violence may occur. Only by accepting that these spaces will never be immune to continued violence, especially in the context of genocidal campaigns, will the international community be able to begin creating holistic plans of actions that are as realistic and viable. Otherwise, instances of violence within these spaces will continue to deter the international community from attempting their institution in other conflicts. As it stands, the international community has shied away from creating any more international safe havens since the fall of Srebreniça, as the scars of this failure are still fresh in global, collective memory. However, to solely focus on this failure negates the fact that the very existence of these spaces saved lives in both

Rwanda and Bosnia, and that places in which these were not even thought of, such as Armenia, would have benefitted from their existence.

Safe havens in international law have evolved throughout time, and their institution in different conflict zones has been met with both resistance and relief. Genocidal violence has been a recurring malady in international relations, and it does not seem like it will be resolved any time soon, as shown by recent events in the Middle East and recurring conflicts in other parts of the world. As such, it is important to continue developing methods that will ensure that the international community reacts swiftly to this unspeakable violence, and that the safety of the non-combatants, not the integrity of genocidal regimes, comes first in the eyes of international efforts for prevention.

What is Safety?

The analysis of safe havens allows for the understanding that the very essence of ‘safety’ needs to be reassessed. This is because safe havens at both the cultural and international levels, are expected to provide security in times of violence. The decimation of this security then, translates to a cognitive dissonance that challenges perceptions and creates disillusionment about safe havens in general. As such, the challenges in both Rwanda and Bosnia have led the international community to avoid the topic of new efforts for their establishments.

“It’s important to remember Srebreniça when considering the wisdom of creating “safe areas” in Syria,” commented Tierney (2015), when arguing against the institution of safe areas in Syria. Even organizations such as the United Nations have become jaded in their view of safe havens. Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High Commissioner on

Refugees, stated “Let’s not waste time planning safe zones that will not be set up because they will not be safe for people to go back” (as qtd in Portland Press, 2017, par. 2). The very idea of safe havens has become difficult to discuss in the international community, as the weight of Srebrenica’s failures continues to be felt. In the end, the United Nations says it best when it states that, “failures to protect civilians rightfully receive widespread publicity” (Challenging Mandate, n.d., par. 11). Yet it seems as if successes are more easily forgotten in the collective consciousness of the international community.

It is time to change the collective perception of safety. It is time to realize that seeing safety as total, is not congruent with the reality of conflict zones, especially in cases of genocidal violence. In these campaigns, the annihilation of the victimized population is the sole purpose of the perpetrators’ plans, and as such necessitates their refusal to stop killing. This means that even if areas are cordoned off as ‘safe’ perpetrators will continue to attempt to kill as many individuals as possible from the targeted groups. Yet this does not mean that safe areas are innately doomed for failure, and in fact the nature of this violence necessitates international intervention. The UN, when explaining its peacekeeping operations, states that one of its main challenges is that, “peacekeeping operations often deploy amidst the unrealistic expectation that they will be able to protect all civilians at all times” (Challenging Mandate, n.d., par. 9). As such, the UN itself understands that safety cannot be total and that to expect it to be so is counterproductive to the institution of safety and security in conflict zones. However, it seems as if individual states still grasp at the failures of these spaces to refrain from their establishment.

In both Bosnia and Rwanda, the premise of safety was challenged in every way and the institution of humanitarian zones and safe areas was an attempt at providing even a modicum of safety. In this, they succeeded, for even though they failed in many ways, thousands of people were saved within their boundaries. Thus, saving people who would otherwise have ended at the hands of the perpetrators and at the mercy of their will. The idea that safety must be total is one that makes the institutions of safe havens an unachievable task, and one which has led conflicts such as those in Syria, Myanmar, and Darfur, continue without any attempt at protection within the conflict zones. While the institution of safe havens may not be perfect, it is still important. As such, an understanding of their roles, their benefits, and their possible failures is essential in the development of future models of intervention that may dare to bring back this form of protection.

Cultural Safe Havens

In this analysis, cultural safe havens proved more than problematic, they proved repeatedly fatal. For the Armenians, the churches proved to be death traps, and the mission complexes proved to be unsafe shelter in which violence and disease took large tolls. In Rwanda, the churches, convents and schools became slaughterhouses in which tens of thousands died as they sought protection in numbers and in places of preconceived safety. In Bosnia, cultural spaces were specifically targeted for destruction by the Serbian forces, yet they did not prove as deadly because the targeted populations did not congregate within them. In all three cases, cultural safe havens were strategically used for issuing violence on the targeted groups. Overall, cultural safe havens proved

dangerous to the victimized populations, and their use as shelter in cases of genocidal violence often proved counterproductive to the search for safety.

These spaces, as their name suggest, vary according to culture, so that in Armenia, the deeply-embedded relationships between the Armenian population and the missionaries, led the Armenians to flee into these places for safety. In Rwanda, the most Catholic nation in Africa at the time of the genocide, the church played a center role in personal and communal life, so that when violence erupted, the people sought refuge there. In both Armenia and Rwanda churches had also been used in prior conflicts as places of safety, thus creating a preconception of safety that shaped victim behavior when new conflicts erupted. In Bosnia, previous conflicts had targeted cultural sites for destruction, as such when the Bosnian War erupted, people knew not to go to these spaces and instead went into their basements when there were no other options. In addition, Bosnians had intervention by the international community, which allowed many Bosnian Muslims to flee to the safe areas created in their name by the United Nations. An understanding of cultural nuances, then, is important when developing new methods of intervention.

In addition, the very protection of these spaces in international law shrouds them with a sense of protection that is attached to an expectation of action from the international community when their status as “off-limits” is violated. Both The Hague Convention and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, established cultural spaces as places to be respected in time of conflict and called for the contracting parties to the conventions to take action when these spaces were not provided the protection afforded to them by

international law. The Responsibility to Protect must go beyond simply labeling spaces as places for the protection of non-combatants; instead, it must mean the willingness and capability of the international community to take decisive action against the violation of these spaces.

Cultural safe havens proved to be more deadly in Rwanda and Armenia, where a history of violence was well established. In Bosnia, on the other hand, the spaces had not been as steeped into the collective consciousness as places of safety, and in fact had been challenged as such by previous conflicts. In both Armenia and Rwanda, genocidal massacres had become a preferred method of oppression by the perpetrators. In these bouts of violence both Armenians and Rwandans fled to spaces where they expected safety – mostly churches and mission complexes – and this behavior became part of the process to cope with the violence. Consequently, when genocidal campaigns erupted in both Ottoman Turkey and Rwanda, the victims repeated their previous behavior without assessing the true value of safety of these spaces. In Bosnia, on the other hand, the destruction of cultural spaces was part of the repertoire of violence during the historic, and as such the victimized population did not seek shelter in these places at the time of the Bosnian War.

This means that a look at the historical behavior of communities is essential in developing preemptive plans for intervention, as knowing where the populations have been conditioned to go to and where the preconceptions of safety lie, may be essential in deciding where to establish safe havens and where to send rapid deployment troops for the protection of as many people as possible. Ideally, the international community would

intervene decisively enough that the conflict is ended, yet history has proven that this is not the case.

It is important to understand that cultural safe havens are often sought out by targeted populations in all types of conflict situations, and they are also targeted for destruction in a variety of forms, from single shooters and suicide attacks, to genocidal massacres. In cases of genocide, however, cultural safe havens have the potential of becoming much deadlier than expected, as they provide a space for the congregation of victims and thus a larger target for destruction. This happens for several reasons:

1. The targeted population is left with little options – In cases of genocidal violence, the disparities of power leave an entire group in need of security. As such, these groups are forced to flee wherever they may find shelter, including spaces that have been used as shelter in previous bouts of violence.
2. The international community is vastly inactive – The issues of intervention are vast and complex, and cannot be tackled all at once. However, as the cases above delineate, the delayed reaction to humanitarian tragedies comes at a high price. In addition, the imposition of international safe havens is slow to occur or sometimes nonexistent, leaving cultural safe havens as the only measure of safety readily available for the targeted populations.
3. Preconceptions of safety are innately attached to cultural spaces – Communal spaces come with an innate sense of neutrality in the collective consciousness. In fact, these spaces are often used by perpetrators and victims alike as places of communal importance in times of peace. As such, it is common to see a disbelief

from the victimized populations in regards to the possibility of attack in these spaces. Overall, these spaces are usually sacrosanct in the collective consciousness and as such become easy to abuse.

The use of cultural safe havens is not always innately negative, as sometimes they may indeed provide protection from violence, as was seen in Armenia during the Hamidian massacres, and in Rwanda during the repeated pre-genocidal violence that plagued the country. However, there is a difference between sporadic bouts of violence and systemic campaigns of annihilation. Whereas in sporadic bouts of violence the perpetrators will usually be satisfied with killing a small number of people, systemic campaigns of extermination necessitate the perpetrators to continue killing as many people as possible, thus pushing them to look for anyone that may be hiding. As such, the use of cultural spaces proves lethal by providing large numbers of individuals belonging to the targeted population concentrated in a single space that makes their destruction much more possible.

It must be noted that in cases of mass violence the success of cultural safe havens is almost always contingent on interventions from third parties to the conflict. In Armenia, the foreign missions were often protected by the clout of the countries to which the missions belonged. In Rwanda, hospitals, stadiums and schools that succeeded in providing protection, were either under the protection of the UN troops that remained, or in close range of the RPF.

Finally, it is also important to note that in all three cases, cultural safe havens were strategically used by perpetrators in their advancements of violence, with schools,

churches, and other spaces becoming prison camps, rape camps, or torture chambers. The use of these spaces by perpetrators are a matter of convenience, as these spaces allow perpetrators to have full access and control of the victims to do as they please. Whether by locking women into churches and turning holy grounds into rape camps, or by turning schools into concentration camps, the perpetrators have historically proven that these spaces are essential to their pursuit of extermination. In addition, the destruction of these spaces is an important part of the goal of extermination, as it allows not only for the physical destruction of the targeted population, but also for the cultural disintegration of their roots.

All in all, cultural safe havens proved to be highly dangerous in cases of genocidal violence where international or third-party intervention was slow or non-existent. As such, it is important to work in the demystification of these spaces as safe in cases of violence. Yet even this will not be enough, as sometimes these spaces will still be the only viable choice for protection available for victimized populations, especially if the international community refuses to act.

International Safe Havens

The premise of international safe havens has been part of international law since before the Geneva Conventions of 1949, with their first mention being The Hague Conventions of 1907. As such, these spaces should have been instituted during the Armenian Genocide, but amid the First World War and without the support of all major powers, the first humanitarian premises in international law were vastly neglected. In 1949, the fourth Geneva Conventions officially instituted international humanitarian law,

and as such provided a better framework with which to tackle humanitarian crises. The advent of genocidal violence in a post-Holocaust world put the Conventions into practice and thus allowed for the institution of safe havens to occur. However, after civil war broke out in Bosnia, the international community did not enforce these premises until Gen. Morillon promised the people of Srebreniça that the UN would protect them. Consequently, the international community rushed to establish a safe are in Srebreniça and subsequently expanded the efforts to five other cities in Bosnia. This showed a reticence from the part of the international community to establish the safe areas in the first place. Consequently, the mandates that were provided to the troops on the ground were ineffective in addressing the needs of the victimized populations and even less effective in deescalating the violence. This was also seen in Rwanda, where the international community did not act until late in the violence and as such provided the opportunity for mass slaughter to occur.

The safe areas in Bosnia have generally been regarded as failures, mainly because of the tragedy in Srebreniça at the tail-end of the violence in 1995. However, it is important to recognize that only two of the six cities fell to the advancing Serbian forces, with only one of them being used for acts of genocide, which means that four of these safe areas proved effective in protecting and safeguarding the refugees inside. While the safety of these places was not ensured as a consequence of the UN troops but rather of the militarized intervention of Bosnian fighters and NATO efforts, the safe areas were still safer than many other cities in which Bosnian Muslims were killed in large numbers, detained in camps, or tortured. In addition, UNPROFOR troops were often essential in

creating diplomatic agreements that provided cease-fires or negotiated the evacuation of the victims ahead of the advance of the perpetrating forces.

Both Rwanda and Bosnia occurred almost parallel to each other, as Rwanda erupted in 1994, while the Bosnian War still raged on. However, the international community did not react in the same manner in Rwanda as it had in Bosnia. In fact, while in Bosnia mandates were created to strengthen the UN mission on the ground, in Rwanda the UN decided to evacuate the country. It was only due to Gen. Dallaire's persistence that some troops chose to remain to provide protection to thousands of people. It was not until the French volunteered to establish humanitarian zones in Rwanda that the international community agreed to intervene in the genocide. The establishment of these zones was controversial, as France's allegiance was to the Hutu government that was committing the violence. In addition, after being established, violence continued inside these humanitarian zones. The failed demilitarization of the zones led to the continuation of abuses under the supervision of both French and UN troops, not only at the time of the genocide, but in the later years.

Overall, the institution of safe havens has not been without issues. However, to expect them to be flawless is to do a disservice to the premise behind these areas. Their creation is a clear attempt at advancing humanitarian law, yet their faults have proven fatal to thousands of people. The establishment of safe havens in genocidal states will always be an issue of great complexity, yet creating preemptive plans of action for countries in danger of escalating violence, as well as focusing on a safety-first approach,

will be a step forward in bettering the institution of these areas to protect the victimized populations.

There are issues attached to the creation of international safe havens, as the creation of these spaces involves a constant push and pull of regional and international contexts that make it impossible for them to emerge quickly and decisively in cases of mass violence.

1. Bureaucratic institutions lead to delayed reactions – The most pervasive problem with international safe havens is that they are entirely dependent on the goodwill of the international community, be it the United Nations or regional institutions such as NATO, the Arab League, the African Union and others. As such, their existence depends on the right conditions to be present to encourage the swift participation of the international community in creating these spaces for the protection of the victimized population.
2. International safe havens are injected with an expectation of safety – The creation of international safe havens, whether in Rwanda, Bosnia, Iraq or elsewhere, is characteristically defined by an expectation of safety. The presence of international intervention, most times in the form of United Nations peacekeeping troops, imbues these spaces with an expectation of safety that in turn shapes victim behavior. As such, people flee to these spaces, as they did in Bosnia during the entirety of the civil war, and in Rwanda, expecting to be safe under the banner of international protection. However, this is not always the case, as the case of Srebreniça proved.

3. A lack of appropriate mandates paired with an inability of troops to make their own decisions, leads to inaction – Overwhelmingly, the mandates provided to UN troops on the ground in international safe havens have been too limited to deal with the issues encountered by them. This includes the inability to deal with violence occurring not only around the safe areas, but sometimes inside them. This inability to stop violence plays a pivotal role in the sentiments of mistrust that grow in the victimized populations and that may affect the behavior of future groups, which may not be so quick to look for protection under international banners in future conflicts.

Although international safe havens are riddled with complex issues, it would be a mistake to completely dismiss them as viable components to genocide prevention. After the fall of Srebreniça and the genocidal massacre that occurred within this UN safe area, the international community has been dubious about establishing any other form of safe area in subsequent conflicts. Even when conflicts with similar complexities have arisen, such as in Syria, or when the total number of noncombatant deaths in Bosnia points to a clear success in the establishment of these spaces. It seems that the international community has also forgotten that although flawed, these spaces in fact saved thousands of people from the violence in both Bosnia and Rwanda. The safe areas that did not fall to the Serbs in Bosnia were places of refuge for thousands of people, and the humanitarian zones in Rwanda, although instituted late in the violence, allowed for many to find safety at the tail-end of the violence and for the stabilization of the country. In addition, the humanitarian zones in Rwanda enabled the retreat of millions of Hutus from the country

which, although highly controversial due to the lack of justice delivered to many of the fleeing perpetrators, could have been much more violent at the hands of the RPF had these zones not been created and under French control. Even in the Armenian case, where no formal safe havens were established, the intervention of foreign governments and the aid of international actors were pivotal to the survival of thousands.

Relationship between cultural and international safe havens

In analyzing different cases of genocide, and the roles of cultural and international safe havens in these cases of mass violence, a relationship between these types of safe havens is evident. During the Armenian genocide, cultural spaces were used for the decimation of the targeted population, with churches and missions becoming places for mass violence. Without anywhere else to turn to, Armenians fled to the only spaces that had provided some protection in previous bouts of violence. However, as the premise of safe havens was not codified in international law, there was little the international community was willing to do to protect the Armenians. As such, churches and missions filled with refugees who had nowhere else to go.

In Rwanda, a similar situation occurred even after the codification of safe havens as part of international law. In this case, the slow reaction of the international community allowed for the congregation of massive numbers of victims in cultural spaces that were strategically targeted for destruction. However, the arrival of the French troops, the RPF and the reinforcement of UNAMIR, provided some respite from the violence. The zones, although controversial, provided safety for thousands of people who could have perished otherwise.

In Bosnia, the establishment of six safe areas provided refugees with places to flee to, along with protection from the violence. These six cities were established in the Bosnian Muslim enclaves and were protected by UNPROFOR forces and NATO military intervention. Together, these six cities provided protection to thousands and allowed for the casualties to be lessened. In Bosnia, a total of 100,000 people perished between 1992-1995, most of whom were military troops from all sides of the conflict. Although Srebreniça was indeed a tragedy, the other five safe areas provided protection to the noncombatants. In addition, cultural safe havens were not used for safety by the victimized populations in Bosnia, and as such did not provide a congregation of victims for destruction.

Overall, the lack of international safe havens meant that there were no other options for the victims than to run to the spaces they had historically used for protection. This proved fatal for those cases in which cultural safe havens were used as tools in the arsenal of destruction belonging to the perpetrators acting within a systemic campaign for extermination – Armenia and Rwanda. The case of Bosnia was different in both history and context, as there were different warring parties that engaged in combat, rather than one group unevenly matched against an overpowering perpetrator. While the Bosnian Muslims were limited in their ability to fight against the Serbs and Croats, the lack of demilitarization in the safe areas allowed for their resistance to continue throughout the war and for them to provide protection to those sheltering within their enclaves. In those towns in which there were no safe havens or resistance fighters, genocidal violence was

perpetrated repeatedly, sometimes by using cultural spaces as places for torture, rape or other atrocities.

The use of cultural safe havens is tied to a myriad of factors, from preconceptions of safety to historical usage; however, it cannot be denied that these spaces are often strategically targeted for violence. Whether within the context of genocidal violence, or in lesser conflicts, these spaces are often victims to attack due to their proclivity to act as spaces of refuge and sanctuary. This is a use that has been seen throughout history and which will continue to be so regardless of historical proof to their potential dangers. As such, it is important to recognize that the rapid institution of international safe havens is needed to protect as many victims as possible. Otherwise, many of those being victimized may find their demise within cultural spaces they preconceived as safe.

Regional and Global Cooperation

The institution of safe havens, and the protection of cultural safe havens, are both issues that must be dealt with by the entire international community, not just by the Secretary-General of the United Nations or the members of the Security Council. Most states put the blame of inaction squarely on the shoulders of the United Nations, and while in many cases the bureaucratic complexities of the organization are indeed a hazard to populations at risk, the truth is that there is much more to the international community than the UN. There is a myriad of regional organizations with the power and clout to work on behalf of affected communities. In fact, any country that has ratified the UNCG has the responsibility to act in cases of genocide. The cooperation of regional organizations with the United Nations needs to be one of the priorities in the move

forward towards genocide prevention. After all, it has been this cooperation what has often led to success in previous times, such as was the case of the Bosnian War, where NATO intervened and the UN had peacekeeping troops on the ground.

As the world continues to develop plans of action that will lead to the lessening of casualties in cases of genocide, it must continue to try to use both its regional and global powers in search for safety and security. Rapid Deployment Troops should be used by regional organizations by deploying them as needed in case of genocide, while the United Nation works on creating an overarching plan to protect the victimized populations. This is not a far-fetched idea, as most regional organizations already have these rapid deployment forces established. In addition, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), needs to recognize that these efforts are not about keeping the peace, as peace is nonexistent in cases of genocide. Rather, these efforts are about protecting and securing the lives of as many people as possible, and engaging in diplomatic efforts that may lead to the creation of peace.

This cooperation must also include the non-governmental organizations on the ground, as they not only have pre-established networks *in situ*, but have also earned the trust of the populations they work with. This was highly successful in the case of the Armenian genocide, as the missions who had been established for decades in the communities served as pillars of safety for the targeted Armenians, whose trust they had earned from years of advocating on their behalf.

This premise of global, regional, and local cooperation is addressed by organizations such as The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, which engages

in advocacy with non-governmental organizations and national governments, while it seeks to make the premise of R2P a part of national policy. The Centre writes reports regarding policy and action initiatives, which can be implemented by the national governments who have committed to be part of the Responsibility to Protect. As such, there is already an existing network that can expand to include the premise of safe havens as a pillar of genocide prevention.

Recommendations for Action

Preemptive Plans

The first step to developing a safety-first approach must be to ensure that these spaces are created in a timely fashion. As shown by history, the approval or disapproval of the warring parties is often irrelevant to the success of the safe havens, so that waiting for the warring parties to agree on their creation is not a necessity, and in fact has not been a determining factor in the creation of safe havens in genocidal states. This was proven in Bosnia, where the agreement to the creation of a safe haven in Srebrenica, did not translate into any true safety for the city, not only because the UN failed at securing the areas correctly, but also because the warring parties continued to engage in violence. In Rwanda, the safe havens were created because of France's initiative – albeit a biased initiative that sought to help its long-time ally – without any agreement from the Hutu Power government or the RPF forces, the latter of which opposed French intervention.

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) binds its signatories to act immediately after recognizing that genocide is occurring through Article I, which states that “The Contracting Parties

confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish”; Article VI, which states that, “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”; and Article VIII, which states that,

“Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.”

However, this responsibility has been challenged time and time again, as the international community has refused to intervene in blatant cases of genocidal violence. This is, of course, directly contingent on the willingness of the Security Council (SC) to intervene. Any contracting party outside of the SC may call upon the UN to take action, but if the SC refuses to create the resolutions that would approve the creation of safe havens, there is not much that the contracting party can do at the level of the United Nations, although there may be some hope at the level of regional organizations. One of the main problems with intervention without approval, however, is the fact that intervention immediately translates to a violation of sovereignty.

The first recommendation of this study is the creation of preemptive plans for safe havens, which can be planned within the context of escalating signs of violence, and executed rather quickly once all needs are determined. The earlier reports can be assembled; the faster action can be taken at the outset of violence. These reports must be

detailed in scope, suggesting the possible number of troops needed for immediate intervention, the best geographical locations for safe havens to be established, and the budgetary constraints that may be faced by the intervening parties.

This is important because past efforts at safe havens have often been developed too late into the violence. Part of the problem is rooted in the bureaucratic complications tied to the efforts of a global organization that depends and indeed only survives through the contributions of its member states. It is in this environment that even rapid deployment forces become too complex to execute correctly. According to Langile (2014), “rapid deployment depends on five levels of authority and effort: political, financial, strategic, operational, and tactical. Problems that arise at one level may have implications for all” (p. 2). As such, the development of these plans must consider this complexity.

The establishment of preventive safe havens has not been attempted before, even when preemptive actions have been taken by the international community in the form of preemptive wars, such as the Iraq War. If the international community can mobilize to preemptively attack a country, then it must surely be able to do so to save innocent civilians from the scourges of war. Granted, it is impossible to create functioning preemptive havens in every country that may be escalating towards genocide, but once the escalation of violence is confirmed it should not take too long to set up these safe havens. Establishing a preemptive plan, however, is much more feasible and more likely to be effective in the context of the complexities of conflict areas.

Safe haven plans should be established so as to include factors such as the deployment of the rapid deployment forces and the number of troops needed for them, the exact location where the safe havens would be most efficient, the resources necessary to deal with each particular case, and an expected mandate from the governing bodies. General Dellaire's *Shake Hands with the Devil*, offers a vivid picture of what the process for protection of civilians entails, and demonstrates how painfully slow and utterly frustrating it can be to wait for all the details before anything is ever done in times of dire need. Creating preemptive plans that highlight the resources needed from both regional and global organizations, would mean that all the pieces are set in place to be executed as quickly as possible when needed.

The creation of these plans would have to be part of the job description of the organizations that oversee these issues, such as the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. This office has the necessary resources to reach out and connect with the governing bodies of the regional organizations required for the establishment of safe havens when the violence erupts. A framework for the establishment of safe havens must be constructed for the countries that top the list in the warning systems. If violence does not erupt, it would not be a waste of resources because it could serve as a model for future prevention. However, if violence did erupt, not having the frameworks that deal specifically with those cases, could prove fatal to large segments of the population. As such, preemptive plans for the establishment of safe havens could make a significant difference in the rapid deployment of the necessary resources to places of escalated conflict.

The creation of preemptive plans is not a farfetched premise, as other bodies within the United Nations already create these types of documents. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for example, provides annual Global Appeals, in which it presents the needs of the global refugee population in terms of budgets needed and highlights the challenges that could be faced in the refugee crisis permeating the world along with possible solutions. The office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide already works with regional and civil organizations to determine possible threats to the safety and security of victimized populations. The office works “to identify risks of atrocity crimes, alert partners within and outside the United Nations to situations where there is a risk of these crimes, recommend preemptive action and mobilize the United Nations system, Member States, regional and sub-regional arrangements and civil society to prevent or halt these crimes” (Advising and Mobilizing, n.d., par. 1). The creation of preemptive plans for safe havens, then, needs to be one of the preemptive actions reported by the office. As such, they must be created by delineating the possible challenges and needs that could be faced in case of escalating violence in the countries at highest risk of genocide.

This also means that the threat for genocide must be identified early and monitored often. Luckily, there are already systems in place for this, as Stanton’s Ten Stages of Genocide provide a framework of analysis for the ongoing violence in many parts of the world. In fact, Stanton (n.d.) makes clear that rapid deployment forces should be assembled by the time the conflicts reach stages eight and nine, in the ten-stage ladder. Stages eight and nine include Persecution and Extermination, during which conflicts

escalate to systemic violence. However, deployment of forces and the establishment of safe havens must occur prior to stages eight and nine because waiting until persecution and extermination begin defeats the purpose of prevention. Ideally, these forces should be deployed somewhere between stages seven (Preparation) and eight (Persecution).

In addition, the United Nations released a “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes” in 2014, which delineates the main warning signs to identify when attempting to prevent atrocity crimes and genocide. This framework is composed of two levels: common risk factors, and specific risk factors. Common risk factors are those that are present in all atrocity crimes, while specific risk factors are those that are more prevalent in specific crimes, such as genocide. According to the framework, there are eight common risk factors that will be found in all atrocity crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These common factors include issues such as ongoing situations of armed conflict, weakened state structures, absence of mitigating factors, among others. The crime of genocide, besides encompassing all eight common factors, also includes intergroup tensions and patterns of discrimination, and signs of an intent to destroy a specific group in whole or in part (United Nations, 2014). The framework is a helpful resource in identifying countries in which conflict escalation may lead to genocidal violence, and in fact was created specifically to aid in the prevention of genocide and its early identification in conflict zones. While a move forward in the path towards prevention, the framework does not go far enough in inciting collective action, as it still places the responsibility to stop atrocity crimes squarely on the shoulders of the

states in which they are happening, neglecting to recognize that these issues are often incited by the governing bodies of that state.

The use of these tools to analyze ongoing conflicts could prove essential in the timely deployment of troops that have been previously prepared and trained for the creation of safe areas in escalating conflicts. The United Nations (2014), through its Framework of Analysis, states that,

“as atrocity crimes are processes, it is possible to identify warning signs or indicators that they might occur. This is particularly true in the case of genocide and crimes against humanity. If we **understand the root causes and precursors** of these crimes, and can **identify risk factors** that can lead to or enable their commission, it follows that we can also **identify measures that can be taken by States and the international community** to prevent these crimes” (Emphasis in original) (p. 4).

As such, the creation of preemptive reports that would assess the conditions in states at risk of violence and create plans that would allow for rapid intervention, may be essential in the move towards true prevention. Creating plans of action that are tailored specifically to the violence in any one state will allow the international community to act quickly in the face of escalation.

Rapid Deployment Forces

Using rapid deployment forces from regional organizations for the creation of safe havens could help in the maximum protection of the population. This is because the United Nations cannot deploy military personnel unless approved by a Security Council

Resolution (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). As such, the UN “lacks rapid deployment forces or any similar capacity for swift action” (Hamburg, 2015, p. 216). Regional organizations, on the other hand, have more flexibility in what pertains their involvement in regional conflicts and most of them have a standing force ready to be deployed. For example, NATO has the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is highly trained and whose purpose is to “provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis-response operations” (NATO Response Force, 2017, par. 7). NATO’s intervention led to a successful establishment of safe zones in Iraq, as well as to the end of the Bosnian War in 1995. As such, it has proven that regional powers, when working alongside the United Nations, can be of great importance in stabilization of conflict zones.

In this globalized world, NATO is not the only regional organization with the capabilities for action. In 2015, the Arab League agreed to create its own joint military force, which reportedly would be “composed of 40,000 elite troops, supported by war planes, naval vessels and light armour” (“Arab League”, 2015, par. 14). In 2008, a coalition of South American countries created the South American Defense Council, with one of its main objectives being to guarantee that South America would be a zone of peace in the world (UNASUR, n.d.). In addition, the African Union has the African Standby Force, which includes military, police and civilian forces that are ready to be deployed, including for preventing the escalation of a dispute in the region (“The African Standby Force,” 2015). As such, these regional organizations are in almost every

continent, which makes them capable to intervene in escalating conflicts early during the violence almost everywhere in the world.

Rapid deployment forces are called such because they are ready to deploy, which means that they are assembled, equipped and trained well in advanced. These forces could be deployed into identified cases of escalating violence, while the details of the broader peacekeeping operations are hammered out in the General Assembly. Victims of genocide do not have the luxury to wait the months it takes to fully assemble a peacekeeping operation, yet they would be benefitted by an immediate deployment of troops that are well-prepared and well-armed to protect specific areas. According to Delaire, the arrival of 5,000 troops in Rwanda would have meant the end of the violence. This is important to note because most rapid deployment forces are larger than this. NATO, for example, boasts a response force of 40,000 troops that are equipped for air, land or sea (Fact Sheet, 2016). These troops should be deployed with mandates that allow the troops to call for air support and at the same time allow them defend the safe areas when directly targeted by the perpetrators. These actions are not far-fetched, as was shown by the extended mandate provided to UNPROFOR troops late in the conflict.

Regional organizations with deployment forces ready to engage in the conflicts within their immediate geographical areas are the best option for stability and the de-escalation of conflict. As mentioned above, many of these organizations already count with these types of forces. Although these forces would not be self-standing as they exist within the context of international military alliances, the deployment of them by regional powers could occur faster than the creation of an entire UN mission.

These forces, then, could be sent into conflicts that have been recognized as possible genocides within the jurisdiction of the respective regional military alliances, with a mandate to establish safe havens for the immediate protection of the victimized population. Choosing the areas in which to develop safe havens would require an understanding of the cultural norms of the affected population, as well as areas within the conflict zone that are more prone to having higher numbers of targeted peoples. The Bosnian safe cities were established in pockets of Bosnian Muslim resistance, and in cities that had a vast percentage of Bosnian Muslims as part of the population, which proved a successful technique in saving thousands of Bosnian Muslims. This means that rapid deployment troops have to be deployed quickly to some of the areas that may encounter the most violence. It is important to realize that places most populated by targeted groups would be singled out for destruction and would require a larger number of perpetrating forces to ensure the violence, thus increasing the risks of military engagement needed from the deployed troops.

The risk faced by the international troops is an important factor to analyze, as it has been the strategic attack on UN troops what has led entire missions to retreat, as was the case in Rwanda and Somalia. Peacekeeping mandates that relegate the troops to observer roles increase the risks to the troops themselves, as they are ill-prepared to retaliate even in cases of self-defense. As such, these forces must be created with a mandate for the protection of civilians from physical violence, also known as POC. This mandate was first created for the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone in 1999, by stating that the peacekeeping operation needed to take any necessary actions to “afford

protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (UNAMSIL, 2005, par. 5). Under the POC, both rapid deployment forces and peacekeeping troops would have the needed mandate to ensure protection rather than just observe the violence.

It also is essential that the troops on the ground have the necessary authority to make decisions *in situ*, rather than having to wait for the approval of the UN administrative body. This might be a slippery slope in which individual judgement would come into play when deciding when and how to retaliate. However, it has been individual judgement what has saved lives in cases of genocide, as proved by Generals Dellaire and Morillon. Prepared and well-equipped commanders could prove to be the difference between life and death for thousands of people in genocidal conflicts.

Lastly, if the establishment of safe areas is not a possibility, then these rapid deployment troops could be used to establish safe passage for victims to move from affected areas into safe havens established outside of the conflict zones. As the Armenian case shows, secured spaces outside of the perimeter of conflict can be highly effective in protecting targeted populations. However, the establishment of these passages is highly complex, as it usually necessitates cooperation from all warring parties.

Demilitarization

As proven by the Rwandan example, segregating combatants from noncombatants in geographical areas that are being used by thousands of people is a daunting task, and could potentially lead to decisions that leave victims in need outside of the perimeter of safety. While it is sometimes possible to screen refugees for weapons while they are crossing the borders into the host countries, those inside the conflict zone would not be

crossing through any specific checkpoint that would allow for the screening process to occur. In addition, stopping the influx of people into the safe areas to screen them would prove counterproductive to the creation of an immediate safe space to which to run to in cases of extreme violence.

However, the demilitarization of these areas should be an issue of utmost importance, so that even when combatants are mistakenly allowed into the safe areas, they do not possess the abilities to oppress those inside or commit further acts of violence. In Rwanda, the refusal to demilitarize the humanitarian zones led to the continuation of violence in spaces that should have been safe. Rapid Deployment Troops sent into these conflicts should be provided a mandate through which they can demilitarize the areas. In Bosnia, a vague mandate of demilitarization was provided, but was in fact confusing, as it called for demilitarization of some of the safe areas but allowed the ARBiH forces to remain active within the enclaves. The efficient demilitarization of these areas must be a primary objective of the rapid deployment forces, a goal that can only be achieved through the issuance of very specific mandates. Efforts to demilitarize safe areas in both Rwanda and Bosnia failed, and had dire consequences in both cases.

It must be noted, however, that successful demilitarization must be partnered with an ability to act on behalf of the affected populations – to follow the POC mandate. Otherwise, the populations will be left too vulnerable to destroy. The demilitarization of the ARBiH forces in the Bosnian Muslim enclaves would have provided the Serbs with easier targets for attack. Although the failed demilitarization of the safe areas also meant

they were targeted due to their lack of neutrality, the lack of a militarized rebellion would have meant that many of these spaces would have fallen to the Serbs. As such, the process of demilitarization must be intricately connected to the protection of the targeted population and the commitment of the international community to ensure the survival of human rights in the context of violence.

It could be argued that creating the safe areas proves counterproductive to resolving the underlying issues of the conflict between the warring parties, as they will be less likely to rush to the negotiation table if the international community has imposed itself on the conflict. However, it must be stressed that any sign of safety and stability provided would greatly benefit the non-combatants. Genocidal violence breaks all international law, and as such cannot be expected to develop within any rules of engagement because it seeks the complete extermination of the targeted group. This has been seen repeatedly by the destruction of non-military establishments and the mass murder of innocent civilians. A look at the history of genocide is enough to understand the barbarity of the crime and the crime's complete disregard of international law.

Providing Long-Term Structures

Part of developing a safety-first approach to international safe havens, is to think of the structural integrity of the available shelters in these areas. As was seen in Bosnia, these spaces are sometimes established for long periods of time, with the safe areas in Bosnia established for several years. When established, these safe havens cordon off entire geographic areas, including the buildings that fall within their perimeter. As such, these buildings are often used by the victimized populations to seek safety. However,

those who cannot find safety within the buildings, must resort to tents or environmental exposure.

This is an important factor that needs to be addressed when creating new models of safety, as refugees without shelter are the most vulnerable to attacks from the perpetrating forces. Asking the rapid deployment troops to bring along with them sturdier structures for shelter would be to overflow the responsibilities of these troops, and to deviate their focus from demilitarization. As such, it must be the supporting troops deployed in the aftermath that bring sustainable shelter to those in need if it is deemed necessary for these spaces to remain functional for long periods of time.

While using available structures would be ideal, it is not always possible. Sustainable structures must be able to at least withstand enemy fire, which is something a tent cannot do. Recent advances in technology have made sturdier and safer refugee shelters more available, with models such as the Rapid Deployment Modules by Visible Good, and the U-Dome by World Shelters (Mallonee, 2014) becoming more widely available. Even housing design giants like Ikea, have begun to develop new solutions for refugee camps (Malek, 2015) and in fact, Ikea's new refugee shelter design was named the Design of the Year in 2016 (Alleyne, 2016). Some of these producers are seeking to establish military versions of their shelters, which could lead to the creation of structures that would be safe not only in remote refugee camps, but also in conflict zones. Yet the establishment of these structures will still fail if the mandates of the troops are not cohesive enough to secure protection.

Developing an approach based on the idea that safety, not humanitarian aid, must come first when structuring these havens, is imperative for the successful protection of the population. This is not to say that humanitarian aid is not just as important, but to highlight that humanitarian aid cannot be safely provided until safe perimeters and infrastructures have been secured. This has been repeatedly established in cases of mass violence. For example, the lack of secured areas in Syria have translated to a severe lack of humanitarian aid reaching some of the most affected spaces, such as the city of Aleppo. As such, although an integral part of the survival of the targeted population, humanitarian aid cannot be provided without firstly securing the areas that will be available for protection.

Challenging Cultural Meanings

The creation of safe havens that focus on safety is only one step forward in prevention, as more is needed to deal with the potential danger of cultural safe havens in conflict. The meaning of the structures itself must be challenged by educational policies that inform the populations of the dangers of congregating *en masse* in times of violence. This is not to say that congregation should be discouraged, but simply to inform the masses so that educated decisions can be made by them in times of need. This can be done in a variety of way, including through Heindenrich's model of victim-targeted propaganda.

Heindenrich speaks of possible psychological operations in the conflict zones, through which victim-targeted propaganda could provide a warning to the victimized population about impending or ongoing violence against them. Heindenrich (2001) states

that, “perhaps a *psyop* campaign should therefore attempt to influence a genocide’s intended victims. By warning them a genocide against them is either impending or ongoing, they could encouraged [sic] to seek out their own native rescuers” (p. 121). He furthers his argument by stating that, “the campaign should be based on at least some understanding of the target audience’s culture, the genocidal regime, and the genocide itself” (p. 117). This warning system could be used to let the targeted population know where safe havens would be established, as well as the risks involved in hiding within cultural safe havens in times of genocidal violence.

Educating the population could be said to be a double-edged sword, since, just as the perpetrators are aware of the cultural nuances that would drive the masses into cultural spaces, they may have access to the victim-targeted propaganda and know that they will not be using these spaces for congregation, and subsequently act accordingly. Heindenrich states that the information provided in these campaigns must be “specific enough to help native rescuers and yet not specific enough to help the killers” (p. 122). By native rescuers, he refers to those inside the conflict zone that would act as rescuers for the victimized populations. However, these campaigns should aim at warning the victims themselves, because if victims are educated ahead of time, or even early in the conflict, then they can flee to the international safe havens that will be hopefully created immediately following the escalation of violence.

Even if victims are unable to get to the international safe havens, they can seek protection in other spaces that are not usually targeted for destruction. In the end, it is about informing the populations about the possible dangers innately bound to these

spaces, not to deter them from going there if there are no other options, but to help them make the most educated decisions regarding their safety. In cases of genocidal violence, safety cannot be found anywhere, regardless of the space in question. Yet to be able to truly assess the situation and make decisions regarding safety based on the true value of these spaces as places for shelter, rather than simply on their preconceived and culturally-infused meanings, may prove to be the difference between life and death for many.

It must be noted that in most conflict zones there is already an existing network of organizations that actively work for the protection of the marginalized and targeted populations. As such, reaching out to these organizations to spread the message of these victim-targeted campaigns is essential in safeguarding success. This is not an impossible task, as shown by the incredible work done by the Near East Relief in Turkey, yet it will take planning to identify the organizations that would be willing to cooperate with these efforts. This, then, must also be assessed when creating plans for action, as different organizations will be available in different countries.

Keeping Refugee Status Available

One of the dangers to the victimized populations in establishing safe havens is that their right to seek asylum is often revoked – as it occurred in Rwanda – because the institution of safe havens is often seen as sufficient for their protection. This idea was reflected recently by U.S. President, Donald J. Trump, who, while speaking to a rally in Melbourne, Florida, announced his intentions to work on the creation of safe havens in Syria, so that the Syrians could “stay there and live safely in their cities” (Ebbs, 2017, par. 5). This alludes to the idea that refugees within the safe areas will be made to stay

there, rather than be allowed to escape to other countries. This is not a new concept, as refugees from Rwanda were restricted in their asylum-seeking process once the humanitarian zones were established. However, the creation of safe areas does not, and must not, negate the right of refugees to seek asylum in other spaces. The Bosnian experience proves that regardless of the institution of safe havens, victimized populations may still not feel safe enough to stay within the geographical borders of the conflict zones. As such, it should not be a condition for the creation of safe havens in genocidal conflicts that refugees must stay within the confines of these areas without any options for resettlement.

Future research

As no research can cover every single aspect of a subject, there will always be more to add to this research in the future. In this case, future research may include the use of cultural safe havens in the context of non-genocidal conflict, as well as the targeting of these spaces for terrorist attacks. In addition, transforming the idea of preemptive plans of action to the institution of preemptive safe havens in cases of escalating conflict will be an integral part of the evolution of safety. If safe havens can be established preemptively, then lives could be saved in time. The complexities of these issues, of course, need their own research.

Furthermore, the case of Kosovo should be looked into as a prime example of the possibilities of regional intervention and the importance of regional organizations in helping protect victimized populations. In Kosovo's case, it was a regional organization (NATO) that took the lead in establishing peace and security. After a 78-day campaign of

bombing against the Serbian forces, NATO sent in its Kosovo force, known as KFOR, on June, 1999, backed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. This resolution was proof of global and regional cooperation, and it determined that member states and international organizations could deploy a military presence to the area. In addition, these forces were in charge of deterring hostilities, demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army, and establishing a secure environment for refugees and displaced persons to begin moving again within the conflict zone, among other responsibilities (UNSCR 1244, 1999, p. 3). Since then, NATO has been a stabilizing force in the region and has protected the persecuted populations. NATO's role has included tasks such as assisting "with the return and relocation of displaced persons and refugees; reconstruction and de-mining; medical assistance; security and public order" and more ("NATO's role" 2017, par. 11). In addition, NATO has been supervising the creation of a Kosovo Security Force, aiding in the training of troops and working on capacity-building for Kosovo's forces. In the process, NATO has kept safe thousands of people who were persecuted in 1999. As such, this case will be important to analyze in the future conversations regarding safe havens, because although not an international safe haven as defined by international law (i.e. no specific areas within the conflict zone were delineated for the protection of the population), the intervention by NATO provided an opportunity to end the violence and to protect the persecuted populations.

The literature regarding safe havens is scathing, with most available content portraying only the negative aspects of these spaces. Although rightfully critiquing the flaws of this method of intervention, the literature seems to neglect that there is no

absolute way at providing safety in cases of mass violence, and that the attempts at doing so, even when flawed, have in fact proven essential to the survival of many. While it is true that the international community must learn from its past and seek to better its methods, it cannot be allowed to completely dismiss these tools for protection because sometimes these are the only options available for those in need. In a world in which persecution has become commonplace, the protection of victimized population must be imperative to all the members of the international community. As such, future research will need to continue identifying the best methods for the establishment of safe havens, and the flaws that need to be improved for future attempts at protection.

Conclusions - A genocide prevention puzzle

The study and advancement of safe havens in cases of genocide is only one piece in the puzzle of genocide prevention. This puzzle is vast and complex, and is made up of many parts that address individual issues in the conflicts, such as early detection models, peacekeeping operations, education and social development, and more. The analysis of safe havens and the endeavors undertaken to better them are only one part in the path to prevention. Other parts of this puzzle must also involve the extension of educational efforts, the amending of international laws, and the lessening of the bureaucratic hurdles that prevent decisions to be made as quickly as the targeted populations need.

As the scholarship continues to grow, this puzzle will undoubtedly continue to become more complex. The analysis of the roles of safe havens, both at the cultural and international levels, and the understanding of the relationship between them, are only one step forward in our understanding of why these places are important and why, despite

their setbacks in history, they must continue to be established when needed. As seen in these case studies, the use of cultural safe havens is a complex subject tied to both history and culture. However, these spaces tend to be more dangerous in places in which no international intervention is instituted, or in which international intervention comes too late. In today's world, places such as Syria and Myanmar are in dire need of these establishments, yet the fears of recurring failure or of the repetition of the tragedy witnessed in Srebreniça, have kept the international community from seriously considering the use of these techniques for the protection of the non-combatants. Even today, the call for safe havens in Syria has fallen on deaf ears, as the international community has refused to acknowledge the call made by several international actors.

Genocidal violence does not follow any rules of engagement. As such, it cannot be treated as any other conflict. A historical look at genocidal campaigns allows us to understand that genocide does not abide by any international or humanitarian rules, with perpetrators violating spaces that are often central to communal life or which have been established as protected by the international community. This means that effective international safe havens are of utmost importance, and their continuation will be the difference between life and death for thousands of people during mass violence. This can also be seen in current conflicts, as the continued bombardment of hospitals and schools in Syria and Yemen prove that these spaces are still strategically targeted for destruction. The refusal to develop methods of intervention that provide successful safe spaces in cases of mass violence has proven fatal to hundreds of people in ongoing conflicts.

The international community must not let the mistakes of the past tamper with the possibilities of the future, but rather learn from them and move forward. Creating preemptive plans of action will allow for prevention in conflicts at high-risk of escalation, and plan for alternate actions if needed. Future establishment of preventive safe havens would be ideal, yet a more expansive study of their possibility will be needed in future studies. The Responsibility to Protects calls, and in fact compels, everyone to continue the efforts to better the methods of protection that are made available to the victimized populations. Safe havens that can provide true safety and at the same time replace the use of cultural spaces that are not truly safe, are and will continue to be essential in extending the international community's commitment to protect those in need of protection.

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